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THE LITTLE WORLD OF THE
DESK OFFICER

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THE LITTLE WORLD OF A LIEUTENANT

by

LCDR. Henry Setzger Cene, Jr., USN
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Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

INTRODUCTION

The country desk officer labors in a field of endeavour which, paradoxically, attracts and repels Americans who are concerned for the welfare of their country. He is an integral part of that Department of State bureaucracy which is damned by conservatives for going too far and by liberals for not going far enough. Detractors perceive Department personnel as pansies in striped trousers rushing from one formal tea to another. Businessmen accuse them of being indifferent to the needs of U. S. business abroad. Headline-seeking Congressmen accuse them alternately of wasting the substance of the U. S. taxpayers in grandiose "give-away" programs or of being communists promoting Soviet interests at the expense of those of the United States. As in all large organizations, a few "rotten apples" have been discovered in the barrel, seemingly lending credence to these views. That the "rotten apples" have met with little success in infecting others or damaging policy is indicative of the high caliber of the Foreign Service and Department of State personnel.

In the following pages, it is proposed to investigate "the little world of the desk officer" and how it impinges on national security policy. The connection, at first glance, may appear tenuous; but, in fact, every action of the country desk officer in the conduct of his day-to-day affairs is taken consciously within parameters circumscribed by the National Security Council.

This paper proposes to explore where and how desk officers originated. Where and how are they recruited? What training has the desk officer

received, and what training may he expect? What sort of career pattern will he follow? What does the country desk officer do now? How does he do it? Finally, what proposals were made to change his job, and how were they implemented?

The assistance derived from innumerable interviews with personnel of the Foreign Service is gratefully acknowledged. These dedicated personnel have borne my questions patiently.

I wish also to acknowledge the continuing help of my wife, Lorene Purcell Cone. She has managed to correct my grammatical errors, suggest changes, provide encouragement, type the required copies, and maintain my comfortable surroundings simultaneously. Greater love hath no woman . . .

Editor: Will be glad to receive your letter and answer it as soon as possible. The question of the "J. A. M. A." is a very important one and we are sure that you will be interested in the results of our investigation.

Very truly yours,
J. A. M. A.

The following is a list of the names of the members of the American Medical Association who have been elected to the office of President for the year 1929. The names are listed in alphabetical order.

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CHAPTER I

THE NEXUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY

The National Security Council and Foreign Policy

The National Security Council

The National Security Council, as it functions under the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, serves as a coordinating forum. In its deliberations, this committee integrates the competing and complementary aspects of national security, foreign policy, and domestic policy. Robert Elder has aptly termed the Council "the highest committee in the executive branch of the federal government for the resolution of national security and foreign policy questions."¹

¹Robert Ellsworth Elder, The Policy Machine (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 13.

A few men of vision sought the means of correlating foreign policy with military and economic capabilities even before World War II. That global conflict illuminated the economic and political effects of military operations and increased the pressure for such coordination. Bismarck noted in his memoirs, some seventy years past, that the conduct of war involved more than purely military campaigns to defeat the armed forces of the enemy. The first tentative U. S. steps in this direction were taken in 1944 with the creation, by agreement among the Secretaries, of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. This body was reorganized in the early postwar period as the State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee in an attempt to resolve the requirement for an

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND ITS POLICY

The National Security Council and Its Policy

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¹Robert E. Rusk, The Policy Making Process, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1950, p. 13.

A few men of vision sought the means of creating foreign policy with military and economic capabilities even before World War II. That global conflict illustrated the economic and political effects of military activities and increased the demands for such coordination. Winston noted in his memoirs, some twenty years later, that the concept of war involved more than purely military capabilities to defeat the enemy forces of the enemy. The first tentative U. S. steps in this direction were taken in 1944 with the creation, by executive order, the Committee of the State-Military-Naval Coordination Committee. This body was reorganized in the early postwar period as the State, Army, Navy, and Coast Guard Coordinating Committee in an attempt to resolve the requirements for an

executive mechanism which would enable the executive to act rapidly in response to security problems cutting across nearly all areas of government responsibility.

The Eberstadt Report of 1945 suggested the creation of the National Security Council, in light of British experience in high-level policy coordination with their Imperial Defense Council, a body successful in national security operations since 1904. The recommendations contained in this report were incorporated in President Truman's legislative proposals to the Congress, which enacted the statutes creating the National Security Council "to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security."²

²"Excerpts from National Security Act of 1947, as amended," United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1.

National Security Policy and Foreign Policy

The United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful single nation in the world. For this reason, influence on American policy is the primary aim of every other foreign ministry in the world. Our action or inaction in the diplomatic arena influences the course of events everywhere. An action taken to resolve an important matter in one place ignites a chain reaction of effect on every other problem being processed. Thus our national security is dependent upon effective foreign policies, and the National Security Council is the device to insure their compatibility with military capabilities and domestic resources.

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The Secretary of State and National Security Policy

Under the circumstances described above, the primacy of the Secretary of State in national security affairs is a well-recognized conclusion. The nature of his duties gives him a perspective more closely approximating the President's than any other officer in the executive branch. He is the principal advisor on economic and military aid, cultural and information programs, arms control and disarmament, diplomacy, and the coordination of all of these facets of foreign policy. The Secretary of State is the only Cabinet Officer primarily charged with looking at our nation as a whole in its relations with the rest of the world, and his panoramic view is essential to national security planning and policy. As our ranking diplomat, he stands at the intersection of foreign affairs: advocate of American policies to other governments and official channel of suggestions and protests about American policies from other governments. As harbinger of bad news and transmitter of the "foreign point of view" to the President, the Congress, and the U. S. agencies, he probably often feels "as welcome as a bastard at a family reunion." Senator Jackson has stated that the Secretary of State should advise the President "on the full range of national security problems. In other words, he is sort of the orchestra leader."³

³United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, State, Defense, and the National Security Council, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 87th Congress, 1st Session, August 1, 7, 17, and 24, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), part IX.

If your mind runs riot in the wake of such metaphor as mine does, your mind's eye will visualize Secretary Rusk with a baton, Secretary McNamara playing the drums, the Joint Chiefs sounding the brasses, the

Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as first violin, assisted in strings by the Treasury Department, while Director McCone and assisting C. I. A. types surreptitiously make cryptic corrections to the music. It will be remembered that a piano player organized this orchestra, which now, though some term it McNamara's Band, Dean Rusk is leading.

Foreign Policy in the National Security Council

Senator Jackson has also indicated that the main work of the National Security Council has thus far centered largely around the consideration of foreign policy questions rather than national security questions in their full contemporary sense. A major portion of the Council's deliberations has focused on the production and study of "country papers" -- what our national policy should be toward a particular foreign nation.

The Department of State in National Security Policy

Limitations of the Secretary of State

Even in this field, the role of the Secretary of State has its limits. He cannot personally generate, correlate, coordinate, and insure the feasibility of all policies and programs bearing on the worldwide position of the nation. He must have adequate, knowledgeable support.

The Secretary of State can neither abandon his Department in order to spend time in the White House, nor can he engross himself in running his Department. He is more than just another White House assistant -- the head of a Department with an ancient and honorable history. Yet he cannot permit others to advise the President on all critical issues exclusively. The administration of his Department is thus at the heart

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Foreign Policy in the National Security Council

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The Department of State in National Security Policy

Identification of the National Interest

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of his dilemma. From less than 6,200 sundry personnel on the eve of World War II, the Department of State has over 24,000 on its rolls today, of which 17,000 are abroad.

The Secretary and His Department

The Secretary sits in a vast, new, polished steel and concrete building amidst many advisors:

. . . 2 Under Secretaries and 2 Deputy Under Secretaries, 13 Assistant Secretaries in charge of 13 bureaus, over 30 Deputy Assistant Secretaries, more than 60 area and other Office Directors, and over 90 Country Desk Officers, together with assorted advisors and special assistants, counselors and inspector generals, and emissaries from the agencies that lie only partly within the Secretary's jurisdiction.⁴

⁴United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State, Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 5.

These personnel are organized to permit analysis of problems from both geographical and functional points of view. Their world is divided into five regions (Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa, and Far East), each under a separate bureau where policy making is centered.

The bureaus maintain a continuing dialogue with some 274 foreign posts -- embassies, legations, special missions, and consular offices. The daily volume of message traffic comprises some 1,500 incoming and 1,500 outgoing cables amounting to more than 400,000 words.

The Country Desk Officer

At the bottom of the heap, some seven or eight levels down, is the country desk officer. Between him and the Secretary are:

The Under Secretary
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

of the district. From last year 5,000 small, permanent on the one hand
and 10,000 on the other, the proportion of these has been 40,000 on the one
side, of which 17,000 are small.

The Secretary and his assistants

The Secretary sits in a room, now, behind a desk, and controls
the whole of the work.

... 2. Under Secretary and a Deputy Under Secretary, 10
Assistant Secretaries in charge of 12 divisions, 10
General Secretaries, 10,000 on the one side and 10,000
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with various divisions and special divisions, 10,000
and 10,000 on the one side, and 10,000 on the other, 10,000
that the only party which the Secretary's jurisdiction.

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
The Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Senate (Washington,
Security Printing and Engraving, 1944, p. 2).

These divisions are organized to handle and to handle the work
geographical and functional points of view. They work in divided into
five regions (Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific),
each with a separate bureau where policy making is centered.

The bureau retains a continuing dialogue with the foreign
bureaus -- consulates, legations, special missions, and consular offices.
The daily volume of messages is 1,000 incoming and
1,000 outgoing cables amounting to more than 400,000 words.

The Country Desk Officers

At the bottom of the hierarchy, some seven or eight levels down, is the
country desk officer. Between him and the Secretary are

The Under Secretary
Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Assistant Secretary
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Office Director
Deputy Office Director.

Subject to supervision and review from above, the country desk officer concerns himself with policy toward a single nation.

Summary

The previous pages have outlined the intimate connection between national security policy and foreign policy -- a connection now so inseparable that definitive lines between the two cannot be drawn. The responsibility of the Secretary of State and his Department in national security policy has been described. Herein was noted the relationship of the country desk officer to the whole. The pages following will present the development of his position, what he does, how he does it, and where he does it.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COUNTRY DESK OFFICER

The "low man on the decision-making totem pole," the desk officer, owes his existence to the hierarchical development of the Department of State as it expanded to meet the needs of a nation expanding in international affairs. From a Department of Foreign Affairs established in 1781 with a secretary and two clerks, the Department of State today has a staff of about six thousand. Its growth has been sporadic, and until recent times, seldom with concerted plan. Like Topsy, "it just grewed."

Establishment of Geographical Divisions

The position of the desk officer became nebulous in the establishment of the first geographical division. In 1907, Huntington Wilson, then the Third Secretary of State, worked out an elaborate plan of reorganization which proposed the formation of four geographical divisions -- Latin American, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and Western European Affairs -- each to be administered by an expert, brought in from diplomatic or consular service in those fields, who would thus provide the expertise for existing conditions and problems. Though begun under the secretaryship of Elihu Root, who had brought order to the haphazard documentary files, this reorganization scheme received little encouragement from him. Some six months after hearing the proposal, Secretary Root grudgingly suggested that Wilson take over the Far Eastern affairs as an experiment.

The Division of Latin American Affairs was established by a departmental order of November, 1909. A departmental order of December 13, 1909,

THE HISTORY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The first step in the organization of the District of Columbia was the establishment of the Department of the Interior in 1849. This was done by an act of Congress which provided that the District of Columbia should be under the direct control of the President, and that the Department of the Interior should be responsible for the management of the District. The first step in the organization of the District was the establishment of the Department of the Interior in 1849. This was done by an act of Congress which provided that the District of Columbia should be under the direct control of the President, and that the Department of the Interior should be responsible for the management of the District.

ESTABLISHMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

The position of the Department of the Interior in the early years of its existence was one of great importance. It was the only department which was responsible for the management of the District of Columbia. The first step in the organization of the District was the establishment of the Department of the Interior in 1849. This was done by an act of Congress which provided that the District of Columbia should be under the direct control of the President, and that the Department of the Interior should be responsible for the management of the District. The first step in the organization of the District was the establishment of the Department of the Interior in 1849. This was done by an act of Congress which provided that the District of Columbia should be under the direct control of the President, and that the Department of the Interior should be responsible for the management of the District.

The position of the Department of the Interior in the early years of its existence was one of great importance. It was the only department which was responsible for the management of the District of Columbia.

small order of members, 1849. A detailed report of the progress of the work of the Department of the Interior in the year 1849.

established the Division of Western European Affairs and the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

Establishment of Country Divisions

The First Country Desk Officer

By 1915, the Latin American Division (11 persons) was so overburdened with work pertaining to Mexico, as a result of the Mexican Revolution and the problems resulting from it, that a departmental order was issued, dated July 28, 1915, establishing a Division of Mexican Affairs. Leon J. Canova, Assistant Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, was made chief of the new division, while Richard C. Tanis, a career officer, became the assistant chief. Mr. Tanis remained in this division until it was amalgamated with the Division of American Republics in 1937. For all practical purposes, then, Leon J. Canova was the first country desk officer,¹ heading an office of seven persons. In the hierarchy of the

¹One might argue that Mr. Canova was, in fact, the chief of the first task force, a task force which perpetuated itself bureaucratically long after the reason for its being had passed.

State Department of that time, he ranked with the chiefs of the Divisions of Far Eastern, Near Eastern, Western European, and Latin American Affairs.

The Short-Lived Russian Division

In 1919, the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (8 people) was likewise found to be so heavily pressed with work pertaining to Russia, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the problems arising therefrom, that a Russian Division was created by departmental order. This Russian Division was liquidated, being merged in the Division of Eastern European Affairs, by departmental order of October 10, 1922, in order to include relations

continued the division of Western European Affairs and the creation
of West European Affairs.

REORGANIZATION OF CHIEF OF BUREAU

The Chief of Bureau and his Staff

By 1915, the Chief of Bureau had a staff of 11 persons, all of whom
were assigned to the division of Western European Affairs. The staff
was composed of the following: Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name],
Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name],
Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name],
Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name], Mr. J. H. P. [Name].
The staff was organized into three sections: the first section was
the section of Western European Affairs, the second section was the
section of Eastern European Affairs, and the third section was the
section of the Middle East.

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the section of Western European Affairs, the second section was the
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the section of Western European Affairs, the second section was the
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The Eastern European Division

In 1915, the division of Eastern European Affairs was organized
into three sections: the first section was the section of Eastern
European Affairs, the second section was the section of the Middle
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Affairs. The staff was organized into three sections: the first
section was the section of Eastern European Affairs, the second
section was the section of the Middle East, and the third section
was the section of Western European Affairs.

with Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The Chief of the Russian Division, then, was the second country desk officer in the Department of State.²

²Or the second chief of a task force, depending on the point of view.

The Office of Philippine Affairs

During the first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Office of Philippine Affairs was established in the Department of State. This agency was charged with carrying out the provisions of the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, in so far as they related to the Department of State. The first chief of the office, Joseph E. Jacobs, might be termed a country desk officer, inasmuch as he dealt solely with the affairs of the Philippines. With the advent of Philippine independence in the post-war era, the agency's functions decreased, its personnel were assigned elsewhere, and the Officer in Charge of Philippine Affairs was transferred in toto to function under the direction of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

World War II and Departmental Reorganization

The need for a thorough reorganization of the Department was recognized as it expanded rapidly and in so many directions simultaneously under the impact of World War II. As a means of delegating responsibilities, in order to relieve the Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretary of their many administrative functions, twelve offices were created, each headed by a Director and a Deputy Director, with divisions placed under their immediate direction. No office was responsible for more than six nor less than two divisions. The geographical divisions were increased in

with similar findings, however, it was found that the
the Bureau of the Interior, and the Bureau of the
Department of State.

For the purpose of a more complete, and in some cases,
the Bureau of the Interior, and the Bureau of the

The Office of Philippine Affairs

During the first administration of President McKinley, the Office
of Philippine Affairs was established in the Department of State. This
agency was charged with carrying out the provisions of the Philippine
Independence Act of March 22, 1902, in so far as they related to the
Department of State. The first chief of the office, Joseph L. Jackson,
might be termed a country club officer, inasmuch as he dealt solely with
the affairs of the Philippines. With the advent of William Howard Taft
in the post-war era, the agency's functions decreased, its personnel
were reduced drastically, and the office in charge of Philippine Affairs
was transferred to the Commission under the direction of the Bureau of
for Eastern Affairs.

World War I and Philippine Administration

The need for a thorough reorganization of the Department was recognized
as it expanded rapidly and in so many directions simultaneously under the
impact of World War I. As a result of increasing responsibilities, in
order to relieve the Assistant Secretaries and their assistants of their
many administrative functions, a new office was created, then known
by a different and a more direct name, which almost immediately
assumed its present name. Its office was designated the Office of the
Chief of the Division. The organizational changes were intended to

number so that where formerly there were only four such divisions, the four offices which took their place were divided into nineteen divisions, which made greater specialization possible. This specialization came first in the American Area in early 1944 with the establishment of Divisions of Mexican, Brazilian, Bolivian, and Canadian Affairs. The degree of specialization reached in the western hemisphere areas, prior to such specialization in other geographic areas, is indicative of the priority placed on western hemisphere affairs. This change, coupled with the wording of the Departmental Order of January 15, 1944, which placed the responsibility for the "coordination of policy and action in regard to all aspects of relations with the . . . countries,"³

³Text of Departmental Order 1128 in Department of State Bulletin, January 15, 1944.

seemed to indicate an intention to combine economic and political aspects of policy for application and coordination by Division Chiefs under the direction of the Office Director.⁴ These Divisions, excepting Canada,

⁴Walter H. C. Laves and Francis O. Wilcox, "The Reorganization of the Department of State," The American Political Science Review (April, 1944), pp. 289-301.

have remained in the Office of American Republic Affairs (since reorganized and renamed the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs). They were the nascent form of the Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, and Canada country desks.

Two further reorganizations, one effected in December, 1944, to correct the deficiencies discovered in the wake of the hasty January, 1944, reorganization, and that undertaken as a result of the Hoover Commission recommendation of 1949, have essentially fixed the structure of the Department of State as it is now. There are presently ninety-six

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country desk officers scattered in five regional bureaus. Some of these desk officers administer our affairs with two or three countries, but generally the principle of one country per desk officer applies. The current organization of the Department and its regional bureaus is delineated on pages 158-163.

CHAPTER III

RECRUITMENT -- WHERE DO DESK OFFICERS COME FROM?

In the dark days following the birth of the republic, public-spirited men of wide experience defended the interests of a weak, new nation on the diplomatic front. It seems fortuitous that men of great stature such as Robert R. Livingston, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, John Marshall, James Madison, and James Monroe gave of themselves to establish the sound diplomatic practice which permitted the stable growth of the republic.

The Spoils System and Political Appointments

The age of Jackson ushered in a long and dreary period of neglect and abuse. With the inauguration of the spoils system, appointments to the Department for political reasons, rather than for fitness, experience, and ability, became commonplace. The patent injustices of the spoils system, as applied to diplomatic and consular services, permitted incompetent consuls to extort exorbitant sums for their services and forced ministers to make heavy personal expenditures to supplement their inadequate allowances. These facts finally induced the Congress, in 1856, to pass a law providing a fixed salary for diplomatic officers and consular officials, based on hierarchical rank. Another section of this same act introduced a new idea -- the merit principle. It provided for the appointment by the President, upon certification by the Secretary of State, of twenty-five "consular pupils of peculiar fitness and qualifications."¹ This legislation marks the first attempt, even though

which is the only one of its kind in the world. It is a very rare and valuable specimen, and is now in the possession of the British Museum. It is a very rare and valuable specimen, and is now in the possession of the British Museum.

The results suggest that the model is valid.

the use of London based in a long and heavy burden of business and abuse. With the introduction of the single system, responsibility is the department for political reasons, rather than for financial, educational and ability, because of the nature of the system. The system of the single system, as applied to diplomatic and consular services, provided in consular consuls in various countries was for their services and foreign ministers to other party officials responsible to maintain their independence of action. These facts finally showed the Government, in 1914, to pass a law providing a single ministry for diplomatic affairs and consular officials, based on historical facts. (The fact that the law was not introduced at the time - the same principle, it is pointed out the appointment by the President, with confirmation by the Senate, of the fact, of the "consular" nature of the consular service and qualifications.) The legislation with the first attempt, was enough

¹Andor Klay, "Lesser Annals of Departmental Troubles," Foreign Service Journal, XXXIII (May, 1956), p. 34.

limited, to recruit a body of young men for government service in the hope that their early training might qualify them for promotion and greater responsibility.

The hopes raised by this innovation were quickly dashed. Congress stubbornly refused to appropriate monies to implement the creation of a corps of consular pupils and even repealed the provisions for its establishment.²

²Ibid.

Another attempt to revive the merit principle was made in an act of 1864 which provided for appointment, with permanency of tenure, of thirteen clerks. Still there was no provision for insuring a continuing flow of trained personnel into the Department; and spoilsmen, changing with the vagaries of the administration, thoroughly infested the Department.

The Merit System

As the continental frontier vanished and our nationalism turned outward with the imperialism of "manifest destiny," the need for diplomatic reform became obvious. Though political hacks were a feature of the consular service as late as the McKinley Administration, the era of reform, with which the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt coincided, produced notable reforms. A three-man Board of Examiners³

³W. McG. Harlow, "Evolution of American Diplomacy," Foreign Service Journal, XXIX (September, 1952), p. 58.

Journal of the American Historical Association, 1931, p. 34.
Journal of the American Historical Association, 1931, p. 34.

limited, to report a body of young men for government service in the
army and navy and to report a body of young men for government service in the
army and navy and to report a body of young men for government service in the

The report issued by this committee will include a list of names
of persons who have been recommended for appointment to positions of
importance in the government and who have been recommended for appointment to positions of
importance in the government and who have been recommended for appointment to positions of
importance in the government.

ibid.

Another attempt to revise the old Civil Service Act was made in an act
of 1904 which provided for appointment, with permanent of course, of
persons to positions of importance in the government. This act was not passed
because of the opposition of the Senate. The act was not passed because of the
opposition of the Senate. The act was not passed because of the opposition of the
Senate.

The Civil Service

As the continental European countries and our own countries have
shown with the introduction of "seniority" the need for systematic
reform became obvious. Though political reform was a factor in the
reform of the civil service as late as the American Civil War, the need for
reform, with which the introduction of systematic reform was connected,
connected, produced a body of reformers who were not connected with the
reform.

Journal of the American Historical Association, 1931, p. 34.
Journal of the American Historical Association, 1931, p. 34.

designated by the Secretary of State had already been authorized by President Cleveland, in 1895, to examine the fitness of appointees in the consular service; ten years later the scope of consular examinations was broadened by executive order, and vacancies in the diplomatic service were authorized to be filled by transfer, promotion, or appointment after examination. The Congress revised the system for selecting consular officials on April 5, 1906, and an executive order in the same year placed consular appointments and promotions under the Civil Service System,⁴ then twenty-three years old. By executive order in 1909,⁵

⁴Tracy H. Lay, The Foreign Service of the United States, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1925), p. 22.

⁵For provisions of this executive order and later amendments, see Lay, op. cit., pp. 398-402, and Elmer Plischke, Conduct of American Diplomacy, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1950), p. 168.

President Taft, being determined to foster a career foreign service and to rid it of dependence upon political patronage, brought diplomatic officers below the chief-of-mission rank under Civil Service and strengthened the composition and functions of the Board of Examiners of the Department of State. By the outbreak of World War I, the efficiency of the Department had improved to a marked degree, but it was still difficult to find men willing to make a career in the poorly-paid Department. For some Department positions and for the diplomatic service, a private income was an absolute essential. An enactment of February 5, 1915, graded diplomatic secretaries and consuls-general into five classes each and consuls into nine, besides fixing their salaries.⁶

⁶See Lay, op. cit., pp. 403-406, for the provisions of this law and its later amendments.

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The Rogers Act

With the reluctant acknowledgement of the status of the United States as a world power, with interests in the four corners of the earth, as a result of victorious participation in World War I, the Congress was more favorably inclined to overhaul the patchwork of Congressional statute and executive order which formed the legal basis for the operation of the Department and the Foreign Service. The diplomatic branch of the Foreign Service numbered about 122, virtually all of whose members possessed private wealth; the consular officers, some 511 strong, were generally political appointees serving at the pleasure of the President.

The Rogers Act of May 23, 1924,⁷ supplied the remedial and con-

⁷43 Stat. 140; also see Lay, op. cit., pp. 407-416.

structive legislation urged by the Secretary of State to correct faults existing in the organization of the Department. Representative John Jacob Rogers had interested himself in the effort to reorganize the machinery for the conduct of American foreign relations and saw the bill bearing his name take the diplomatic and consular services out of politics once and for all.⁸ Consular and diplomatic officers alike became Foreign

⁸Excepting only appointments of ambassadors and ministers, which are still made at the discretion of the President.

Service officers, and appointment to the new Foreign Service became limited to open, competitive examinations with commissions granted to a class and not a particular post. A career service, composed of officers recruited when young for long tenure and orderly advancement based on merit, was presaged by the Rogers Act.

With the minimum requirements of the State of the Union
given as a basis, with interest in the fact of the
as a result of various conditions in which the
were already limited to control the Government of
various and economic order which the State of the
of the Government and the foreign service, the
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It is clear, then, that the

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The Rogers Act, among its other features, authorized the assignment of Foreign Service officers to the Department without loss of pay, thereby permitting some alleviation in their continuous official exile and presaging their future assignment as desk officers after suitable field experience. There were also provisions for the subsequent re-admission to the Foreign Service of career officers appointed as chiefs of mission; a retirement and disability system; authorization for payment of representation allowances; and family travel and subsistence expense authorization.

"At first the act stimulated enthusiasm and raised morale and efficiency. It also aroused interest in the service as a career, as shown by the number of candidates taking the first entrance examinations in 1925."⁹ Under its provisions, President Coolidge created a Foreign

⁹Richard S. Patterson, "The Foreign Service: Four Decades of Development," Department of State News Letter, XXXIX (July, 1964), p. 3.

Service Personnel Board, and the Department established a Foreign Service School Board.

Unfortunately, all of the deficiencies of the Foreign Service were not remedied. Some officers of the Department performing substantive work in international politics were not consolidated into the Foreign Service. Further, salaries which ranged from \$3,000 per annum in Class IX to \$9,000 per annum in Class I were still too low to attract capable but poor personnel. Career officers were still reluctant to accept promotions to the rank of minister or ambassador because of inadequate salaries and niggardly representation allowances. In addition, the Personnel Board, in making recommendations for promotion under the act, adopted practices that gave a disproportionate share to the diplomatic officers. Consular

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in 1952.² Since the previous President Clinton visited a Syrian town in 1950, the number of Arabians visiting the White House has increased. It also included answers in the month of a letter, as well as the act of obtaining information and other details.

1. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, Report of the Inspector General on the Audit of the U.S. Department of State's Financial Management System, Washington, D.C., 1997.

THESE RESULTS ARE IN ACCORD WITH THE FINDINGS OF OTHER STUDIES.

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officer objections and dissatisfactions led to a House request for information and a Senate resolution for an investigation. The Congressional criticisms and the recommendations made in their light led to revisions which were incorporated in the Moses-Linthicum Act of 1931.

Yet, all of the developments following in the wake of the Rogers Act did not have a deleterious effect on personnel policies. "With foresight, the Department began assigning some gifted junior officers to study the languages, history, and social customs of Russia, the Far East, and the Arab countries -- all later critical areas."¹⁰ Under

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4.

Secretary Grew, noting that only nineteen of fifty ministers and ambassadors were career men in 1926, urged Secretary Kellogg to invite the attention of the President to the desirability of replacing various inefficient political appointees with Foreign Service officers.

Short-sighted fiscal measures in an era of prosperity cut off promotions and other benefits promised by the Rogers Act, causing discouragement and further discontent. Morale of the Service was low when Secretary Stimson assumed his office in March, 1929. But President Hoover understood the monetary needs for the conduct of foreign relations, and Secretary Stimson was so persuasive with the House Appropriations Committee, that funds were provided for promotions, rent allowances, and modest representation funds.

The Moses-Linthicum Act

Senator George H. Moses, a former minister to Greece and Montenegro (1909-1912), and Representative John C. Linthicum sponsored the act which

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bears their names to remedy some of the defects of the Rogers Act and to advance the development of the Foreign Service. Under its terms, the Foreign Service Personnel Board was reorganized to insure its impartiality; the system of officer classification was modified, salaries were raised, and automatic within-class increases were instituted; more generous representation and post allowances were provided, annual and sick leave with pay were instituted, a more liberal retirement system was initiated, and career status for foreign service clerks was granted.¹¹

¹¹Ibid.

The Effects of the Depression

The Depression of the 1930's unfortunately cancelled the gains made under the Moses-Linthicum Act. The prevailing economic conditions gave impetus to the government economy measures which suspended promotions, reduced salaries 15 per cent, abolished post and representation allowances, cut rent and living allowances by 65 per cent, and eliminated home leave at government expense. Dollar devaluation further reduced salaries already cut, creating widespread hardship and distress among members of the Foreign Service and their families.

The number of Foreign Service officers dropped from 762 to 688 between July, 1932, and December, 1934. A lack of recruitment funds created a gap of four years when no one entered the Service. President Roosevelt's stringent economy measures further injured both the Department and the Foreign Service. Indeed, Secretary Hull's first telegram to the posts abroad was one of regret for cutting staffs to save money.¹²

¹²Ibid., p. 5.

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The depletion of the 1930's unfortunately constitutes the gain made under the post-war situation for the prevailing economic conditions. The situation in the investment economy includes such various provisions, reduced savings in the past, applied to the post-war economic situation, but that the living allowance by 50 per cent, and allocated from leave of treatment expense. Better education factor should also be taken into account, resulting in the post-war situation and the future of the foreign market and their families.

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Thus as world conditions created vastly increasing demands for its services, the Foreign Service struggled along under greater burdens with insufficient funds.

The Depression and the nascent expansion of the power and size of the Federal Government combined to attract young and talented personnel. There was no lack of qualified competitors for the small number of appointments made annually following the resumption of entrance examinations in 1935. By the latter portion of that year, the worst of the Depression had passed, and the Service had gained most of the salary and allowance benefits granted by the Moses-Linthicum Act.

The Effects of World War II on Recruitment

With the outbreak of global war in Europe for a second time in a generation, the United States had a single Foreign Service in which admission was gained by open, competitive examination and advancement through proven ability.¹³ Despite some "deadwood" remaining among

¹³The foreign services of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and the Bureau of Mines, which had been established between 1927-1935, were incorporated into the Foreign Service by a reorganization act passed in 1935. Treasury Attachés are still to be found abroad. See Arthur W. MacMahon, Administration in Foreign Affairs, (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1953), p. 226.

pre-Rogers Act political appointees,

The Foreign Service of the United States at the outbreak of the second World War was in the main made up of a corps of able, unselfish, and devoted public servants in whom the values of the career service were deeply ingrained, laboring conscientiously under occasionally trying conditions for a country which did not fully comprehend, and often ignored, their existence.¹⁴

There is no doubt that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants.

The United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants.

The United States is a country of immigrants

With the exception of the United States, no other country in the world is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants.

The United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants.

Pre-1900 Act Political Activities

The United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that the United States is a country of immigrants.

¹⁴Virgil P. Randolph, III, "The Recruitment of Junior Foreign Service Officers 1945-1955," (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1956), p. 16.

The decision was made in 1940 to seek no preferred status under Selective Service for Foreign Service personnel. After the examination given in the fall of 1941, all recruiting was suspended to eliminate competition with the armed forces. Because of the cessation of recruiting and statutory limitations on the total number of officers occupying the six highest classes, promotion also ceased during World War II.

Recruitment Since World War II

Owing to the wider responsibilities of the United States after the war, the Department was faced with a twofold recruiting problem. There was, first, a need for rapid expansion to meet immediate requirements and, second, the need for careful and painstaking rebuilding of the career service. The first need accentuated the requirement for a number of specialists; the second stressed attracting personnel with a general liberal arts background.

In 1945 and 1946, the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service decided to hold shortened examinations specifically aimed at recruiting veterans of the armed forces and personnel of the Foreign Service Auxiliary¹⁵ in order to build up the career service. The expediency of

¹⁵There were 976 of these in 1945 as compared to only 820 career officers. See Elton Atwater, "The American Foreign Service Since 1939," American Journal of International Law, XLI (January, 1947), p. 79.

the shortened examination¹⁶ relieved the most pressing needs.

1. James E. Buchanan, III, "The Development of James Buchanan's Political Career," University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1962, p. 10.

The decision was made in 1941 to have an executive branch which would be responsible for foreign policy. After the establishment of the State Department in 1947, all activities were transferred to this department. The State Department also had the responsibility of representing the United States in the United Nations and other international organizations. The State Department also had the responsibility of representing the United States in the United Nations and other international organizations.

Recruitment Since World War II

Due to the rapid technological changes in the world since World War II, the State Department was faced with a serious recruitment problem. There was, first, a need for rapid expansion to meet immediate requirements. Second, the need for a more professional and efficient service. The first need was met by the recruitment of a number of specialists; the second need was met by the recruitment of a number of specialists.

In 1945 and 1946, the Board of Governors for the Foreign Service decided to hold shortened examinations specifically aimed at recruiting persons of the armed forces and personnel of the Foreign Service. The purpose of this was to build up the service. The purpose of this was to build up the service.

There were 170 of these in 1945 and 1946. The purpose of this was to build up the service. The purpose of this was to build up the service.

The shortened examinations¹² helped the war-torn world.

¹⁶As a result of these examinations, over 400 new officers were appointed to the lowest rank of the Foreign Service. Until July, 1945, when it was raised to 1160, the authorized strength was 866. This was again increased to 1280 for the fiscal year 1947. See Atwater, op. cit., p. 93.

The Bloom Bill and Lateral Entry

The "Bloom Bill" of May 3, 1945, was enacted as a stop-gap measure to remove the disabilities of a number of officers in the upper grades of the Service and to improve the status of non-career personnel. A provision of the bill, struck out before passage by amendment, would have authorized entry into the Foreign Service of some 120 persons whose special fitness and qualifications would have been demonstrated by prior service in other federal agencies or in the armed forces. This controversial "lateral entry" feature unexpectedly aroused such strong opposition from supporters of the career principle that it was stricken -- temporarily. Yet the blear-eyed guardian of career principles grudgingly admitted that some sort of lateral entry would strengthen the Department, if carefully administered, at a time when trained and experienced specialists were needed. Thus the Foreign Service Manpower Bill was passed on July 3, 1946, authorizing the appointment of 250 specialized personnel within two years, as additional career officers. These personnel were to be appointed to classified grades commensurate with their experience in the armed forces or their previously-held positions of responsibility in other federal agencies.¹⁷

¹⁷ It was feared that undue training would be required to compensate for a lack of field experience and that the career principle would be irreparably harmed. These fears were wholly false, because the Department of State so cautiously and parsimoniously administered these appointments that seven years later only 165 appointments had been made, 69 of which were to the three highest classes. See MacMahon, op. cit., p. 228.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946

While the Congress engaged in the polemics of the Manpower Act, the Division of Foreign Service Planning feverishly prepared new basic legislation for the Foreign Service, because the Rogers Act and its subsequent amendments was considered obsolescent. Their labors were accorded sanctity in Public Law 724, 79th Congress,¹⁸ commonly called

¹⁸For a complete narration of its legislative history, see Harold Stein, "The Foreign Service Act of 1946," Public Administration and Policy Development -- A Case Book, (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 28-42.

the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

This act did nothing to alter the traditional method of recruitment to the lowest grades of the Foreign Service offices. It reclassified all Foreign Service officers into six grades and superimposed a new grade of career minister. This latter grade was created for the accommodation of Foreign Service officers promoted to chief of diplomatic mission who wished to remain in the Service. A Foreign Service Reserve was created to permit the appointment of highly competent specialized or technical personnel for short terms of service. A Staff Corps of twenty-two grades was established for administrative, clerical, fiscal, and custodial responsibilities. A lateral entry feature was provided for controlled entry of highly qualified Reserve, Staff Corps, or Departmental personnel into the career service after comprehensive mental and physical examinations as prescribed by the Board of Examiners. In the hard fight to gain its passage in the Congress, the question of specialist versus generalist was raised and debated hotly. Implicit in the passage of the act was the inadequacy of a selfishly administered program of recruitment at the bottom rank.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946

While the Congress was in the process of the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the Department of State was engaged in a study of the organization of the Department of State. This study was conducted by the Department of State and the results were reported to the President in a report dated June 1, 1946. The report recommended that the Department of State be reorganized so that it would be able to carry out its functions more effectively. The report also recommended that the Department of State be given the authority to appoint and remove its officers and employees.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946 was passed by the Congress on July 2, 1946. The Act provided for the reorganization of the Department of State and for the appointment and removal of its officers and employees. The Act also provided for the establishment of a Foreign Service Commission to advise the President on matters relating to the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service Act of 1946

This act did nothing to alter the traditional system of recruitment to the lowest grade of the Foreign Service Officer. It reclassified all Foreign Service Officers into six grades and authorized a new grade of career minister. This latter grade was created for the recommendation of Foreign Service Officers promoted to grade of diplomatic minister and related to remain in the Service. A Foreign Service Officer was authorized to receive the appointment of right commission (diplomatic or technical) for short term of service, a full term of twenty-two grades was established for administrative, clerical, fiscal, and consular responsibilities. A lateral entry feature was provided and controlled entry of highly qualified persons, staff corps, or non-career personnel into the career service after competitive exam and several examinations as prescribed by the board of examiners. In the same time to gain the passage in the Congress, the question of whether or not the act was was raised and debated hotly. In the process of the act was the independence of a legislative administration process of recruitment at the bottom rank.

Stagnation

The Board of Examiners felt pleased with the results of the first post-war examinations and decided to administer the same type of examination in the fall of 1948. In the meantime, they determined that a statistical study of examinations held since 1932 might prove of value in modifying examination methods and procedures.

An incidence of 47 per cent of candidates otherwise successful in passing written examinations failed the modern language portion. Further, reductions in appropriations would permit only replacement of current vacancies in the Service; new expansion could not be contemplated. The standards of the written examinations which permitted 20 per cent to pass were raised to allow passage of only 17 per cent.

In spite of more stringent examining procedures, a backlog of one hundred candidates, certified eligible by the Board of Examiners, had accumulated by early 1949. These persons were placed on an Eligible List and were notified that they would be appointed when funds became available. Some of the best of these candidates were lost forever, because they were unable to await problematical appointment indefinitely.

Meanwhile, under the lateral entry feature of the Manpower Act of 1946, some 2,542 applications were received. Because reduced appropriations made it impossible to permit the lateral entry of the 250 new career officers envisaged, the Board of Examiners instituted a set of elaborate screening devices which were approved by the Secretary of State. Of the 2,542 applicants, only 817 were designated to take the oral examinations; 330 individuals passed the oral examinations; 205 of these candidates were declared eligible for appointment under further restrictive standards; 199 of these were certified as eligible for appointment,

The Board of Examiners will please find the results of the

post-graduate examination in the following table:

Examination in the Fall of 1940. For the examination, they were

that a statistical study of examinations in the Fall of 1940

of value in evaluating examination methods and procedures.

An incidence of 17 per cent of candidates who were successful

in passing written examinations failed the spoken language portion.

Further, reductions in expenditures would result only replacement of

current vacancies in the service; new expansion could not be contemplated.

The standards of the written examinations which permitted 20 per cent to

pass were raised to allow passage of only 15 per cent.

In spite of more stringent examination procedures, a backlog of one

hundred candidates, certified eligible by the Board of Examiners, had

accumulated by early 1940. These persons were placed on a waiting list

and were notified that they would be required to wait for a vacant position.

Some of the best of these candidates were lost forever, because they were

unable to meet practical requirements of the service.

Meanwhile, under the Federal Civil Service Act of

1940, some 2,344 applications were received. Because written applications

were it impossible to permit the Federal Civil Service Act of

officers engaged, the Board of Examiners limited a set of written

examination devices which were approved by the Secretary of State.

The 2,344 applicants, only 417 were designated to take the oral

examination; 200 individuals had no oral examination; 203 of these

candidates were designated eligible for appointment under restrictive

standards; 100 of these were certified as eligible for appointment;

34 of this group withdrew in disgust after being offered appointments at too low a salary; and only 165 new officers were finally appointed.

It was felt that "many highly intelligent, highly educated, and highly competent men with excellent records . . . were unsuccessful."¹⁹

¹⁹ Joseph E. Green, "The Manpower Act in Retrospect," Foreign Service Journal, XXVI (April, 1949), p. 44.

The principal difficulty faced by the Board of Examiners was determining the class to which the candidate for lateral entry should be appointed. The Board and the candidate often disagreed.

By the summer of 1949, some 156 candidates were eligible for appointment to almost non-existent vacancies in Class VI, while 30 new college graduates had been employed by the Department as interns. Additionally, the Staff Corps had become the vehicle for entrance into the Foreign Service of persons whose service was intended to be only temporary or semi-permanent, who could not pass the regular entrance examinations, or who enjoyed influential political connection. A few of these managed transfer into the permanent officer corps.

By the end of 1949, some 166 candidates were on the Eligible List awaiting appointment. Some of these had been waiting nearly two years. Sixty-five additional candidates were added to the Eligible List in the first half of 1950, despite further raising the standards for admission.

In June of 1950, a change occurred in recruitment policy. Eighty-three new Class VI officers were appointed, and the Board of Examiners was urged to produce as many successful candidates as possible. By January, 1951, only a handful remained on the Eligible List, but more than a dozen excellent candidates had refused to continue their interminable wait. The damage had been done.

24 of this group, although in 1950 only 1000 were registered.
of 100,000 in 1950, and the number of voters was 100,000.
it was the first time that the number of voters was 100,000.
highly concentrated in the hands of a few individuals.

25 Joseph D. Green, "The Movement for a New South," Foreign
Journal, 1951 (April, 1951), p. 14.

The principal difficulty faced by the board of directors was obtaining
the class for which the candidate for federal party would be registered.
The board and the candidate of the class.

By the summer of 1949, some 150 candidates were registered for the
most of which no candidate was registered in Class VI, while in one class
registered had been approved by the government as inferior, administratively,
the staff corps had become the vehicle for election into the foreign
office of persons whose service was intended to be only temporary in
character, who could not pass the regular entrance examination,
or who enjoyed an official political connection. A few of these people
transfer into the permanent officer corps.

By the end of 1949, some 150 candidates were on the list for the
waiting appointment. Some of these had been waiting since the war.
Sixty-five additional candidates were added to the list in the
first half of 1950, despite further delays in the process for selection.
In June of 1950, a change occurred in recruitment policy. Fifty-
three new Class VI officers were appointed, and the number of candidates
was used to produce a new successful candidate as possible. By
January, 1951, only a handful remained on the list for the war.
and a new candidate was added to the list in January 1951.
similar with the change had been made.

The Hoover Commission

The Congress and the public had been debating the course of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. During the course of the controversy, one of the questions raised was whether specially-trained personnel were required by the national interest in carrying out the aims of American foreign policy; and if so, should they be professional members of a Foreign Service Officer Corps or members of a single foreign affairs service closely affiliated with, or a part of, the Department of State.

A Committee on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) was created in accordance with Public Law 162 of the 80th Congress. One of its many suggestions concerning the reorganization of the Department of State was:

The personnel in the permanent Department establishment in Washington and the personnel of the Foreign Service above certain levels should be amalgamated over a short period of years into a single foreign affairs service, divided into grades and divisions, obligated to serve at home or overseas and constituting a safeguarded career group administered separately from the general Civil Service as it now exists.²⁰

²⁰Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs (Appendix H) (Washington: Government Printing Office, January, 1949), p. 28.

The Hoover Commission findings resulted in the enactment of Public Law 73 of the 81st Congress, which placed responsibility for the administration, coordination, and direction of the personnel of the Foreign Service upon the Secretary of State directly and formally. This act, in turn, gave rise to the appointment, by the Secretary of State, of an Advisory Committee on Personnel, to consider whether fundamental

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changes were required in the personnel systems of the Department as a consequence of the Hoover Commission's recommendations.

The Rowe-Ramspeck Committee

This committee, known informally as the "Rowe-Ramspeck Committee," generally concurred with the Hoover Commission that the many variations in the several personnel systems administered by the Secretary of State inhibited efficient management and effectiveness. They also concurred in the Hoover Commission recommendation that "there should be a single but flexible personnel system for the Department of State and the Foreign Service instead of separate systems that exist at present."²¹ Yet the

²¹"An Improved Personnel System for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," A Report to the Secretary of State by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Personnel (August, 1950), p. 3.

Committee also proposed that the recommended unified personnel system be independent of the Civil Service system. Appointments, they recommended, should be based on rigorous and comprehensive written, oral, and physical examination which, it was found, insured the selection of intelligent and educated individuals possessing a high devotion to duty and potentiality for development.

In essence, the Department of State rejected the Hoover Commission's and Rowe-Ramspeck Committee's recommendations for a single personnel system. Instead, the Department chose to create a closer relationship between Foreign Service and Civil Service groups by means of administrative action and minor legislative changes. Only lip service was paid to the fundamental recommendation for amalgamation through permitting a "larger" number of lateral entries into the Foreign Service by Civil Service personnel. Even though the Department liberalized lateral

knowledge was provided in the primary stages of the movement as a
consequence of the proper Commission's recommendations.

The Commission's findings

This Committee, based primarily on the "Administrative Committee"
recommendations, concluded that the proper Commission had the same relationship
in the current national system as that by the Ministry of State
individual officials management and administration. They had concluded
in the proper Commission's recommendations that there should be a single
but flexible national system for the movement of State and the proper
service system of officials within that area of power. ¹¹ For the

¹¹ This report was prepared for the use of the Ministry of State
in the Department of State by the Commission's Administrative Committee
on 10 January, 1957, p. 2.

Committee also proposed that the Commission's findings should be
be taken into account of the Civil Service system. ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³ ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁶ ³⁷ ³⁸ ³⁹ ⁴⁰ ⁴¹ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴ ⁴⁵ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ ⁵¹ ⁵² ⁵³ ⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ ⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² ⁶³ ⁶⁴ ⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ ⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ ⁶⁹ ⁷⁰ ⁷¹ ⁷² ⁷³ ⁷⁴ ⁷⁵ ⁷⁶ ⁷⁷ ⁷⁸ ⁷⁹ ⁸⁰ ⁸¹ ⁸² ⁸³ ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ ⁸⁸ ⁸⁹ ⁹⁰ ⁹¹ ⁹² ⁹³ ⁹⁴ ⁹⁵ ⁹⁶ ⁹⁷ ⁹⁸ ⁹⁹ ¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹ ¹⁰² ¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ ¹⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹ ¹¹² ¹¹³ ¹¹⁴ ¹¹⁵ ¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁸ ¹¹⁹ ¹²⁰ ¹²¹ ¹²² ¹²³ ¹²⁴ ¹²⁵ ¹²⁶ ¹²⁷ ¹²⁸ ¹²⁹ ¹³⁰ ¹³¹ ¹³² ¹³³ ¹³⁴ ¹³⁵ ¹³⁶ ¹³⁷ ¹³⁸ ¹³⁹ ¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² ¹⁴³ ¹⁴⁴ ¹⁴⁵ ¹⁴⁶ ¹⁴⁷ ¹⁴⁸ ¹⁴⁹ ¹⁵⁰ ¹⁵¹ ¹⁵² ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁵ ¹⁵⁶ ¹⁵⁷ ¹⁵⁸ ¹⁵⁹ ¹⁶⁰ ¹⁶¹ ¹⁶² ¹⁶³ ¹⁶⁴ ¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶ ¹⁶⁷ ¹⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁹ ¹⁷⁰ ¹⁷¹ ¹⁷² ¹⁷³ ¹⁷⁴ ¹⁷⁵ ¹⁷⁶ ¹⁷⁷ ¹⁷⁸ ¹⁷⁹ ¹⁸⁰ ¹⁸¹ ¹⁸² ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁴ ¹⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷ ¹⁸⁸ ¹⁸⁹ ¹⁹⁰ ¹⁹¹ ¹⁹² ¹⁹³ ¹⁹⁴ ¹⁹⁵ ¹⁹⁶ ¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹⁸ ¹⁹⁹ ²⁰⁰ ²⁰¹ ²⁰² ²⁰³ ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵ ²⁰⁶ ²⁰⁷ ²⁰⁸ ²⁰⁹ ²¹⁰ ²¹¹ ²¹² ²¹³ ²¹⁴ ²¹⁵ ²¹⁶ ²¹⁷ ²¹⁸ ²¹⁹ ²²⁰ ²²¹ ²²² ²²³ ²²⁴ ²²⁵ ²²⁶ ²²⁷ ²²⁸ ²²⁹ ²³⁰ ²³¹ ²³² ²³³ ²³⁴ ²³⁵ ²³⁶ ²³⁷ ²³⁸ ²³⁹ ²⁴⁰ ²⁴¹ ²⁴² ²⁴³ ²⁴⁴ ²⁴⁵ ²⁴⁶ ²⁴⁷ ²⁴⁸ ²⁴⁹ ²⁵⁰ ²⁵¹ ²⁵² ²⁵³ ²⁵⁴ ²⁵⁵ ²⁵⁶ ²⁵⁷ ²⁵⁸ ²⁵⁹ ²⁶⁰ ²⁶¹ ²⁶² ²⁶³ ²⁶⁴ ²⁶⁵ ²⁶⁶ ²⁶⁷ ²⁶⁸ ²⁶⁹ ²⁷⁰ 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entry by a directive of 1951, of 2,150 applications received by November 1, 1951, only 25 of these had actually been taken into the Foreign Service by 1954.

Decline in Recruitment

A marked decline in the number of applicants seeking to take written examinations was noted in the years 1949 through 1951. This slackening of apparent interest in the Foreign Service prompted the Executive Director of the Board of Examiners to investigate this phenomenon. Letters were addressed to the presidents of some 266 colleges and universities requesting their opinions as to why candidates for Class VI appointments had fallen off.²²

²²A brief discussion of this decline may be found in William Vandell Elliott, United States Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 270.

The replies were illuminating, interesting, and informative. The decline in public esteem of the Department was cited, owing to the irresponsible attacks of Senator McCarthy and others; young men and women were reluctant to search for positions in which their loyalty to the United States might be impugned in unwarranted attacks. Other replies noted the discouragement produced by long delays in the selection process. A lesser number mentioned the ease with which college graduates could obtain appointments, without examination, in the Foreign Service Staff Corps, the Department's intern program, or in other federal agencies. A large number noted that full employment and widespread prosperity made diligent searching for employment by qualified college graduates completely unnecessary. The majority of letters received urged the Board

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Knowledge of Biology

unpublished and fallen off.

University Press, 1955), p. 140.
Yamamoto, Mitsuo, United States Invasion Policy (Tokyo: Yamamoto

completely unnecessary. The matter of interest needed upon the basis
some definite evidence for assignment of qualified subject resources
A large number noted that full employment and widespread productivity
Growth, the Government's income program, by its other Federal agencies,
detail appointments, without exception, in the foreign service must
A further subject involved the issue of which subject resources could
be used for investigation, conducted by some agency in the national program,
the United States might be involved in numerous cases. Other replies
were more reluctant to accept the position at which they felt they to
irresponsible attitude of limited resources and subject resources and
decline in subject resources of the Government was likely to be the
The replies were illuminating, enlightening, and constructive. The

of Examiners to adopt an active and carefully organized recruiting program in the colleges and universities of the nation.

"The obvious desirability for cultivating the main source of Foreign Service Officers did . . . spur the Department of State into issuing a directive in March, 1951, announcing that an intensive recruitment campaign for new officers would be launched at universities and colleges throughout the United States."²³ Because of an insufficiency of staff

²³Randolph, op. cit., p. 58.

and funds, representatives of the Board of Examiners met with faculty members of institutions solicited in regional conferences about the country in order to acquaint them with the aims and needs of the Foreign Service and to provide for a resident faculty representative on each campus. Stringency of funds eliminated a projected new and attractive brochure containing general information about the Foreign Service.

These efforts were crowned with only partial success in providing a steady and adequate supply. Lowered standards utilized in 1951 (22.5 per cent passing instead of 20.1 per cent) provided only 84 eligible for appointment. Of the 1,639 who were examined in 1952, only 94 were appointed, when the Board of Examiners was calling for an annual intake of 150-200 officers. The apparent lack of success was blamed primarily on the inadequacy of the Board of Examiners -- too small to process the large number of applications for lateral entry and so overburdened with examining procedures that the program for further meetings with college and university faculties had to be curtailed. Secondly, the "Foreign Affairs Intern Program" continued to recruit college graduates in competition with the Board of Examiners.²⁴

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Program in the College was implemented by the author.

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Revised November 2011

1. Classification of the subject

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There is a significant difference in the amount of time spent in the different states of the system.

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members of institutions will find the following information useful:

11-10-1962

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bioactive compounds present in the plant.

These efforts are crowned with only partial success in convincing

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12.2 per cent (instead of 50.1 per cent) (provision only in addition

of equipment. The cost of equipment was \$1,039 and was recorded in 1935. Only one item

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6 150-200 dollars. The apparent lack of resources and training

and the frequency of the wave of excitation — the small to increase the

was member of applicants for Internal City, and in connection with

examining procedures that the program for United Nations with countries

of military facilities and to be carried, directly, by the Warsaw

"Fair Labor Program," continued in several college newspapers in

competition with the Board of Education.

²⁴ There are two different intern programs. The first provides an opportunity of summer work in the Department to selected college graduates who have been nominated by their university faculties. After a summer of work in the Department, during which those selected are exposed to some of the sundry daily tasks of foreign affairs, they are encouraged to take the regular examination for FSO-8. Though the Executive Director estimated that some 2,800 potential candidates were lost by the Board of Examiners to the intern program, it is submitted that if they did not take examinations for appointment to FSO-8 after their summer of work, then their interest in becoming members of the Foreign Service was superficial and transitory -- they would never have developed into good officers, and the Department is better without them.

The second intern program, the Management Intern Program, is designed to create a supply of administrative functionaries whose intent is to remain in administration. Personnel entering this program take a Federal Service Employees Examination and, if successful, enter the Department in Grades GS-7 through GS-11, depending on their qualifications. Their first two years, intern years, are probationary as is the case with all Civil Service employees. There are presently twelve persons in this program, which will end in January, 1965.

The Board of Examiners made plans to appoint some two hundred candidates through examinations to be held in the fall of 1952 through liberalizing age and language requirements. Unfortunately, the Board was laboring in a vacuum -- all appointments to Class VI ceased in August, 1952. Then recruitment responsibility was removed from the Board of Examiners and delegated to a newly-created Division of Recruitment. This Division, given authority to conduct all recruitment for the Department of State, established a College Relations Unit to continue to tap the obvious source of personnel. However, this Division was absorbed as a branch of the Office of Personnel as part of the general move to deemphasize recruitment in accordance with the program of the new administration. The new Republican administration had promised economy and reform to the electorate. Thus a stringent economy drive produced a reduction in force program which, coupled with a reappraisal of government security measures and an examination of employee reliability, was compounded by a chronic shortage of funds.

There are two different kinds of people. The first kind are the "good" people, the second kind are the "bad" people. The "good" people are the ones who are honest, who are kind, who are helpful, who are generous, who are brave, who are strong, who are wise, who are just, who are true, who are pure, who are good. The "bad" people are the ones who are dishonest, who are cruel, who are unhelpful, who are stingy, who are cowardly, who are weak, who are foolish, who are unjust, who are false, who are impure, who are bad.

The second major project, the development of a new system of classification for the purpose of classifying the various types of information, is being carried out by the Department of Defense. This project is being carried out by the Department of Defense, and is being carried out by the Department of Defense.

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1999

In the fall of 1953 over a thousand persons took the written examination for Class VI, but only 108 names appeared on the Eligible List. Of these, 4 had established eligibility in the 1949 examinations, 8 in the 1950 examinations, 24 in the 1951 examinations, and 72 in the 1952 examinations.

In 1951 the Foreign Service Officer Corps had a total strength of 1,390. This reached a peak strength of 1,427 in 1953 but fell to 1,285 through annual attrition in 1954. Attrition, in fact, exceeded by 55 per cent the total entry at the bottom. Instead of expanding to meet increased responsibilities, the Foreign Service was growing smaller.

The Wriston Committee

The unhappy state of recruitment had become so desperate by early 1954 that even the most reactionary in the Department conceded that some remedy was required. The appointment by the Secretary of State of a Public Committee on Personnel (known familiarly as the Wriston Committee after the name of its chairman, the president of Brown University) climaxed a decision to inquire into the administration of the Foreign Service. The Wriston Committee was requested to study and make recommendations concerning the organization of the Service, the feasibility of amalgamating Civil Service employees of the Department of State with the Foreign Service, personnel and administrative policy, restoration of public confidence, and the morale of the Foreign Service.

Two months after it began its work, the Wriston Committee made its report. The conservative recruitment policies which produced the lowest numerical strength in the Foreign Service Officer Corps since 1948 were sharply criticized; poor administration permitted the intake of officers to fluctuate without due regard for real needs.

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1771-1772 1773-1774

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The report noted that responsibilities had increased while size decreased, necessitating immediate expansion. Because it was too late to build through bottom intake, it was recommended that Civil Service personnel of the Department of State be integrated to the greatest extent possible. It was noted that about half of these personnel (in Grades GS-7 or above) were in positions ranging from desk officer to the highest levels of the Department. Only 119 Foreign Service officers, staffing 2 per cent of the home desks, were on duty in the Department in Washington.

It was emphasized that the Foreign Service must "open its ranks to a large number of people with a high degree of specialization in other than the general practice of diplomacy."²⁵ Because the Foreign Service

²⁵ Quoted from "Toward a Stronger Foreign Service," Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel (Washington: 1954), p. 14.

Reserve, organized to supply officers with such skills, had failed to provide them, the Wriston Committee recommended a solution of permitting large numbers of Civil Service employees the "attractive" and "rewarding" opportunity of transferring into the Foreign Service Officer Corps. The Committee considered that the Foreign Service should be "geographically representative, adequately reflective of the wide and essential variety of American life, and sufficiently diversified in the technical skills required in present-day diplomacy."²⁶ In order to increase the Foreign

²⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

Service rapidly to an adequate size of about 3,900, the Committee recommended that lateral entry into the upper and middle grades from

the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, and the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, and the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, are the primary agencies responsible for the management of the public lands in the State of California. The Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, and the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, are the primary agencies responsible for the management of the public lands in the State of California.

It was mentioned that the Foreign Service was "open" to women in a large number of ways with the degree of restriction in other than the general category of "women's work".

of various life and activities associated in the natural world
regeneration, especially in the case of the natural world
Diversity considered that the natural world would be "potentially
opportunity of translating into the foreign sector of the world. The
large number of life forms requires the "active" and "passive"
provide that the global diversity represented a balance of potential
diversity, appears to have different with each other, but failed to

04 00 00115

Device sagging is an important sign of about 3.5% the diameter

the Staff and Reserve Corps, as well as from the Civil Service, be utilized.

For future recruitment, the Committee reaffirmed the principle of annual, competitive, nation-wide examination. However, the Board of Examiners was castigated for "want of close and fruitful relationship with colleges and universities, the Service's principal source of officer-candidates."²⁷

²⁷Ibid., p. 39.

The Department of State was urged, by Wriston Committee recommendation, to establish a system of national, competitive scholarships to provide a steady and adequate flow of excellent, varied, representative personnel. This system would be patterned after the Navy's successful Contract Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program. The Committee felt that this was the only method of insuring the five hundred personnel required each year to support a Foreign Service trebled in size.

Action and Reaction

The energetic action of the Department of State in implementing the recommendations of the Wriston Committee surprised most observers. The Board of Examiners was directed to revise, modernize, liberalize, and expedite examining and appointing procedures. The Secretary of State further directed that legislative authority for the proposed scholarship program be sought.

Draft legislation for the Proposed Foreign Service Scholarship Training Program was completed in the early months of 1955. Seven hundred and fifty scholarships of \$900 each were to be awarded, under a state quota system, to candidates nominated by members of Congress on

the body and Reserve Force, as well as from the right service, as

outlined.

For future reference, the Committee considered the possibility of
annual, unexpired, full-time appointments. However, the fact of
flexibility was considered for "need of income and training" purposes
with salaries and allowances, the service's financial needs in

effect-consideration.

11th, p. 38.

The Department of State and Navy, in various legislative documents
action, to establish a system of training, competitive selection
in various areas and assigned time in training, which, representative
personnel. This system would be organized along the Navy's successful
Contract with Marine Corps (Training and Education). The Committee
felt that this was the only system of training the five member personnel
required each year to support a foreign service system in time.

Action and Reaction

The specific action of the Department of State in implementing
the recommendations of the Action Committee required with objects.
The Board of Examiners was divided in terms, economic, legislative,
and expedite examining and appointing procedures. The necessity of basic
further directed that legislative authority for the proposed reorganization
program be sought.

Staff legislation for the proposed Foreign Service Administration
training program was completed in the early months of 1952. Seven
hundred and fifty candidates of 1950 rank were to be assigned, under
a state exam system, in accordance with the needs of Congress on

the basis of competitive examinations administered by the Secretary of State. It was estimated that this program would cost more than \$1,600,000 each year of the operation.

Before submitting the legislation to Congress, the Bureau of the Budget was given an opportunity to express its views. The Bureau of the Budget did not endorse the proposed legislation, because there was "grave doubt of State's ability to take into the Service sufficient trainees from the program to justify its cost, judging from past recruitment history."²⁸ It was also suggested that scholarship candidates

²⁸From an unpublished memorandum of May 6, 1955, from the President's Advisor on Personnel Management, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

would possess so great an advantage over others taking the examinations for appointment that those appointed might become limited to persons fortunate enough to have been selected for the scholarship program. The Bureau of the Budget argued further that an undesirable political coloration, even though remote, would be introduced into the appointment procedure, and that a bad precedent would be set in establishing a scholarship training program to satisfy the requirements for only one relatively small segment of the civilian federal service. The inevitability of military service would interrupt the constant flow of scholarship personnel into the Foreign Service. Reconsideration of the legislation was accordingly recommended to the Department of State.

As a result of the Wriston Committee's recommendation that recruitment be based upon closer relationships with the principal source of candidates, some 233 colleges and universities were visited by teams of Foreign Service officers. Future entrance through examination at the bottom grade was stressed in the detailed explanation given to students

and faculties alike concerning the career opportunities afforded by the Foreign Service. These efforts brought some 7,404 candidates to take the written examinations of June and December, 1955, and 8,069 candidates for the examinations of 1956. Of these candidates, some 588 were appointed. The table on page 41 indicates the results of continuing liaison with the colleges from 1957 through 1964.

Generally, these candidates have come from all parts of the United States, though approximately one-third are from the Middle Atlantic States. There has been a recent increase in personnel from the California area, reflecting properly the population trends. In 1952, it was noted that 25 per cent of those Foreign Service officers appointed had attended Harvard, Princeton, or Yale. By 1956, the number appointed from these universities had been reduced to 17 per cent, indicating the success of the Department in diversifying and transfusing more of "main street" into the arteries of the Foreign Service.²⁹ However, it must be

29

The high percentage of successful candidates from Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, it may be surmised, is also indicative of the higher academic standards maintained by these universities. Owing to the large annual number of applicants for admission to these universities, they need only admit those whose academic abilities have been amply demonstrated in the high schools and preparatory schools. Attrition within these universities further screens out those unable to maintain their scholarly achievements at a high level. For this reason, then, the candidates from Harvard, Princeton, and Yale are an academic elite whose chances of successfully passing both written and oral Foreign Service examinations are immeasurably greater than candidates from other universities whose academic standards are not so high. Yet, as of December 1, 1963, it was determined that Foreign Service officers had received their undergraduate degrees from 412 colleges and universities in the United States and 31 foreign universities. See United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, November 21, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part IV, pp. 345-349 for a list of those universities involved.

remembered that the Foreign Service is not a congress and does not seek to resolve conflicting social and regional viewpoints. The demand for a

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55

The high percentage of successful candidates from minority backgrounds, it was concluded, is due to the fact that the majority of the students are from the same background as the teachers. The majority of the students are from the same background as the teachers. The majority of the students are from the same background as the teachers.

to resolve conflicting social and physical requirements. The second set of theories that the Foreign Service is not a computer and does not have

larger and more representative service should never be allowed to overshadow the need for high quality.

It has been charged that the recruitment program and the promotion program favored Ivy League or white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. This charge has been partially answered in the preceding paragraph. The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, the Honorable William J. Crockett, in testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee, further refuted the charge.

For instance, it is one of our continuing problems that the very toughness of the Foreign Service entrance examination excludes many Negro candidates. We have virtually no successful candidates from southern Negro colleges simply because their training in these colleges has not been oriented toward successfully preparing for the entrance examinations. So although there was no overt intention to do this, sometimes our standards or the application of our standards caused this.³⁰

³⁰ Ibid., p. 296.

A Ford Foundation project, partially administered by the Department, will select some twenty-five students from various colleges, principally Negroes, and provide them with two summers of work in the Department and graduate training at selected graduate schools in foreign affairs, economics, or public administration. On completion of their graduate year, these students will take the examination for entrance at the FSO-8 level.

A Foreign Service Academy?

Though the scholarship program was quietly aborted, the much-discussed Foreign Service Academy scheme, first considered by the 82nd Congress, is still bruited about. H. R. 1870, introduced in the 83rd Congress, proposed a four-year specialized curriculum for the preparation

of junior Foreign Service officers. Its students, selected by national competitive examination, were to receive the same pay and allowances as cadets at the United States Military Academy. Neither this bill, its predecessor in the 82nd Congress, nor successors in the 84th through 87th Congresses, received much serious consideration because of a fear, both within and outside of the Foreign Service, that such an academy would eliminate diversity in the Service by tending to force its students into a single mold and to breed a caste spirit. The Honorable Lincoln Gordon, U. S. Ambassador to Brazil, in testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee, indicated that "drawing junior recruits of the Service from the whole range of American colleges and universities, and from many graduate schools as well, provides a far broader base and much better prospects of highly qualified entrants into the career."³¹

³¹United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), part V, p. 376.

Further, the decision to seek a career in the Foreign Service would be undesirably pushed back to the high school level, at which stage it would be most difficult to judge the qualities of the applicants.³²

³²Imagine the initial uniform outfit for each budding diplomat! For example:

Coat, morning (cutaway)	each	1
Trousers, striped, diplomat's	pair	1
Ties, silk, striped, old school	each	3
Spats, gray, w/pearl buttons	pair	2
Portfolio, leather, black, brass mounted, w/lock	each	1
Suit, flannel, oxford gray, sincere, winter, business	each	3
Suit, dacron, cord, striped, blue, sincere, summer	each	2

of United Kingdom between England and Scotland, and the
 comparison of the two countries, and the
 as shown in the British Isles, and the
 the movement in the two countries, and the
 17th century, and the 18th century, and the
 both within and outside of the British Empire, and the
 main elements of the British Empire, and the
 into a single unit, and the British Empire, and the
 Gordon, H. A. and the British Empire, and the
 International, and the British Empire, and the
 from the whole of the British Empire, and the
 many economic schools of thought, and the
 better prospects of the British Empire, and the

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...the fact that the ... of the ...

Let \mathcal{C} be the class of all \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 and let \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 be the classes of all \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 respectively. Then \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 are both in \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{C} is the smallest class containing \mathcal{C}_1 and \mathcal{C}_2 . □

[illegible]

Suit, dacron, cord, striped, brown, sincere,
summer
Etc.

each 3

See Zara S. Steiner, Present Problems of the Foreign Service (Princeton University: March 20, 1961), p. 43, for more discussion on an undergraduate Foreign Service Academy.

The latest guise of the Foreign Service Academy scheme, S. 865 of the 88th Congress, for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs College at the graduate level, was given more earnest consideration; because it was suggested by the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, known more commonly as the Herter Committee. This group of private citizens, most of whom had been previously involved professionally in foreign affairs, was constituted late in 1961 at the request of Secretary Rusk. It was established under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and drew its financial support from the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, thus giving its findings some semblance of independence and impartiality. Former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter was chairman of the twelve-man group which included former ambassadors John Hay Whitney and George V. Allen. The Committee focused its attention on the personnel problems of the Department of State, A. I. D., and U. S. I. A.

As outlined in S. 865, the College would consist of two main operating divisions -- one for instruction and the other for research. The instructional division would assume and enlarge upon the activities of the existing Foreign Service Institute other than consular, visa, and immigration instruction. Curricula would include language instruction, area studies, orientation of new officers whose substantive work would be in the field of foreign affairs, orientation of government officers designated for service abroad and their accompanying relatives, and

courses similar to the existing midcareer and senior officer courses. It is considered that this instruction could be performed adequately by the existing Foreign Service Institute provided with additional funds for an enlarged student body and curriculum.

The real justification for the Academy, according to its proponents, lies in the proposed character of the research division. The Herter Committee hopefully describes the Academy as "a graduate-type institution," autonomous, "new and unique," and "topnotch." This is a government enterprise which is to enjoy "freedom of inquiry" and "the advantages of the traditional academic environment" along with access to official secrets. To staff its faculty, the Herter Committee hopes to attract "the best of American minds."³³

³³Personnel For the New Diplomacy (Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel. Washington: Judd & Detweiler, Inc., 1962), pp. 103-111.

Admittedly, training is important; but intellectual improvement does not necessarily presage improvement in the management of complex foreign affairs. The Honorable Dean Acheson, commenting on S. 865 in a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, stated, "Not knowledge alone, but how it is marshaled by will and brought to bear in action, must remain the determining consideration in the conduct of foreign policy."³⁴

³⁴United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), part V, p. 379.

Able individuals will, no doubt, benefit from the academic instruction envisaged, but minds which do not gain from experience and responsible

There are no other persons who are known to have been in contact with the subject of this report.

1. The first of these is the fact that the Commission has not yet received any information from the Government of the United States regarding the activities of the "Black Panther Party" in the United States. This is a serious matter, and the Commission is deeply concerned about the possibility of a large-scale infiltration of the United States by the "Black Panther Party".

and the various conditions in the course of which the
but now it is considered by all and sundry to have its origin, and
a letter to Herbert A. Wilson, Editor, New York Times, dated
Foreign Affairs, The American People, Washington, D. C. 20540
and not necessarily through the Department of Justice
Administrative Division, and (individuals) (individuals)

[illegible]

While individuals will, on demand, readily give the economic justification for their actions, they will not give the moral justification for their actions.

contacts with problems are not likely to receive such qualities in the course of lectures. Lectures cannot equip personnel to handle crises.

Many advocates of the project are fond of citing the 12 per cent of the armed forces officer's career spent in training and comparing it with the Foreign Service officer's 5 per cent. Such a comparison is not analgous, and the percentage of time which military officers spend in training is certainly greater than 12 per cent. Excepting for brief periods of war, the military establishment is continually in training for war. It is a force in being which is brought to bear through the consciousness of its potential rather than actual employment. The foreign policy establishment, on the contrary, is operating in its fullest sense at all times, especially in peace.

Assuming that "the best of American minds" could be attracted, is it logical to assume that any administration would permit this faculty free and unhampered public scope to criticize or question the policies being pursued? Further, since the proposed bill does not include relevent terms of tenure, academic freedom cannot exist. Political control, despite pious utterances to the contrary, is implicit in a lack of professional tenure -- the College Chancellors, the Board of Regents, and the financial support would be subject to the vagaries of such control.

In view of the foregoing, how is it proposed to attract a faculty with "that rare mixture of high academic standards and rich exposure to the practical world of foreign affairs" -- men which the Herter Committee admits are in short supply? Such men already have tenure in the institutions where they teach or high salaries in the businesses which they direct.

The first period we will consider is the period from 1900 to 1914. During this time, the United States was engaged in a policy of imperialism, seeking to acquire new territories and establish a global empire. This policy was driven by a combination of economic interests, strategic considerations, and a sense of national destiny.

In the early years of the century, the United States focused on acquiring territories in the Pacific Ocean, particularly Hawaii and the Philippines. These acquisitions were justified by the need for coaling stations for naval ships and as a means of expanding American trade routes. The Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in the acquisition of these territories, marking the beginning of the United States' imperial adventures.

By 1914, the United States had established a significant presence in the Pacific and Caribbean regions. However, the outbreak of World War I in Europe forced the United States to shift its focus to the Atlantic and European theaters. The war ended in 1918, with the United States emerging as a major world power and a permanent member of the League of Nations.

The second period we will consider is the interwar period, from 1918 to 1939. During this time, the United States pursued a policy of isolationism, seeking to avoid entanglement in foreign conflicts. This policy was based on the belief that the United States should concentrate on domestic issues and protect its own interests rather than becoming involved in the struggles of other nations.

Despite its isolationist stance, the United States remained active in international affairs, particularly in the Americas. The United States intervened in several Latin American countries, often citing the need to protect American interests or promote stability. The United States also played a key role in the creation of the League of Nations, although it ultimately refused to join the organization.

The third period we will consider is the wartime period, from 1939 to 1945. During this time, the United States entered World War II, fighting against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States' entry into the war was prompted by the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, which brought the United States directly into the conflict.

The United States' military efforts during the war were instrumental in defeating the Axis powers. In the Pacific, the United States fought a series of battles, culminating in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, which led to Japan's surrender. In Europe, the United States fought alongside the Soviet Union and other Allied forces, contributing significantly to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

The final period we will consider is the postwar period, from 1945 to the present. During this time, the United States emerged as the dominant superpower in the world, leading the free world against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States played a central role in the reconstruction of Europe and Japan after the war, and in the establishment of the United Nations and other international organizations.

In the postwar era, the United States has continued to play a major role in global affairs, often acting as a mediator between conflicting nations. The United States has also been involved in several military interventions, most notably in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. Despite these challenges, the United States remains one of the most powerful and influential nations in the world today.

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in view of the foregoing, now is it proposed to discuss a further
with "some few minutes of your valuable attention and your assistance
to the practical world of business affairs" -- and which the latter
Committee should and in short answer. Thus we already have found in
The Committee which they have of high authority to the Committee
which they have

A wiser and more economical course would be to continue training in the Foreign Service Institute and the service war colleges, none of which have problems that more generous budgets could not resolve. Finally, existing colleges and universities already offer excellent facilities for advanced international studies and research. Tuition grants for officer students and contributions to such institutions for increased expenses would make instruction and research available to Foreign Service officers under conditions of real academic freedom.³⁵

³⁵For more discussion on the Foreign Service Academy, see Ellis O. Briggs, "Case Against a 'West Point' for Diplomats," The New York Times Magazine, May 3, 1964, pp. 20, 60, 62, and 64. See also Briggs, "Let's Shoot the Piccolo Player," The Foreign Service Journal, XL (March, 1963).

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On the Lincoln trial, the Lincoln defense counsel, Mr. John D. Jones, said, "I, John D. Jones, do hereby certify that the above is a true and correct copy of the original as it appears in the Lincoln defense counsel's files."

EXAMINATION DATA 1957-1964

Results of Examinations for Appointment to FSO-8

Examination Year	No. of Applicants	No. Examined	No. Passed Written	No. Passed Oral	No. Certified/Appointed
1957 (June)	4,385	2,616	556	80*	46**
1957 (Dec.)	6,094	3,959	676	87*	26**
1958	***	***	***	***	***
1959	10,112	6,470	1,311	342	227
1960	8,015	5,230	1,469	1,469	365
1961	6,066	3,815	1,068	226	140
1962	4,465	2,773	1,079	268	121
1963	8,127	5,325	952	168	4
1964	4,671	2,792	405	4+	+

The annual number of applicants for appointment to FSO-8 shown in the table above is indicative of the continuing liaison with the colleges and universities and the fiscal ability to sustain this program. The number of candidates successfully completing both written and oral examinations reflects efforts to resolve conflicting needs of the Service with the stringent academic standards. The number certified/appointed is reflective of funds available to augment the Foreign Service. The above figures do not indicate the number of candidates withdrawing before oral examinations, or the number withdrawing after oral examinations, or those otherwise disqualified after oral examinations.

* 15 candidates were deferred pending a second oral examination from the June, 1957, group and 13 from the December, 1957, group. Final disposition of these candidates was not available.

** 18 candidates were pending appointment from the June, 1957, group and 54 from the December, 1957, group. Final disposition of these personnel was not available, but it is safe to assume that they were appointed unless they withdrew of their own accord.

*** No examinations were given in this year.

+ These figures are incomplete because oral examinations are still in process as this is being written.

CHAPTER IV

TRAINING

The Ideal Candidate

Traditionally, the Foreign Service has sought men with general experience who are readily adaptable to all kinds of work but not particularly expert in any one field. Their ideal applicant for the bottom grade is between twenty and thirty years old, preferably under twenty-six, with a bachelor's degree. He should be able to read the English language with clear understanding and to write it with clarity and precision. The candidate should also be able to read reasonably well in either French, German, Spanish, or Russian; possess an elementary knowledge of economics; and have a general knowledge of American history.

The Examination

As given prior to 1955, the written examinations lasted over a period of three and a half days. It was designed, in its emphasis upon the formal aspects of learning, to test the quality and breadth of mind of the recent college graduate with a background in liberal arts. The examination also gave some advantage to candidates whose education extended beyond the undergraduate level.

The written examination was composed of four general examinations and three special examinations covering reading and comprehension, vocabulary, statistical interpretation, factual information, written

expression, world history and government, principles of economics, and languages. Those candidates successful in the written examinations passed on to an equally formidable oral examination administered by a panel of five Deputy Examiners. These Deputy Examiners, experienced in and out of government in the field of personnel and management, would probe for more than a half hour such characteristics as poise, facility and precision of expression, forcefulness, knowledge of the United States, and adaptability for the Foreign Service.

Formerly given only in Washington, the oral examination tended to favor those candidates who could afford the speculative outlays of money which would be required of those residing any distance from the capital.

The written examinations utilized since 1955 have been prepared by the Educational Testing Service at Princeton, New Jersey. These are composed of four parts: a ninety-minute test in English expression; a ninety-minute test in statistical analysis; a two-hour test, half of which relates to social studies and half to humanities and natural science; and, finally, an hour test in French, German, Spanish, or Russian.

Critics of the new examination, which is now given in 69 U. S. cities and 110 posts abroad, point out that there is no test of the candidate's ability to write a prose composition. Multiple-choice questions have replaced essay questions. Considering the needs of the Foreign Service, this is indeed a glaring omission, and considerable pressure has been exerted on the Department to return to the essay form. The hour test in modern languages has been made optional. Less than 2 per cent of those taking the examination now attempt the language examination, and only half of these pass it satisfactorily. Formal training in international affairs has been deemphasized, so that only a general liberal arts

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background is essential to successful competition. No rewards accrue to candidates with additional training in fields that are particularly germane to foreign affairs. Finally, the very brevity is indicative of the reduction in scope.

Even the oral examination¹ has been liberalized. In lieu of the

¹It is now given in 23 U. S. cities and 15 foreign cities.

formidable five, a thorough three conversationally scrutinizes the facets of the candidate's personality for character defects that might inhibit effectiveness in the Foreign Service. However, despite apparent liberalization, approximately half of the candidates successful in the written examinations are eliminated in this screening process, which normally lasts an hour and a half.

Having vaulted the hurdle of written examination, satisfied loyalty scrutineers of a lack of subversive tendencies, and disposed the oral inquirers to place his name on the Eligible List, some initial training remains to be completed prior to assignment within the Department, or as third assistant "flunky" in a large embassy, or in a more important position such as vice-consul in an "important" location such as Vigo. To this end the Foreign Service Institute was established.

The Foreign Service Institute

The Department of State had for many years, particularly after the passage of the Rogers Act of 1924, carried on a program of limited training for Foreign Service officers who had just been admitted to the Service. In pre-World War II days, such training was carried out on an ad hoc basis, the number of new Foreign Service officers at any one time

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being small. Being mindful of the vastly increasing role of the United States in international politics and anticipating an increasing number of new personnel requiring orientation courses prior to assignment, provision was made for the establishment of the Foreign Service Institute in the draft legislation which became the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

Its precursor, the Division of Training Service, had been established by a departmental order of April 7, 1945, in expectation of training a large group of armed forces veterans. This division provided basic orientation for junior officers and advanced courses for Foreign Service officers of middle grades in preparation for higher administrative and fiscal duties. Specialized training at selected colleges, universities, and technical schools was an essential part of this program.

The Basic Course

The Foreign Service Institute, which finally commenced operations on March 13, 1947, initially offered a nine- to twelve-week (now three months) basic officer-training course to acquaint the young officer with the requirements and functions of the Foreign Service. Lectures, conferences, and practice work are utilized, covering all phases of Foreign Service operations. Some effort is presently expended in acquainting the students with the activities of other government agencies participating in the field of foreign affairs. A few lectures introduce them to some of the basic philosophical and political concepts involved in international politics. The last four weeks of the course are applied to training for consular operations.

Degeneration

Before the curriculum was fully devised to provide for advanced and specialized training, the Foreign Service Institute had fallen into

in the early 1960s, which began the process of the 1966
revision was also the establishment of the Foreign Service Institute
of the National Security Council, which began to coordinate
of the National Security Council, which began to coordinate
effort in international affairs and to develop a common
(with itself). These efforts of the United States and the United

1. The Department of Education, the Department of Health, and the Department of Social Services, in cooperation with the Department of the Interior, have been authorized to conduct a study of the educational needs of the Indian population in the United States. This study is being conducted in order to determine the extent of the educational needs of the Indian population and to develop a plan of action to meet these needs. The study is being conducted in cooperation with the Department of the Interior, the Department of Education, the Department of Health, and the Department of Social Services. The study is being conducted in order to determine the extent of the educational needs of the Indian population and to develop a plan of action to meet these needs.

THE WALL GROUP

The British Police Institute, which finally commenced operations on March 11, 1941, initially offered a course in two-semester law enforcement training for British subjects and foreign police officers. The course was designed to provide a foundation in the principles and practice of law enforcement, and to provide a basis for further study and research. The course was divided into two main parts: the first part dealt with the principles and practice of law enforcement, and the second part dealt with the principles and practice of law enforcement in the United Kingdom. The course was highly successful, and it was soon recognized that it was one of the best in the world. It was also recognized that it was one of the most important in the world.

and associated training, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Customs Service will be required to provide for training for officers.

low esteem. The appropriations for its operation have been too small from its inception, representing usually about 1½ per cent of the Department's budget. Whenever the fiscal pinch is felt elsewhere in the Department, funds from the Institute are among the first to be diverted to ease that pinch. This restricts, necessarily, the quantity and/or quality of faculty that can be attracted to supervise and instruct. The Institute was, and is, primarily staffed with Foreign Service officers, some with only limited educational experience.² For these reasons,

²When the Wriston Committee commenced its work in April, 1954, it was calculated that 28.8 per cent of all Foreign Service officers had earned an M. A. degree or its equivalent; 4.6 per cent held a Ph. D. degree; and 25.1 per cent had done graduate work without receiving a degree. See James L. McCamy and Alessandro Corradini, "The People of the State Department and Foreign Service," American Political Science Review, XLVIII (December, 1954), p. 1076. Yet supervisors were, and still are, reluctant to free better officers for duties at the Institute.

academia generally cast a jaundiced eye at the budding institute, which became tolerant amusement and then disdain, as government economics caused it to degenerate into a secretarial school to teach typists the difference between Kleenex and diplomatic notes.

Reconstruction

The Institute was revitalized in the repercussion stemming from the Wriston Report. It is still primarily staffed by Foreign Service officers who will serve in this capacity for only two or three years and then leave the Institute for other duty. The bulk of the teaching is now done by language tutors working on a contract basis, government employees who volunteer their services, and guest professors who give one or two lectures. The library was, and is still, small, supposedly harnessed to the courses of instruction offered; but in my personal opinion, it does not suffice. Like so many other institutes of higher learning in

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When the Western Committee commenced its work in 1904,
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Recommendations

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does not suffice. Like so many other institutions of higher learning in

the metropolitan Washington area, personnel are expected to rely on the resources of the Library of Congress. The competition for books there and the bureaucratic red tape involved in utilizing its books off the premises are too well known to be delineated here.

The Mid-Career Course

The Foreign Service Institute also provides a mid-career course for selected officers from Classes IV, V, and VI; senior seminars for Classes VII and above; and specialized training in languages, area studies, economics, and similar fields which become allied with policy more and more with the passage of time.

The nine-month mid-career course proposes to acquaint students with conceptual theories which may help reporting officers in diagnosing social behavior and to review domestic influences significantly affecting U. S. policy formulation. Though aimed at providing the officer with a broader frame of reference than can be acquired in the field, many diplomats believe that the arts of diplomacy are best learned in the field. This prejudice has not been completely overcome. In the course, a brief introduction is given to:

. . . current theories of social behavior; the agencies, departments, and private interests participating in the field of foreign relations; the domestic values and attitudes underlying American policy; and life in Russia and Communist China. It concludes with a period of studies on good administration and executive practices.³

³Zara S. Steiner, Present Problems of the Foreign Service (Princeton University; March 20, 1961), p. 42.

The entire course conveys an impression of haste and superficiality: How much can be retained from a lecture or two on epistemology, cultural anthropology, or legal-normative theory? Experts in these fields can only give broad generalizations in the time allotted.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or goal. This involves understanding the current situation and what needs to be achieved. It is important to be clear and specific about the objectives.

Journal of Management Inquiry 18(6)

The Foreign Service Institute has produced a classroom course for selected officers from January 19, 1944 to 1945, under the direction of the Institute. This course was designed to provide a general knowledge of the United States, its history, its government, its people, its geography, and its foreign relations. The course was held in the Washington, D. C. area and was attended by approximately 100 officers. The course was held in the Washington, D. C. area and was attended by approximately 100 officers. The course was held in the Washington, D. C. area and was attended by approximately 100 officers.

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The entire course covers an important part of the history of the world, and the student will find it very interesting and profitable. The course is divided into two parts, the first part dealing with the history of the world from the beginning of time to the present, and the second part dealing with the history of the world from the present to the future. The course is very well planned and the student will find it very interesting and profitable.

In the fields of functional and specialized training, priority has been given to language instruction, particularly French, German, and Spanish. It was noted that some 50 per cent of all officers lacked a useful knowledge of any foreign tongue in 1958. In addition to the major languages, intensive instruction is being given in exotic languages in recognition of a growing interest in and increasing contacts with Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. This language study forms the base of three major area specialization programs, some of which are conducted in universities. Other personnel pursue training in the more common areas of Western Europe and Latin America. Under ideal conditions, the officer becomes a linguistic, geographical, and political expert in the area studied.

A few officers receive training for specialization in economic affairs -- trade, finance, investment, labor, aviation, and economic development, for example; others specialize in international organization, where the knowledge of the historian and the qualities of a technical expert, political analyst, and extemporaneous debater are necessary.

The Senior Seminar

The Senior Seminars began in 1959. Usually, some twenty persons, half of whom are brought from outside of the Foreign Service, probe a wide variety of subjects but none in depth. The emphasis is on briefings, lectures, and discussions led by "visiting firemen." The result is the same superficiality found in the mid-career course. There is no time spent in concentrating on one or two problems of international politics which may become crucial to U. S. policy in the next decade. The concentration on one problem relevant to future U. S. policy would provide a more fruitful method of conducting this seminar.

Training in Department of Defense Establishments

Usually about thirty more senior officers are assigned to one of the defense colleges annually for training. The majority attend the National War College; a smaller number attend the Naval War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Air University. An even smaller number attend the Imperial Defense College or the NATO Defense College. The attendance of Foreign Service officers in these institutions is not predicated upon concentrated research in some area of international politics, but rather to provide them with new contacts and ideas which may become applicable in the international area. Another unadvertised facet of this program is to give Foreign Service officers an appreciation of what the military can do for them, and vice versa. Such knowledge should be available to senior diplomats⁴ who may be required to

⁴Military attachés are occasionally asked to provide this type of advice to their ambassadors. Though these officers were primarily assigned for intelligence and representation functions, the country team concept has given a larger scope to their activities. The ultimate scope of their activities is, of course, dependent on the wishes of the ambassador.

make a decision affecting the deployment of large military forces. There was a time in the not-too-distant past when the Foreign Service and military establishment viewed each other with a mutual, veiled suspicion. This program has engendered a considerable alleviation of this problem.

Recommendations Concerning the Institute

It should be obvious from the foregoing that if the Foreign Service Institute is to be maintained to perform those functions which serve as a rationale for its existence, its permanent staff should be enlarged, both from the ranks of experienced Foreign Service officers and from university faculties. The present system of utilizing temporary

instructors for one or two lectures is, at best, a stopgap measure. While experts should be invited to lead seminars or give courses, a permanent staff is required to develop an adequate training program. A tour of duty on the Institute staff should have the same attractiveness for a Foreign Service officer that a tour of duty at Annapolis has for a naval officer. To accomplish the requisite enhancement of prestige, the Institute should be guaranteed of adequate funds, despite the whims of economy-minded Congresses or penny-pinching Department administrators, in order to pay salaries attractive to the best academicians.

Many, however, feel that the Foreign Service Institute can, at best, only duplicate the facilities of a good university in terms of books, courses, and professors. It is considered that the facilities of the five or six graduate schools now developing programs in international relations could hardly be matched. Yet such graduate schools do not operate at the convenience of the Department of State and are notoriously "sticky" about applications being made many months in advance. Finally, there is little agreement among the faculties of these universities as to what courses should be pursued in advanced studies of international relations. Those academic lines of investigation pursued may or may not fit specific present or predicted needs of the Department. These problems, however, are relatively minor -- problems which could be fruitfully resolved by close liaison between those universities conducting studies in international relations and the Department.

Experience

Many observers feel that the government is suffering from an overconfidence in formal educational processes and an overestimation of the

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There is no doubt that the Government is entitled to the same treatment as the private citizen in the matter of the right to a fair trial.

benefits to be derived therefrom. Assuming a good educational foundation, experience is always the best teacher for the Foreign Service officer. "On the job training and experience are likely to be more educational . . . than a year at an educational institution."⁵

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State, Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 12.

This is not intended to denigrate the value of formal educational processes, but rather to place the benefits of such processes in their proper perspective. An opportunity to catch up with advances in specialized fields or to become acquainted with research in new fields will be useful to some officers. However, "for training related to government requirements, better use can be made of interagency job exchanges, like the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program."⁶

⁶Ibid.

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CHAPTER V

CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Career Planning

A number of administrative surveys begun by the Career Development and Counseling Section of the Personnel Office, in the spirit of the Wriston Report, have not yet been completed. "According to many reports, present staffing patterns are a strange mixture of personal influence, regional rivalries, area proximity, and budgetary considerations."¹ It

¹Zara S. Steiner, The State Department and the Foreign Service, The Wriston Report -- Four Years Later (Princeton University, March 26, 1958), p. 37.

is almost inconceivable that no current inventory of overseas positions and officer skills is maintained. Though the Department has been developing what may be "the most advanced conceptual approach (to a career development program) of any civilian agency of the Federal Government,"² its impact on operational decisions has been negligible.

²Personnel For the New Diplomacy (Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel. Washington: Judd & Detweiler, Inc., 1962), p. 83.

The Career Development and Planning Section lacks manpower information on which to base its career planning recommendations. Created to synchronize the development of specialists and generalists with commensurate demand, the program has not been coordinated with recruitment and promotion -- hence its failure to exert any significant influence. The Department supposedly makes assignments according to

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

General Findings

A number of administrative measures taken by the Government and Consulting Section of the Personnel Office, in the light of the existing report, have not been completed. According to many details, present existing policies are a strong obstacle to personnel reform, regional rivalry, more provincial, and negatively recommendations. It

¹ State of Affairs, the State Department and the Foreign Office, the State Department -- Four Years Later (Washington University, March 19, 1951), p. 31.

is almost inconceivable that no current inventory of overseas positions and official skills is maintained. Indeed the situation has been developing what may be "the most advanced conceptual approach (to a career development program) of any civilian agency of the Federal Government,"² its impact on operational decisions has been negligible.

² Personnel for the New Military (Report of the Committee on Foreign Military Personnel, Washington: Joint Personnel, Inc., 1951), p. 33.

The Career Development and Planning Section lacks necessary information on which to base its career planning recommendations. Career is synchronizing the development of specialists and generalists with commensurate demand, the program has not been coordinated with recruitment and promotion -- hence the failure to meet any significant financial. The department supposedly raised assignments according to

"the needs of the service," but how can a career be planned if career patterns designed to broaden experience and develop personnel for greater responsibility are ignored?

The Herter Committee has indicated that the Career Development and Planning Section staff has been too small and uneven in quality and that it has been a repeated target for budget cuts.³ They recommend

³Ibid., p. 84.

that the Department obtain "highly qualified professionals in the field of personnel" to staff this unit. In plain English, the Herter Committee suggests creating an empire of career developers and personnel planners. Concerning the contribution which such experts can make to the Department, Ellis O. Briggs has commented:

Another foolishness fed by the State Department to the colleges is the proposition that "Management Equals Diplomacy." This reflects the truly astonishing proliferation both within the Department and in its offices abroad of souped-up administrative types who inflate themselves with all sorts of rich and resonant titles like Career Evaluators, General Services Specialists, and even Ministers of Embassy for Administrative Affairs. These glorified janitors, supply clerks, and pants pressers yearn to get their fingers in the foreign affairs pie, and when they do, the diplomatic furniture often gets marked with gummy thumbprints.⁴

⁴Ellis O. Briggs, "Case Against a 'West Point' for Diplomats," The New York Times Magazine, May 3, 1964, p. 20. Mr. Briggs, a retired career ambassador, testified before the Jackson Subcommittee on the marked improvement of administration of the U. S. Embassy in Prague after the communist government of Czechoslovakia declared 66 of his 78 personnel persona non grata in hopes of dealing him a painful blow. He had, prior to the communist coup, been waging an administrative battle with the Department to reduce his staff by 50 per cent. See United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, June 14 and 17, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part II, pp. 130-159.

1990s, the concept of "cultural capital" has been used to describe the knowledge and skills that are valued in the workplace. This concept is often used to explain the success of individuals who have a high level of education and training. Cultural capital is often used to describe the knowledge and skills that are valued in the workplace. This concept is often used to explain the success of individuals who have a high level of education and training.

and there is also a somewhat larger one. The larger one is called "The Great One" and the smaller one is called "The Little One".

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the Department, this is a serious matter. Concerning the political side, the Department is not in a position to comment. It is a matter for the political authorities to decide. The Department is not in a position to comment on the political side of the matter. It is a matter for the political authorities to decide. The Department is not in a position to comment on the political side of the matter. It is a matter for the political authorities to decide.

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Admittedly, there is a complexity in planning a personnel program which will satisfy present needs and prepare for projected future requirements. However, I feel that professional personnel planners and career evaluators are unnecessary. Foreign Service officers, by virtue of a wide variety of experience, ranging from quadruple-entry bookkeeping to the anthropology of Southeast Asia, can best administer the needs of their own service with a small and efficient staff. The problems are of no greater complexity. The assignment of Foreign Service officers to personnel duties in the Department should be viewed in the same light in which naval officers perceive a tour of duty in the Bureau of Naval Personnel -- rewarding and career-enhancing.

Finally, the need for coordination is obvious. Administrative surveys should be expedited, and the resultant planning should be coordinated with recruitment and promotion. With all of their experience in coordination with other executive agencies, it seems paradoxical that there is an uncoordinated area within the Department itself.

Lack of Career Patterns

It is presently obvious that if a man is to make his career in the Foreign Service, he must avoid specialization at all costs. Personnel often desperately needed in Washington for their specialized knowledge are rotated to overseas duties because their superiors feel that postponement of foreign tours may hurt future promotion chances.

Generalists and Specialists

The relative merits of the employment of specialists or generalists in positions of high responsibility is a subject of much sterile debate.

Finally, there is a possibility in (b) that α is

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It is difficult to see how it is possible to have a country in the
European Service, as most of the population of all kinds, whether
of the European or of the American type, are not only not
and are not in contact with the American people and their
movement of living force may not be the same.

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In position of high responsibility is a spirit of such heroic deeds.

The history books of the regiment are written by specialists

Obviously the State Department has need of both -- generalists of good judgement and specialists in law, economics, intelligence, etc.

As seen by the Jackson Subcommittee, "a generalist is a specialist who has widened his interests and sacrificed extreme specialization, with its rewards, for assignments presenting broader challenges, and the rewards associated with work covering much or all of the range of foreign policy."⁵ Thus a generalist should possess specialized com-

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State, Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 10.

petence in some field of related endeavour. This would create an awareness of the limitations of specialization in areas of complexity. Specialization, properly applied, does not conflict with the development of generalists, but rather implements and enhances the training for broad responsibility.⁶

⁶Ibid., p. 11.

The Generalist

Many have considered that the Wriston Report does grave injustice to the role of the generalist. While it is true that overseas programs cannot be administered without men expert in technical skills, ultimate policies must still be determined by generalists -- men of broad background, training, and vision. The political staff, the men who serve successively in a number of countries and deal with a wide variety of problems, remains the spinal column of the Foreign Service, to which the specialists are appendages. Yet the traditional preparation of a

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diplomat has been too narrow. He has too often deprecated the importance of economic and social factors and viewed information (propaganda) programs with a jaundiced and suspicious eye. But the future head of a diplomatic mission is responsible for every aspect of its work and must coordinate the activities of the specialized members of his staff. He therefore needs a sympathetic knowledge and understanding of the non-political aspects of his mission and a wisdom to utilize the expertise at his beck and call.

With the preparation for posts of responsibility in the future in mind, the Department tries to assign the junior officers to positions where they will be introduced to the skills of the economic and commercial officer, the intelligence expert, and the public affairs specialist. In the course of his career, the Foreign Service officer may become expert in a geographical area. He should continue to be given jobs which are related to his past geographic experiences or which will prepare him for more responsible planning and coordinating activities.

Economic Specialists

The highest rewards in the Foreign Service are given to officers performing political work. Few commercial or economic specialists ever become consul generals or chiefs of diplomatic mission. Yet most economic negotiations are conducted on a multi-lateral basis, requiring the presence of a large number of economic experts. If the American case is to be adequately presented, men with broad economic training and experience who are able to deal with a wide variety of problems, and technicians possessing specialized knowledge in commodities, international finance, or world trade, must be available. The problem of recruiting and keeping economic experts has always been a difficult

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Economic Development

The highest rewards in the foreign service are given to officers
performing political work. Few countries are economic specialists
and become political specialists as a result of economic changes. But
most economic specialists are concentrated in a few countries.
Regarding the present of a large number of economic specialists in the
foreign service is to be especially noticeable, and even more noticeable
training and experience and the fact that this is done with a view to
provision, and economic specialists are given to specialists
functional elements, or even teams, both of specialists. The process
of recruiting and training economic specialists for service in a foreign

one because of intense competition for those trained in this field. The State Department and Foreign Service can offer only poor inducements compared to industry.

Intelligence and Research Specialists

There is strong feeling in the Department that the Intelligence and Research Offices engage in academic exercises with little immediate application to the other regional and functional offices. "One Foreign Service officer warned that it was considered a 'graveyard' for aspiring diplomats and was to be avoided at all costs."⁷ Research and analysis

⁷Steiner, The State Department and the Foreign Service, The Wriston Report -- Four Years Later, p. 39.

require background material and experience that can only be built up over a long period of time. It takes time to train a man accustomed to operational work to prepare a background paper or an intelligence estimate. Subtleties of discrimination are required, which come only after years of practice, in order to utilize available sources effectively. Obviously, the Foreign Service officer just returned from a tour of duty in Eastern Europe may not, therefore, be an equal of the man who has studied Eastern European affairs over a long period of time. The incoming officer serves in this office for only three years; but he can, in that period, learn to appreciate the need for accurate reporting from the field and learn some of the niceties connected with this type of reporting for future assignments.

Attracting the specialist without doing injury to the career of the generalist seems to be an unresolved problem at the present time. I personally consider that the Personnel Office would benefit by studying and copying the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

THEIR COMPANY TO INCREASE

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There is strong feeling in the Department that the Intelligence and Research Office should be reorganized to be more effective in its work. The Department is of the opinion that it is not desirable to have a separate Intelligence and Research Office, but that the two functions should be combined in a single office. The Department is of the opinion that the Intelligence and Research Office should be reorganized to be more effective in its work. The Department is of the opinion that it is not desirable to have a separate Intelligence and Research Office, but that the two functions should be combined in a single office.

THE STATE OF NEW YORK
IN SENATE
JANUARY 10, 1917.

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and copying the Bureau of Naval Personnel, personally convinced that the Personnel Office would handle by studying

A Recommended Staff Corps

Specialists specialize, but generalists become ambassadors. This belief has encouraged disdain for activities in fields other than political reporting -- the new activities which developed during and after the second World War. However, according to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, the Honorable William J. Crockett, the Department is "implementing . . . a personnel system that recognizes and encourages the role of specialization in the Foreign Service, that establishes a number of clearly defined management fields, and that offers a tailored career development program for each Foreign Service officer."⁸

⁸United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, November 21, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part IV, p. 278.

Looking at this problem from a point of view narrowed by some twenty-two years of naval service, it seems logical to establish a regular staff corps within the Foreign Service -- a staff corps organized and administered in the same manner in which the Naval Supply Corps, Medical Corps, or Corps of Civil Engineers is managed. Such a corps should include economic specialists, intelligence and research specialists, public affairs specialists, etc. There is no apparent reason why such personnel could not also aspire to the grade of career ambassador and become, as senior fiscal or cultural officer, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs or Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Fiscal officers, for example, could perform a dual function: that of acting as supply and disbursing officer for an embassy and

performing the tasks assigned to economic advisors in a diplomatic mission. In addition to becoming versed in disbursing, an economic specialist should specialize, in depth, in world trade, international finance, commodities, labor, or economic development. From this same corps, personnel to operate the Agency for International Development should be obtained. The Educational and Cultural Affairs specialists could be utilized to operate the U. S. Information Agency.

A sample career for an economic staff corps officer who specializes in labor during his graduate studies tour is shown on page 61.

Administration

There is a tendency in the Department, which also permeates the Foreign Service, to deprecate the Bureau of Administration and its personnel. It seems logical to me to assume that administrative training should be afforded to all Foreign Service officers, staff or line, as a prerequisite to more responsible positions. In considering the career of a naval officer aspiring to command, a normal preparatory tour for the responsibility of command is a tour as an executive officer -- the chief administrator of a command, who executes the captain's policies. In a like manner, I envisage Foreign Service officers receiving training first as administrative assistants and then as "executive officers" of a diplomatic mission. On becoming chief of a diplomatic mission, the Foreign Service officer will have had sufficient administrative preparation to enable him to promulgate administrative policies which will not be burdensome, but practicable and efficient.

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Summary

The foregoing suggestions are indicative of what could be done to develop multiple career patterns to meet the different needs of the Department of State. I do not agree with Deputy Under Secretary Crockett's remarks concerning devising a separately tailored career program for each Foreign Service officer. This, it seems to me, is an absurdity which overlooks one basic fact -- the individual is subject to the needs of the Department and not vice versa. The Department does not exist to cater to individuals.

The suggested career patterns form only a nucleus of the varied career patterns which might be developed by a personnel office administered by and for Foreign Service officers. The establishment of a staff corps should not, however, preclude the assignment of generalists to tours of duty in specialist areas for purposes of broadening their experience and developing an appreciation of the specialized areas. Nor should the specialists who broaden their competence be precluded from becoming generalists and ambassadors. Diplomacy is essentially a personal thing, and the man who excels in one area, usually after study and experience, can excel in another.

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The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation

SECRET

State courts should not, however, maintain the following as precedent:

1. The first group of people who are interested in the results of the study are the researchers themselves. They want to know if the study was successful in achieving its goals and if the data collected is reliable and valid. They also want to know if the study has contributed to the field of research and if it has provided any new insights or findings.

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could the applicant be considered as a person who is

1. *Staphylococcus aureus* (100%)

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4. *Conclusions*

A RECOMMENDED CAREER PATTERN FOR AN ECONOMICS
SPECIALIST -- LABOR -- IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Orientation	
Disbursing Officer and Second Assistant Economic Advisor -- Large Embassy	FSO-8
Home Tour in the Bureau of Economic Affairs or in the Department of Commerce or Labor	FSO-7
Economic Advisor, Labor -- Small Embassy	FSO-6
Graduate Studies in Labor and Its International Aspects Acquire M. A. degree. Selected personnel remain for Ph. D. degree.	FSO-5
Economic Advisor, Labor -- Large Embassy	FSO-4
Tour in the Bureau of Economic Affairs or in the Department of Labor	FSO-3
Member of U. S. Delegation to I. L. O. or E. E. C.	FSO-2
Chief, U. S. Delegation to I. L. O. or Assistant Chief, Bureau of Economic Affairs	FSO-1
Chief, Bureau of Economic Affairs	CAREER MINISTER/CAREER AMBASSADOR

The predicted length of tours, in most cases, will vary from 3 to 4 years, 3½ years being average.

The total length of the career indicated here is 30 years.

The above career can, of course, have as many variations as sub-specialities.

This is intended to be a suggested pattern only.

A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION
TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE
RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES

Date	Title
1900-1	Commission on the Causes of the Recent Economic Crisis in the United States
1900-2	How far in the history of the United States has the government been successful in its efforts to regulate the economy?
1900-3	Economic History, 1800-1850
1900-4	The Economic History of the United States, 1850-1900
1900-5	Economic History, 1900-1950
1900-6	The Economic History of the United States, 1950-1960
1900-7	History of the U. S. Department of the Interior, 1849-1900
1900-8	Chief, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1900-1910
1900-9	Chief, Bureau of Economic Affairs, 1900-1910

The preceding figures of years, in most cases, will vary from 1 to 4 years, 3 years being average.

The total length of the career indicated here is 10 years.

The above career can, of course, be very varied in its details.

This is intended to be a suggested pattern only.

CHAPTER VI

DECISION MAKING AND THE DESK OFFICER

In the preceding chapters, the nexus of national security policy and foreign policy was described. Following this, the historical development of the position of the country desk officer from inception to his present status was delineated. The recruitment of country desk officers, or more specifically, the Foreign Service officers who become country desk officers, was discussed, along with their subsequent training and career development. Having examined these facets to gain an insight into the environment and character of the desk officer, this chapter will describe what he does and how he does it.

The Desk Officer -- Where He Is Now

As a result of successive attempts to meet complex country problems with complex organizational answers, the country desk officer has been relegated to a role bearing little resemblance to his conceived purpose. With a few notable exceptions, what he does today is to serve as a contact point for overseas posts, prepare first drafts and initial recommendations, store information, and try to keep abreast of the activities of colleagues on his level in other agencies. As seen by the Office of Management of the Department, he does not provide leadership in policy formulation, coordination, or decision making.¹ Yet Robert Elder says

¹Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus (Washington: Department of State, 1963), p. 1.

of the country desk officer, "With a considerable degree of truth, it may be said of him that he is both wheelhorse and sparkplug of the decision making process."² It is suggested that the Office of Manage-

²Elder, op. cit., p. 19.

ment, with a reorganizational "axe to grind" and a modicum of contempt bred from close familiarity, might tend to deprecate the importance of the desk officer. Conversely, Mr. Elder may have been overly impressed with the importance-laden atmosphere which seems to prevail in most government bureaus.

It may be asserted with a measure of truth that the successive reorganizational efforts which have led to the diminution of the country desk officer's role have not produced compensating improvements in the policy making and action-capacity of the regional bureaus. The hierarchy above him has proliferated in complexity as he has worked at the same tasks. A Deputy Office Director, Office Director, and a Deputy Assistant Secretary separate him from regular contact with the Assistant Secretary. Consultation with the Secretary has been nearly eliminated by the existence of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and his deputy. In any event, the Secretary has become much too busy to see desk officers.

Layering

The bureau structure has become complicated and confusing. A series of layers between the Secretary and the desk officer delays action and compounds reviews -- a rigidity wasteful of manpower. Responsibility for action, taken or consciously postponed, is so widely diffused below the Assistant Secretary level that accountability is uncertain. Secretary Rusk was particularly illuminating on the detriments of layering in

of the country was affected, with a considerable number of people, in
and he said he had not as yet received any information of any
decision being made. It is suggested that the Office of Economic

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ment, with a recommendation "not to follow" and a decision to proceed
that the close facilities, right now to discuss the importance of
the new office. However, it is not yet clear what will happen
with the independent-acting situation which seems to be still in doubt.
Government continues.

It may be stated with a degree of certainty that the situation
organizational efforts which have led to the formation of the country
and efforts to have not produced considerable improvements in the
policy making and administrative of the national defense. The Ministry
shows that has produced in reality as in the period of the war
there. A heavy office director, office director, and a deputy assistant
secretary separate the two regular contacts with the national government.
Communication with the Secretary has been more stimulated by the
existence of the secretariat for political, military and his deputy.
In any event, the Secretary has become much less busy as the office.

History

The history of the office has been complicated and confused. A review
of history between the Secretary and the staff shows a number of
complicated events -- a history of political, administrative
for action, based on functional position, is so widely different from
the Assistant Secretary that responsibility is uncertain. History
has been particularly complicated in the context of history in

his testimony before the Jackson Subcommittee. Terming it a principal problem, he stated:

For example, when I read a telegram coming in in the morning, it poses a very specific question, and the moment I read it, I know myself what the answer must be. But that telegram goes on its appointed course into the Bureau, and through the office and down to the desk. If it doesn't go down there, somebody feels he is being deprived of his participation in a matter of his responsibility.

Then it goes from the action offices back up through the Department to me a week or 10 days later, and if it isn't the answer that I knew had to be the answer, then I change it at that point, having taken into account the advice that came from below. But usually it is the answer that everybody would know has to be the answer.³

³United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 398.

Delegation of Authority

Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk admits that of the 1,300 incoming cables, he sees only 20 to 30 in his course of daily business; and of the 1,000 outgoing cables, he sees only 6. This indicates that there is extensive delegation of authority down to the level of the desk officer. This thought is further reinforced by Secretary Rusk's comment that, "Junior officers in the Department today deal with and have to deal with matters which before World War II would have come to the Secretary of State."⁴ Thus the desk officer is the key State Department post in

⁴Ibid., p. 388.

bilateral relations with other countries. He is the man that broods 24 hours a day about the problems confronting the United States with respect to a particular country. From his position, the desk officer

can alert the Assistant Secretary to festering problems, to action which may prevent problems, or to existing opportunities where, by early attention, U. S. interests can be sustained and promoted.

Myth of His Role in Major Policy Decisions

As a maker of major policy and important decisions, the desk officer's role is a myth, existing only in the minds of those who have little or no direct dealings with him. He serves as a junior contributor to policy and decision making but has no authority to sign off on other than routine matters. In reality, the country desk officer is a mid-career Foreign Service officer who may or may not have served a tour of duty in his country or area. He keeps track of all aspects of U. S. relations with the country, sees that the U. S. Ambassador and the Diplomatic Mission get the information and support they need to do their jobs, provides coordination among middle-level colleagues in foreign affairs agencies when the Department has action responsibility, serves as the main communication channel between the Department and the U. S. Embassy, and provides a starting point for those seeking action or information concerning U. S. relations with the country.

A Typical Country Desk Officer

Probably there is no such thing as a typical country desk officer, but some generalizations can be made about them without distortion. They are college-trained, coming from some 412 American colleges and universities and some 31 foreign universities as of December 1, 1963.⁵

⁵United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, November 21, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 345-349.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM THE FILES OF THE
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On a number of occasions, the Department has been requested to provide information regarding the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the above report. In response to these requests, the Department has provided information to the extent of its knowledge. It is noted that the information provided is based on the best information available to the Department at the time of the request. The Department is not aware of any other information regarding the activities of the groups and individuals mentioned in the above report.

4. *English Country Man*

university and some 25 foreign universities in November 1965.
That the college-trained, middle class and middle class and
but some generalizations can be made about their attitudes.
Probably there is no such thing as a typical country man abroad.

Division of National Security, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520

They are usually in their late thirties or early forties, possessing verbal skill, initiative, and responsibility. Varied tours of duty have rendered them more adaptable, making them equally at home at a New England clambake or an embassy row cocktail party.

Steppingstones

Foreign Service officers view the country desk as a coveted assignment, ample compensation for tours of duty in lonely outposts. This is not indicative that a Washington tour is particularly desirable, especially when considering the living expenses of such a tour. The desk is a steppingstone in the path of advancement for a Foreign Service officer, just as command of a small vessel is a steppingstone for a naval officer on the path toward becoming an admiral. Even in the complexity of the Department of State structure, the country desk has lost but little of its old glamor.

The country desk officer, for purposes of this study, is the officer immediately responsible for the overall work of a country desk. Sixty per cent of the ninety-six country desks are one-man desks. The median grade of country desk officers is FSO-4. Fifty-six per cent of the ninety-six desk officers have served regular tours of duty in their assigned countries. The page following shows these figures in a more analytical form.

They are known to have been in the vicinity of the
other side, however, and possibly, the possibility of
any further action will be taken, and it is a
question of the future of the country.

Conclusion

It is not possible to say that the country is a
success, but it is not a failure either. It is a
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SOME FACTS ON COUNTRY DESK OFFICERS

(As of February 21, 1963)

60 Percent of the Country Desks Are One-Man Desks

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number in Category</u>
1 officer - 1 country assigned	46
1 officer - 2 or more countries assigned	11
2 or more officers - 1 country assigned	27
2 or more officers - 2 or more countries assigned	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	96

FSO-4 Is the Median Grade of Country Desk Officers

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number in Grade</u>
FSO-1	0
FSO-2	4
FSO-3	37
FSO-4	43
FSO-5	10
FSO-6	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	96

56 Percent Have Served Regular Tours in Their Assigned Countries

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number in Category</u>
Served in assigned country (ies)	54
(16 revisited as desk officers)	
Have not served in assigned country (ies)	42
(22 have visited as desk officers and	
20 have neither served in nor visited)	
TOTAL	<u>96</u>

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

1402 J. Neurosci., September 24, 2008 • 28(39):1400–1408

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2000-2001

Abstract

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Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

Activities

The desk officer serves as the central point where a broad spectrum of matters political, economic, consular, cultural, educational, public affairs, military, etc., are brought to a focus from the viewpoint of the over-all U. S. relationships with a country. He does not make policy; neither does he decide important matters. He provides detailed background and does the "pick and shovel" work for his superiors.

The desk officer drafts communications for signature by the Office Director or a higher official, taking into consideration the established views and policies of the President, Secretary of State, and other officials in the hierarchy of the Department in more responsible positions. With the exception of official informal letters, he does not have authority to sign outgoing communications to the posts, other agencies, the public, or other bureaus in the Department. He prepares briefing and position papers for the use of other officers of the Department and the President in their meetings with representatives of the country in question, or for use at inter-Departmental meetings or international conferences.

He maintains close working relationships with the country's embassy or legation and assists in representation -- hospitality extended to prominent visitors, messages of congratulations, etc. His advice is sought in connection with specific passport and visa problems, and in cases of American citizens and interests. If a higher ranking officer of the Department receives a call from the country's ambassador, the desk officer normally attends the meeting to record the proceedings and to provide such background as may be needed.

The desk officer keeps the U. S. Diplomatic Mission overseas informed of developments in Washington and insures that replies are made to requests from the posts for information or instructions. He serves as its primary point of contact in Washington. He reviews and appraises Embassy officer reports, brings them to the attention of interested officers, and insures that they receive appropriate action. He briefs officers enroute to posts in the country and consults with those returning to the United States on leave or transfer.

He must be familiar with the viewpoints of the other areas of the Department of State, and of other interested departments and agencies of the government. He is expected to know about the leading personalities and political parties of the country in question, their influence, and their attitude toward the United States. He must follow the domestic and political situation in the country, its press and popular opinion, its economy and its economic relationships with the United States, and its international position and policies.

Relationships

The desk officer's usual relationships involve other bureaus in the Department of State, other departments and agencies that operate programs in his country, private organizations, the U. S. Ambassador and diplomatic mission in Washington, White House staff, press, public, and members of Congress.

With Office Directors and Deputy Office Directors

The desk officer looks to the Office Director and Deputy Office Director for guidance, supervision, and leadership. Office Directors, with few exceptions, are inclined to delegate very little, holding the

The first office under the U.S. Department of State was established in Washington in 1789 and has since that time been the center of the foreign policy of the United States. It is the primary point of contact in the United States with the rest of the world. The Department of State is responsible for the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the United States. It is also responsible for the representation of the United States in international organizations and for the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. The Department of State is also responsible for the administration of the United States' foreign affairs. It is the primary point of contact in the United States with the rest of the world. The Department of State is responsible for the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the United States. It is also responsible for the representation of the United States in international organizations and for the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. The Department of State is also responsible for the administration of the United States' foreign affairs.

Organization

The Department of State is organized into several major divisions. The Office of the Secretary of State is the highest office in the Department. It is responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the Department's activities. The Office of the Secretary of State is also responsible for the representation of the United States in international organizations and for the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. The Department of State is also responsible for the administration of the United States' foreign affairs. It is the primary point of contact in the United States with the rest of the world. The Department of State is responsible for the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of the United States. It is also responsible for the representation of the United States in international organizations and for the negotiation of treaties and other international agreements. The Department of State is also responsible for the administration of the United States' foreign affairs.

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reins tightly. Senior officers in the regional bureaus who have served previously as desk officers made the observation that desk officers are consulting with Office Directors much more frequently now than several years ago. The presence of a full-time Deputy Office Director tends to cause an extra review of the desk officer's work and a duplication in recommendation, both up and down the line.

With Deputy Assistant Secretaries

Each bureau has two or three Deputy Assistant Secretaries, but one who has full authority to act for the Assistant Secretary in every sense is not found in all bureaus. They have been relegated to functional or area specialists or assigned special problems. In absence of a Deputy who can speak for the bureaus, subordinate officers, on occasion, must consult more than one Deputy Assistant Secretary or see the Assistant Secretary.

Normally the desk officer's contacts with the Deputy Assistant Secretary are on an ad hoc basis through the Office Director or his Deputy. These contacts are usually prompted by the fact that a Deputy Assistant Secretary has a special interest in or is working on a matter concerning the desk officer's country.

With the Assistant Secretary

The desk officer's contacts with the Assistant Secretary depend on the extent to which the desk officer's country is involved in critical situations affecting the United States' national interests, how often distinguished visitors from the desk officer's country call on the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary's working habits.

During periods of crisis, the desk officer provides a detailed fill in on background and developments. He drafts messages reflecting

These officials, known as the Regional Directors, are the primary
personnel in the field who are responsible for the day-to-day
operation of the office. They are usually men, but in some
cases women. The number of Regional Directors varies from
one to three in each office. In some offices there may be a
deputy regional director, but in most cases there is not.

With the Regional Director

Each office has two or three deputy regional directors, but one
who has full authority to act for the regional director in his
absence. They have been selected to function as
specialists of various kinds. In some cases a deputy
may have been selected for his knowledge of a particular
subject, such as agriculture, or for his ability to
communicate with the people. In some cases a deputy
may have been selected for his ability to handle
the office's financial affairs. In some cases a deputy
may have been selected for his ability to handle
the office's personnel affairs. In some cases a deputy
may have been selected for his ability to handle
the office's general administrative affairs.

With the Assistant Secretary

The office's contacts with the Assistant Secretary depend on
the nature of the office's work. In some cases the office
may have a direct contact with the Assistant Secretary, while
in other cases the office may have a contact with the
Assistant Secretary through the Regional Director. In some
cases the office may have a contact with the Assistant
Secretary through the Regional Director, while in other
cases the office may have a contact with the Assistant
Secretary through the Regional Director. In some cases the
office may have a contact with the Assistant Secretary
through the Regional Director, while in other cases the
office may have a contact with the Assistant Secretary
through the Regional Director.

the guidance provided by the Assistant Secretary and expanded upon by the Office Director, and generally does what his superiors tell him to do.

With the Secretary and Other Senior Officers

Contacts at these levels are infrequent and occur on an ad hoc basis. The desk officer's opportunity to meet with the Secretary arises, if at all, when top government officials representing the desk officer's country call on the Secretary. The desk officer prepares briefing papers, takes notes, and prepares memoranda of conversations for such a meeting.

Contacts with the Under Secretary, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs arise in connection with problems of major significance involving U. S. relations with the desk officer's country or calls by state visitors. Here the desk officer's role is largely one of keeping the particular official briefed and carrying out instructions.

When a state visit is planned to the United States by another head of state, the desk officer of the visitor's country is involved in several stages of a lengthy process. The initiative for such a visit would probably come from the foreign head of state, who would let it be known that he would accept an invitation to visit the United States. This "gentle hint" would be transmitted by the U. S. Ambassador to the Department, where it would eventually come to the cognizance of the desk officer, but the Chief of Protocol would be the action officer. Initially, agreement would be sought on a date mutually convenient to the President and the visiting head of state. Once having passed this hurdle, the Chief of Protocol would invite the Country's ambassador in Washington to consult on a proposed itinerary. The country desk officer

the publication provided by the Assistant Secretary and approved upon the
The Office Director, and Executive Secretary, and his Secretary will be
to be.

With the Secretary and other officials

Contacts of these levels and individuals will occur on an ad hoc
basis. The desk officer's opportunity to meet with the Secretary, Assistant
If at all, when the Government officials representing the desk officer's
country call on the Secretary. The desk officer requires briefing, reports,
tasks, notes, and presents members of the Government for such a meeting.
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Affairs, and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs occur in
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hurdle, the Chief of Protocol would invite the country's Ambassador in
Washington to consult on a proposed itinerary. The country's desk officer

usually joins these consultations and prepares a memorandum of the itinerary agreed upon for transmission to the U. S. Ambassador in the prospective visitor's country. The U. S. Ambassador will clear the itinerary proposed with the prospective visiting head of state and transmit concurrence or further suggestions.

With the itinerary agreed upon, the Chief of Protocol frantically arranges details of colors to be flown, who will shake hands with whom, what national anthems will be played and in what order, and who will stand where when the visitor's aircraft arrives. Meanwhile, the desk officer is busily engaged in preparing the first draft of a "briefing memorandum" for the President, which covers those subjects likely to be discussed by the two heads of state and includes a recommended U. S. position for each anticipated subject. This memorandum will work its way through the chain of command from the bottom to the top with revisions made enroute until at last it arrives in the White House for the President's use.

A similar process is engendered by the prospective visit of the President to a foreign country. Here, President Kennedy's visit to Costa Rica might be used as an example.

The initiative came from a visiting head of state, who suggested that a visit by President Kennedy to the Central American Republics would be welcome at his earliest convenience, and an estimated date was requested. President Kennedy suggested that he might come in the spring of the ensuing year, in reply to the unexpected invitation. When the interview ended, word of the commitment was quickly passed to the Department, where a chain reaction was set in motion.

The Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, assisted by the Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian

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Affairs and the desk officers of the six republics involved, consulted with the ambassadors of the six republics and the White House staff to arrange dates and fix an itinerary, after weather prognostication and lengthy dialogues with the U. S. Ambassadors. It was suggested that President Kennedy "barnstorm" through all six nations, but this was rejected in view of time limitations. It was finally decided that the visit to all six nations would be considered made by a visit to San José, Costa Rica, and that all six heads of state and a head of state elect should meet President Kennedy there.

Desk officers now carefully prepared "briefing memoranda" for the President's use, with the breath of the Office Director hot on their necks. The Chief of Protocol meanwhile had the problems of determining precedence among the heads of state, whose anthem should be played and in what order, who should shake hands with whom and in what order, how they should be seated at official gatherings, and who should ride in what vehicles. Naturally, security was arranged between the Secret Service and the Costa Rican police and Guardia Nacional. When all of the ramifications of the visit are considered, it seems almost impossible that it proceeded so smoothly and successfully.

With the Functional Bureaus of the Department of State

The desk officer's relationships were reviewed with a representative cross-section of his counterparts and their superiors in the functional bureaus. All tended to characterize working relationships with the desk officer as generally satisfactory or better, but made the following observations:

Though generally a good group, desk officers are spotty in quality and occupy positions of low status.

The average desk officer is overworked and not on top of everything.

His morale is low. He frequently works in crowded surroundings and at a grade level lower than his counterparts.

He is probably too junior for country desks handling affairs of major importance.

Anything of importance is handled by Office Directors or officers at a higher level.

Some cannot give an answer without consulting their Office Directors or Deputy Office Directors.

In suggesting how the situation might be improved, officers in functional bureaus recommended the assignment of desk officers who act and make decisions.

With Other Departments and Agencies

Issues of policy are seldom one-department or even one-country issues in this interdependent world. In this respect the organization of the government as a whole is the crux of the problem, because there is seldom any real distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy. Because almost everything other executive departments do has a foreign policy aspect, interdepartmental coordination is and will remain a major operational problem.

Because the Secretary of State is the President's principal advisor in matters of military and economic aid, cultural and information programs, reduction and control of arms, as well as diplomacy, he is also the coordinator of all of these diverse elements of foreign policy. Like his chief some seven or eight heads above him, the desk officer is expected to coordinate the many facets of foreign policy toward one country on his level.

1. The above-mentioned will be in accordance with the
2. of the following.

It is necessary to limit the number of
excluded items to a minimum.

Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Department of Defense

Office 616-230-2200 or 616-230-2201

in addition to the situation of the subject, it is also necessary to consider the situation of the subject's family and the situation of the subject's community.

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Remains a subject operational problem.

[illegible]

Interagency task forces as interdepartmental coordinating committees were a salient feature of the Kennedy Administration as well as of the successor Johnson Administration. Superficially, they provide an ad hoc answer to the problem of coordination in critical issues; but they are, to some extent, an admission that existing policy machinery has proven inadequate to execute policy. Most of the task forces are dissolved when their job is done; while others, such as the Latin American Policy Committee which evolved during the Cuban crisis, remain in existence to supply a coordinated approach to policy. While critical task forces have been chaired by the President himself or other higher authority, a few have been chaired by desk officers.

Deputy Under Secretary Crockett stated that desk officers are being encouraged to be leaders of a country team relating to their country. Weekly or biweekly meetings are held with officers around the government who have an interest in the desk officer's country programs. The desk officer in charge of India has a real problem of coordinating approximately seventy people in the U. S. Government, representing various agencies, who are interested in India.⁶

⁶United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffings and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, November 21, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part IV.

There is, of course, a danger in attempting to solve policy problems in a committee. Committees may delay decision and diffuse responsibility. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau suggests that committees produce compromises based on the lowest common denominator or evade issues through platitudinous statements which satisfy everyone rather than reaching any bold innovations in responsible policy. He adds that

[illegible]

...the most difficult in the world to find a good person to conduct it. ...the most difficult in the world to find a good person to conduct it. ...the most difficult in the world to find a good person to conduct it.

November 21, 1903 Washington, Government Printing Office, Page 27.
The National Security Council's Office of Operations, War Department,
Division of National Security, has been advised by the Subcommittee
United States Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations.

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the necessary individual responsibility is lacking.⁷ Dean Acheson

⁷Hans J. Morgenthau, "Can We Entrust Defense to a Committee?" The New York Times Magazine, June 7, 1959.

considers committees as substitutes for thought at the top.⁸ Committees

⁸Dean Acheson, "Thoughts About Thought in High Places," The New York Times Magazine, October 11, 1959.

do serve the indispensable function of collecting, appraising, and preparing ideas for consideration. Policy here becomes the resultant merger of a number of ideas from different sources, polished by the grinding effect of opinion differences. But the final decision is a personal thing, and no committee procedure provides a substitute for it. Once the decision is made, the committee serves the useful purpose of implementing it in the several agencies of its members. The desk officer, as chairman, must insure that his committee adheres to its useful functions. Inasmuch as committees will try to avoid responsibility, the power of decision making will gravitate to a forceful desk officer who is willing to make decisions and abide their results. It is to be expected that the desk officer will make an occasional erroneous judgment, but such is the nature of gaining in experience. Higher authority will correct the mistakes as a matter of course.

The telephone is another indispensable means of coordination for the desk officer. Without it he could not gain rapid and informal clearances of notes and cables to embassies, policy papers, or replies to Congressmen. Nor could he discuss urgent problems with colleagues or gather spot information on pressing problems. However, it is both a servant and a master. Much of the desk officer's working day is

The necessary business communication is being... with the...

¹James L. Thompson, "The Business and the Community,"
The New York Times Magazine, June 15, 1931.

Constitution Committee on Administrative and Financial Reforms, 1931.

²James Thompson, "The Business and the Community,"
The New York Times Magazine, October 11, 1931.

On the other hand, the independent function of business, operating, and
preparing ideas for consideration. Under this system the business
sector of a number of ideas from different sources, followed by the
existing effect of certain decisions. The final decision is a
technical role, and no committee procedure provides a possibility for it.
Once the decision is made, the committee between the final purpose of
implementation is in the general opinion of the member. The final
effect, as stated, must involve the committee member in its
general function. Through the committee with the in which responsibility,
the power of decision making will be divided to a number of men, each
who is willing to make decisions and solve their problems. It is to be
expected that the new officer will take an occasional business judge-
ment, but such is the nature of things in business. When judgment
will correct the officer as a matter of course.

The response is another independent means of determination for

the new officer, without it he could not gain from his industrial
circumstances of nature and capital for business, public power, or influence
to Congress. But could he discuss general problems with colleagues
or without that influence on general business. However, it is not
a perfect and a matter. Much of the new officer's action may be

punctuated by the shrill insistence of the telephone's ring, which may require him to drop pressing matters for irritating minor ones. Fortunately, a good secretary shields him from the majority of these petty annoyances.

In order to obtain a different perspective of the desk officer's role and relationships, their contacts with their counterparts and senior officers in the Department of Defense, A. I. D., U. S. I. A., and the Peace Corps were reviewed. According to their appraisals, relations with desk officers in particular, and the Department of State in general, have never been better. They are happy with present relationships. But the following specific observations are worthy of note:

When a desk officer cannot sign off on an urgent matter, it causes excessive delay and can result in unnecessary embarrassment to the United States.

Sometimes it is not certain whether a desk officer's position is supported by his superior.

A few desk officers do not seem to understand the purpose and mission of other foreign affairs agencies.

When the Department of State establishes task forces, the desk officer seems to be left out. This creates problems for his counterpart in other agencies whose line of communication with the Department of State is thus broken.

Officers in other agencies would like desk officers to work through established channels in their organization. When they do not, their counterparts lose touch.

Contacts between the Department of Defense and desk officers are, for the most part, with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of International Security Affairs, the plans staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Politico-Military Affairs section of the three services.

I. S. A. usually is seeking policy information and guidance from the desk officer for the supervision of those military agencies which direct the operations of military missions and military assistance

...the fact that the...
...the fact that the...
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The following specific observations were made by SA:

When a case officer reports that a man
is being employed by the CIA, the
CIA should be informed of the situation.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific information required.

A list of names of persons who have been arrested for the purpose of the investigation of the case of the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., is being furnished to you for your information.

When the Department of State established the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the first officer sent to the United States was Mr. [redacted] for his consular duties in other parts of the world. The Bureau of Consular Affairs was established in 1907.

Officers in other agencies would like to see the

contacts between the Department of Defense and the Office of the Inspector General.

for the most part, with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of International Security Affairs, the State Dept. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Liaison Commission of the United States.

1.2.4. usually is seeking policy information and guidance from the best officer for the provision of those military resources which direct the operations of military missions and military assistance

groups. The political ramifications of the sale of military material to client countries would probably be discussed in a broad spectrum extending from the effect on political alignments to the effect on the economy. The desk officer also arranges diplomatic clearances, including assurance of acceptability, for U. S. personnel assigned to military missions.

The Defense Intelligence Agency contacts the desk officer to obtain information or an evaluation of information received. Because of the constant stream of letters, telegrams, and reports which the U. S. Diplomatic Mission sends to the Department of State, the desk officer⁹ usually possesses better and later information than the

⁹Except for "Eyes Only" reports held by higher authority.

Defense Intelligence Agency.

The desk officer usually initiates contacts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain military support for a policy or program decision already made by higher authority. He may arrange for conferences between the Office Director or Assistant Secretary and the cognizant action officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The desk officer records memorandum minutes of these conferences and supplies such detailed background information as may be required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform their military functions.

The Politico-Military Affairs sections of the armed forces obtain policy guidance from the desk officer in an effort to insure consistency of policy.

Like echelons of the Department of State, by whom it is administered, A. I. D. has office directors, deputy office directors, and desk officers.

Example. The detailed functions of the staff of military agencies to direct committee would probably be directed in a broad manner excepted from the other on political grounds by the effect on the economy. The staff of the committee would be directed in the kind of resource of personnel; for it is necessary to assign in military matters.

The various intelligence agencies would be directed to obtain information as to the activities of information resources. Because of the constant stress of interest, personnel, and resources which the U. S. Intelligence Mission would be the subject of study, the staff officers would be necessary to direct the intelligence from the

direct for "less only" reports held by United authority.

Defense Intelligence Agency.

The staff officer usually initiated contacts with the joint chiefs of staff to obtain military support for a policy or action decision already made by higher authority. He was assigned for consultation between the office director or assistant secretary and the assistant chief officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The staff officer received permanent orders to have conferences with officials such decision was made. Information as to be received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to perform their military functions.

The policy-making staff was made of the same nature obtain policy guidance from the staff officer in an effort to insure consistency of policy.

list actions of the Department of State, as well as its administrative, A. E. P. has office director, deputy office director, and staff officers.

The country desk officer receives project proposals from A. I. D. which cannot be implemented without approval from the Department of State, even though A. I. D. field personnel have thoroughly investigated the project and obtained the U. S. Ambassador's concurrence. The desk officer examines the proposed project in terms of its political and economic effects. Who will administer and develop the project in the country are of interest to the desk officer as indicators of probable cause of failure. Should the desk officer agree with the project, he initials concurrence and passes the project proposal to his Office Director. In these matters, the Office Director is generally guided by the opinions of his desk officer and will approve on his recommendation. If the desk officer disapproves the project proposal, the final resolution of the project proposal will occur on the Assistant Secretary or Secretary level.

In an attempt to facilitate coordination of policy planning and A. I. D. activities, an administration reorganization was effected in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. Here the Bureau for Latin America, A. I. D., was completely integrated with the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in March, 1964. Some desk officers now have development-officer assistants. This reorganization will be discussed more fully in the pages which follow.

Excepting for important countries, a single person in U. S. I. A. is responsible for the activities of that agency in several countries -- a multi-country desk officer. He discusses two broad categories of policy with the desk officer: political policy and cultural exchange. In the field, cultural exchange is administered entirely by the U. S. I. A. with approval of the U. S. Ambassador. In the United States, the Department of State administers the program. The U. S. I. A.

The committee shall submit a report to the President of the United States, and to the Senate, on or before the first day of January, 1904, containing a full and complete statement of the results of its investigations, and of the progress of its work, and of the recommendations of the committee, and of the action of the President and the Senate thereon. The committee shall also submit a report to the President and the Senate, on or before the first day of January, 1904, containing a full and complete statement of the results of its investigations, and of the progress of its work, and of the recommendations of the committee, and of the action of the President and the Senate thereon.

publishes periodicals, devises television programs, produces movies, broadcasts radio programs, and operates bi-national centers. Their printed, spoken, filmed, and televised words must be in accordance with established policy. Policy guidance from the Department of State for a particular country is passed through the medium of the country desk officer to the multi-desk officer in the U. S. I. A.

The organization of the Peace Corps is basically similar to that of U. S. I. A. The desk officer receives a policy paper which has been initiated by a roving field team with approval of the U. S. Ambassador. The desk officer initials his concurrence or disapproval as in the case of A. I. D. projects, with the same results.

The organization of the Central Intelligence Agency parallels that of the Department of State but receives a far larger budget to perform its functions. In the desk officer's client country, the U. S. Ambassador may not know or want to know who the operatives of the C. I. A. are and what they are doing. This viewpoint is shared by only a very few of our ambassadors. Generally, it is considered that if he is to perform his functions intelligently, the ambassador must be informed about all activities of any U. S. governmental group. He can be informed of C. I. A. activities if he so desires. In this manner, the C. I. A. becomes an indirect supplier of client country information to the desk officer. The C. I. A. frequently also supplies information directly to the desk officer from their country officer-in-charge in McLean. The C. I. A., for example, may have access to "Organization X" in a client country and receive information as a result of that access. Such information is passed to the country desk officer by his counterpart in the C. I. A. The country desk officer is, of course, interested in the information,

The country desk officer is, of course, interested in the information
is passed to the country desk officer by his counterpart in the U. S. A.
and receive information as a result of that contact. Such information
for example, may have access to "Organization B" in a client country
officer from their country officer-in-charge in Moscow. The U. S. A.
The U. S. A. frequently also receives information directly to the desk
insistent supplies of client country information to the desk officer.
activities if he so desires. In this manner, the U. S. A. becomes an
activities of our U. S. government's group. It can be informed of U. S. A.
his functions immediately, the information may be relayed about and
our objectives. Generally, it is considered that it is to perform
that they are doing. This viewpoint is shared by only a very few of
any not know or want to know the objectives of the U. S. A. and not
its functions. In the desk officer's client country, the U. S. representative
of the Department of State has received a far larger budget in the form
The organization of the Central Intelligence Agency provides that
case of U. S. A. cooperation, with the same results.

but is not, generally, interested in the methods utilized by the C. I. A. to obtain the information. In some instances, the desk officer may already be in possession of the information which the C. I. A. has obtained.

By the time that the weekly C. I. A. intelligence summary reaches the desk officer, it is usually stale. Senator Pell stated that while he held the Rumanian desk, there was an utter lack of intelligence flow from that source. Secretary Rusk agreed that there was indeed a need to expedite information from the C. I. A. to the desk officer and a need to suggest priorities for types of information to the C. I. A. Mr. Rusk said that this matter had received his personal attention and that of Mr. McCone.¹⁰ Interviews indicate that the joint action of

¹⁰United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.

Mr. McCone and Secretary Rusk has had a salutary effect. Where previously the desk officer had no contact with or knowledge of his C. I. A. counterpart, both are now encouraged to become acquainted with each other and to exchange their ideas and information freely. It is hoped that this exchange may aid in remedying information gaps when snap decisions are required.

In 1954 the Department of Agriculture obtained Congressional permission to appoint agricultural attachés funded from their own budget. They had become dissatisfied with their dependency on diplomatic channels for agricultural information. The concept of agricultural attachés has since expanded, proliferating into what is now the Foreign Agricultural Service. Copies of the commodities reports originated by the agricultural

1. The first of these is the fact that the Commission has not yet received any information from the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the progress of its investigation into the alleged activities of the British Security Co-ordination Unit (BSCU) in the United States.

[illegible]

10 United States Customs Service, located in Department of Justice
Administration of Customs Service, Washington, D.C. 20541

Mr. Tolson and Secretary Board had had a preliminary meeting. Board was to be in charge of the first office and Mr. Tolson was to be in charge of the second office. Board was to be in charge of the first office and Mr. Tolson was to be in charge of the second office.

in less the Department of Agriculture Official Correspondence 1917-1918

attachés are received by the country desk officer, who examines them, being mindful of their inherent implications -- especially in regard to those countries with "one-crop economies." While the political aspects of the current crop status concern the desk officer, the Department of Agriculture concerns itself with the effect of that country's crop status upon the markets of the United States. The Department of Agriculture may, as a result, become intent upon a policy which is at cross purposes with those of the Department of State. Noting such a conflict, the desk officer will try to resolve it on his level; but, if unsuccessful, he will advise higher authority, appending his recommendations for resolution to his superiors. Such conflicts may require resolution on the Assistant Secretary or Secretary level.

Traditionally, the Department of Commerce had its own attachés, but it lost the right to maintain a separate Foreign Commercial Service in the reorganization of 1939. At present, specially-trained Foreign Service officers are assigned abroad as commercial attachés. Their reports are received by the desk officer along with other reports from the U. S. Diplomatic Mission. The reports, which generally contain trade information and opportunities, are forwarded to the Department of Commerce after the desk officer's perusal. Conflicts of policy arise frequently here in the indiscriminate encouragement of trade by the Department of Commerce to countries with inflated economies and dollar shortages, while the Department of State is interested in encouraging trade only along such specific lines as will maintain the viability of the client country. As with agricultural policy, the desk officer makes every effort to resolve the differences on his level, forwarding the problem, with his recommendations, to higher authority when satisfactory compromise cannot be reached.

The Committee has been very busy in the past few months, and it is
 expected that it will continue to be so for some time to come. The
 Committee has been very busy in the past few months, and it is
 expected that it will continue to be so for some time to come.

With the Department of Labor, the desk officer is usually concerned with labor leader grants. A. I. D., U. S. I. A., and Cultural Exchange also propose labor leader grants, usually without any coordination between them. It is the function of the desk officer to coordinate these fragmented efforts so that the available resources can best be utilized and formulated into an integrated program. He assesses the value, in each case, to the client country and estimates the benefits which may redound to the United States. The political implications of labor leader grants are self-evident. In these instances, as with agricultural and commercial policy, the desk officer makes recommendations which, if not accepted, are passed to higher authority for action.

The foregoing governmental agencies are not, of course, the only agencies which may contact the desk officer for information or pass information to him. The science attachés in scientifically advanced countries forward reports of scientific advances which may or may not have political implications. These may require the desk officer to establish contact with such agencies as the Defense Atomic Support Agency or the National Aeronautical and Space Administration on an ad hoc basis.

With the Congress

Relationships with the Congress are challenging and require consummate tact. Should the Department propose legislation to the Congress affecting his country, the desk officer's views are sought within the Department during legislative drafting sessions. His participation will also be required in interagency conferences within the executive department to obtain clearance and agreement on the proposed legislation. Even after the proposed bill has been introduced

[illegible]

With the Congress

negotiated legislation. Even after the proposed bill has been introduced the executive department has certain powers and agencies in the investigation and also be required to interview confidential informants within limits and objectives during legislative activity outside. The Congress affecting the country, the American people's view are subject to change. It is the executive department's responsibility to the Congress and the American people, to maintain the highest degree of legislation in the relationship with the Congress and the American people.

and has been assigned to a Congressional committee for hearings, the desk officer will probably testify at the behest of that committee in an executive session.

From time to time the country desk officer may be required to answer letters from Congressional sources. Such Congressional inquiries may have been initiated for the information of a congressman or on behalf of a constituent. These letters are channeled into the sundry bureaus of the Department by the Bureau of Congressional Relations and are scheduled for reply within a three-day period. If an official response cannot be cleared within this time limit, the desk officer is required to notify the Congressional originator by phone or letter why the answer is not immediately forthcoming and set a date for an answer.

With the Ambassador and the U. S. Diplomatic Mission

The desk officer is the primary link between the ambassador and Washington. The ambassador looks to the desk officer to keep him informed, to see that his views are properly presented and considered in policy and decision making, to coordinate action in Washington affecting the ambassador's responsibilities, to prod others into completing action requested by the U. S. Mission, and to see that the ambassador has what he needs to carry out his responsibilities as Chief of the U. S. Mission.

While he interprets and presents the ambassador's point of view, the desk officer does not feel that his role is limited to being an advocate for the ambassador's views. As a part of his responsibility to the Assistant Secretary, he sees his role as putting things in their proper perspective. If the desk officer does not agree with the ambassador, he is expected to say so and be prepared to support his case.

and has been assigned to a (continued) monitoring role. The
data will continue to be used in the future to
in addition to the

From this it follows that the only way to avoid the
inadequacy of the Commission's report, and to ensure that
the Commission is able to carry out its duties, is to
have a Commission which is independent of the Government
and which is able to act in the interests of the
people. It is therefore recommended that the Commission
be made independent of the Government and that it be
able to act in the interests of the people.

minutes, approximately 1.5 to 2.0 mg/kg administered subcutaneously.

The first officer in the primary line between the subordinate and the superior. The subordinate looks to the first officer to keep his line forward, to set that his view as the properly presented and coordinated in policy and action setting, to coordinate action in accordance with the superior's responsibilities, to keep action into completion action requested by the U. S. Mission, and to see that the subordinate has what he needs to carry out his responsibilities as Chief of the U. S. Mission. While the subordinate and primary the subordinate's view of view.

the best officer does not feel that the work is important as being an
adviser for the Ambassador's office. As a part of his responsibility
to the Assistant Secretary, he does not take an active part in their
higher activities. If the best officer does not agree with the
Assistant, he is expected to say so and be prepared to support his case.

In this middleman role, the desk officer can contribute to a narrowing of the area of disagreement where it exists.

With the Country's Diplomatic Mission in Washington

The desk officer is the primary point of contact for the country's diplomatic mission in Washington in its dealings with the Department. The mission's day-to-day business with the Department is with or through the desk officer, who sees that its requests are answered. For some desk officers, this can be time consuming, while for others it may be negligible, depending upon the activity generated by the mission. There is no set pattern with respect to whom ambassadors see in the Department. This is governed by the personality and temperament of the ambassador and the business at hand. Some call on Assistant Secretaries; others call on Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Office Directors; a few call on desk officers. Some restrict their calls to high ranking officers above the Assistant Secretary level.

When the ambassador calls on officials on the Assistant Secretary level or higher echelons in the Department hierarchy, the desk officer is usually present, making his expertise available to that official. If the Department knows sufficiently in advance of the call, the desk officer draws up a "briefing memorandum" for the official to be called. This memorandum includes background information and a U. S. position if the subject to be discussed is known in advance. Where the subject is not known in advance, the memorandum becomes, of necessity, lengthier, covering many possible topics together with U. S. positions on each topic.

Following the meeting, the desk officer prepares a "memorandum of conversation" which describes all of the discussion in sufficient detail

in this situation, the case officer has contacts in a number of the area of interest which is vital.

With the Country's Diplomatic Mission in Washington

The case officer is the primary point of contact for the country's diplomatic mission in Washington in its dealings with the Department. The mission's day-to-day contact with the Department is with an officer, the case officer, who sees that the requests are handled. For the case officer, this can be time consuming, while for others it may be negligible, depending upon the activity requested by the mission. There is no set pattern with respect to whom communications are in the Department. This is governed by the personality and temperament of the individuals and the business at hand. Some call on Assistant Secretaries, others call on Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Office Directors, a few call on case officers. Some testify that calls to high ranking officers show the Assistant Secretary level. When the Assistant calls an official in the Assistant Secretary level or higher is shown in the Department hierarchy, the case officer is usually present, seeing his expertise available to that official. If the Department knows sufficiently in advance of the call, the case officer may be a "briefing memorandum" for the official to be called. This memorandum includes background information and a U. S. position if the subject to be discussed is known in advance. While the subject is not known in advance, the memorandum becomes, at necessity, tentative, covering many possible topics together with U. S. position on each topic. Following the meeting, the case officer prepares a "summary of conversation" which recaps all of the discussion in sufficient detail

for future reference. Should the ambassador leave a "note" or an "aide memoire," the desk officer prepares the first draft of any reply thereby necessitated. Information copies of these go, in final form, to interested agencies in Washington and cognizant overseas posts.

Assume, for example, that agreement has been reached between the ambassador and the Department in conversation for the transfer of some surplus U. S. property. In this event, a third-person note will be drafted by the desk officer to the foreign embassy expressing the pleasure of the Department in the agreement. He also drafts an outgoing cable advising the U. S. Embassy abroad of the agreement, supplementing this with a personal letter to the embassy staff if he possesses any detailed information of value, and/or formal instructions to the embassy delineating the process of transfer -- documents involved, copies required, signatures, and forwarding of receipts.

Policy and Decision Making

A Lack of Written Guidelines

The desk officer performs the staff work involved in marshaling facts, drafting papers, and recommending courses of action. His drafts, sometimes modified by his superiors but often untouched, usually reach the Assistant Secretary or may even go to the National Security Council for consideration and to the President for final decision. His influence depends on his detailed knowledge of the area and the confidence which his superiors have in his knowledge, judgement, and ability.

Unless his views are not in consonance with his superiors' views, it is easier for them to concur, making minor revisions. "The tyranny of the written word works in his favor."¹¹ There are no written

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The case officer performs the staff work involved in maintaining files, keeping papers, and recommending courses of action. His duties sometimes modified by his superior but after consultation, usually send the decision in respect of any item to the National Security Council for consideration and to the President for final decision. His influence depends on his personal knowledge of the facts and his confidence which his reports have in his knowledge, judgment, and ability.

Under his class are not so numerous with few exceptions; they are in general less than in general, major civil servants. The typical of the British word with all favor, all there are no other

¹¹Elder, op. cit., p. 23.

guidelines for him to follow. The desk officer learns through experience, though there are some unwritten rules followed consistently throughout the five regional bureaus.

The Unwritten Rules

Briefly, the unwritten rules are:

The desk officer must consult his Office Director on any shift in policy or any matter of real significance or sensitivity.

Decisions on deviations from established policy are made by the Assistant Secretary, his Deputy, or at a higher level in the Department.

Any official communication leaving the Department must have at least the Office Director's approval.

Desk officers can clear papers initiated by other elements of the Department and other agencies if the subject matter reflects established policy.

In the case of the sustained serious crisis, the tendency is to take matters of consequence out of the desk officer's hands. Task forces or other special arrangements are instituted to cover critical aspects. Under these special arrangements, the desk officer carries on the routine, daily operations work of the country desk.

The Scope of the Desk Officer's Authority

The desk officer's role in policy making and application is a combination of recommending policy and carrying it out once the policy is decided at higher levels. The broad goals of policy as formulated by the National Security Council and approved by the President quickly become inherent in his thinking. These goals are usually of a stable

and continuing nature, having been formulated prior to his becoming a desk officer. They set general limits within which he carries out policy and considers alternatives. He implements it in his daily activities by drafting instructions to the U. S. Diplomatic Mission and other action documents, by providing guidance to other elements in the Department and to other agencies in the government, and by clearing papers having policy implications. Though he participates in the development of policy recommendations, the process of policy making is dispersed and diffused all the way from the desk officer to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and, in some instances, to the President.

Desk officers have a free rein to recommend or initiate action whenever they think action is called for. They make many routine decisions within the established policy every day. If there is no precedent, or if a shift in policy is involved, the desk officer will not act without the approval of the Office Director. In these cases, he is expected to make a recommendation. Normally, he has the opportunity of expressing his views on all matters pertaining to his country. The exception occurs when task forces or other special arrangements are instituted to cover the critical aspects.

Planning and Programming

Policy Guidelines Statements

The desk officer's primary involvement in planning concerns drafting and follow-through on policy guidelines statements covering his country. In doing this he consults with his Office Director, functional specialists in the regional bureau, officers in other elements of the Department

and continuing efforts, having been formulated prior to the beginning of
each session. They are presented in the form of a series of
policy and programmatic recommendations. The Department is in the daily
activities of providing instructions to the U. S. Ambassador in
and other action documents, in providing guidance to other elements in
the Department and in other agencies in the Government, and by clearing
papers having policy implications. Through its participation in the
development of policy recommendations, the process of policy making is
disseminated and diffused all the way down the line within the Executive
of State, the National Security Council, and, in some instances, to the
President.

Each office has a free rein to recommend as it sees fit
whenever free action is called for. They are very flexible
decisions within the established policy framework. It is not
precursor, but a shift in policy is involved, the same office will not
act without the approval of the Office Director. In some cases, he is
expected to make a recommendation. Usually, he has the opportunity of
expressing his views on all matters pertaining to his country. The
exception occurs when task forces or other special assignments are
assigned to cover the critical aspects.

Planning and Programming

Policy Planning Committee

The Staff Officer's primary involvement in planning consists of
and liaison with the policy planning committee covering his country.
In doing this he consults with his Office Director, functional specialists
in the regional bureau, officers in other elements of the Department

having a reason to participate, and his counterparts in other departments and agencies, particularly Defense, A. I. D., and U. S. I. A. Before formal clearance of his draft with other agencies, he obtains the U. S. Diplomatic Mission's comments and incorporates them, as appropriate. At this point, the responsibility of the desk officer and the Bureau Planning Officer blur. Some desk officers take the initiative in interagency clearances. In other cases, the Office Director, Deputy Office Director, or the Bureau Planning Officer assumes this responsibility. Although efforts are made to reach agreement before papers are sent to the Assistant Secretary for approval, major differences are referred, when necessary, to higher authority through established channels.

Special Policy Studies

In addition to his work on policy guidelines statements, the desk officer responds to requests for special policy studies initiated by the Policy Planning Council, Bureau Planning Officers, National Security Council, or elsewhere, such as requests for contingency plans. He writes the first drafts and acts in the role described above in connection with the policy guidelines statements. He checks drafts for factual accuracy, suggests changes, and generally brings his country knowledge and experience to bear on the situation.

Programming

The current role of the desk officer in action programming is restricted largely to reviewing program plans for clearance by other agencies. He insures that the appropriate elements of the Department review the programs, if other elements are involved, and sees that they are consistent with established policy.

The Plan of Action

For other than occasionally refreshing his memory, the desk officer seldom needs to refer to the policy guidelines statement, because he drafted it, and because it is cast in the general terms of goals. The plan of action which outlines policy for a six-month period is also drafted by the desk officer. In drafting a new plan of action, he will first peruse that which served for the previous six-month period. Then, after reflecting on information available to him, the country desk officer drafts a paper which varies in length according to the information considered pertinent in determining courses of action. The paper consists of three major parts: an estimate of the current situation, courses of action and an evaluation of each course, and methods of implementation. On completion, the plan is examined by the Office Director and then circulated on the Assistant Secretary level to the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, the White House, and U. S. Information Service five days in advance of their conference to consider acceptance or rejection. If accepted, its suggestions become the policies which are pursued for the ensuing semi-annual period. If rejected, the Assistant Secretary will probably draft a plan of action based on decisions reached at the conference.

The Briefing Book

Each desk officer maintains an up-to-date briefing book on his client country. It includes general background data, the political and economic situation, U. S. agency projects in the country, and a discussion of its relations with the United States. The President, Vice President, members of Congress, or other government leaders find it useful in preparing for international conferences, trade fairs, or

The Plan of Action

For other than occasionally reviewing his memory, the desk officer seldom needs to refer to the policy guidelines document, because he drafted it, and because it is kept in the general office of policy. The plan of action which outlines policy for a planning period is also drafted by the desk officer. In drafting a new plan of action, he will first gather data which served for the previous planning period. Then, after reflecting on information available to him, the country desk officer drafts a paper which serves as input according to the information contained pertinent in determining content of action. The paper consists of three major parts: an estimate of the current situation, sources of action and an evaluation of each source, and methods of implementation. On completion, the plan is examined by the Office Director and then circulated on the Assistant Secretary level to the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, the White House, and U. S. Information Service for data in advance of their conference to consider acceptance or rejection. If accepted, the suggestions become the policies which are pursued for the ensuing annual period. If rejected, the Assistant Secretary will probably draft a plan of action based on decisions reached at the conference.

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vacation trips abroad. It is likewise available for ready reference within the Department for other levels of the hierarchy. These books are reproduced and distributed throughout the regional bureaus to help in achieving coordination of information and policy.¹²

¹²See Elder, op. cit., p. 38, for some comments on the usefulness of briefing books. However, desk officers whom I have interviewed have not disparaged their utility.

Intelligence and Evaluation

Usually the desk officer has more than enough information available for policy-making decisions. The American Embassy sends daily telegrams on questions which require immediate action. Additional supporting details are sent via courier or air-mail pouch. A broad summary of political, military, and economic developments is forwarded by the embassy weekly, with similar, but more comprehensive, reports sent quarterly, semi-annually, and annually.

Of course, daily political, economic, and military intelligence reports are available for his day-to-day operations. In addition, there is a weekly intelligence summary prepared by the C. I. A., which may be stale by the time it reaches the desk, but the exhaustive evaluation it contains makes it useful.

The embassy also forwards press clippings of editorials and newsworthy events to supplement the teletype Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters reports received in the Office of News. This office also clips information from twenty-eight U. S. newspapers and distributes them to the desks.

Because policy affects a multiplicity of government agencies and their several interconnections, many interdepartmental controversies

which tend to inhibit coordination arise from an insensitivity in understanding pronounced Presidential policy. Though the President's decisions trickle downward from the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and other Presidential working groups, his public statements, which are directed to government employees as well as the public at large, are too often lost in the mad scramble of daily business or glossed over. The failure to appreciate the nuances and intent of these public statements impedes the progress of interdepartmental business.

The Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, insists that careful reading of the President's speeches, statements, and press conferences is a requirement for officers at every level of government, especially for country desk officers in the Department of State. He further indicates that a man cannot last in the administration without doing so, because he will not be able to function adequately in foreign policy formulation.¹³

¹³United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, March 11, 22, and 25, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part I.

For this same reason, the Department's Public Opinion Studies Staff circulates summaries of American press editorial comment each day. Broader summaries are prepared on a monthly basis, while public attitude toward specific policy issues is the subject of separate, detailed study.

In most bureaus, marked copies of the New York Times are routed, indicating comments or articles relating to the desk officer's country. Additionally, in his leisure time at home, Foreign Affairs and the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings describe world developments elsewhere.

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Specialized research within the Department is performed by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Historical Office, or the Bureau of Economic Affairs for the desk officer as well as higher echelons. Other information may be gleaned from studies prepared by the Legislative Reference Service for the Congress or possibly from data gathered by an outside consultant.

In addition to information received from the U. S. Diplomatic Mission, the C. I. A., and the D. I. A., the desk officer gleans information from individuals -- lobbyists, speculators, disgruntled exiles, personnel of the client country's embassy, reporters, and tourists. Some of these may also be searching for information which may aid them in their pursuits.

With experience, the desk officer will develop a "sixth sense" concerning the reliability of the information received. He considers the source, whether or not the information reflects the known views of the source, and whether or not the source could reasonably be expected to have such information available. Having determined the amount of confidence to be placed in the intelligence received, the desk officer proceeds to choose a suitable course of action.

Choice

The desk officer's choice is conditioned by his knowledge of the individuals involved, the plan of action, and current intelligence. The views of the U. S. Diplomatic Mission in the client country also receive due consideration prior to making any decision. The desk officer weighs these factors judiciously in his mind before drafting recommendations for consideration by the policy committee. Contrary to what some outside experts believe, there is always a choice.

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Conclusion

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Action, Reaction, and Reevaluation

The policy committee also gives careful consideration to embassy views prior to making their decision. Once made, the decision is communicated to the U. S. Diplomatic Mission by electronic means, supplemented with letters. Further copies are distributed to other agencies which are or may become involved.

If the decision should be contrary to the expressed views of the U. S. Ambassador, the Assistant Secretary will direct the Office Director or desk officer to prepare an amplifying letter for his signature, which explains the reasoning involved in the decision. The ambassador, if he feels strongly about the course of action, may bombard the desk officer with a stream of missives in the hope that the decision may be reversed. If this action does not produce a satisfactory response, the ambassador may visit Washington for "consultation."

A policy which produces adverse effects is reexamined. The desk officer has ready alternatives which he proposes to the Office Director. The same policy committee will be reconvened to examine the alternatives and choose one which offers the most promise of success. Policy changes can be effected rapidly, but programs may continue in the old direction from sheer inertia or because no satisfactory terminus can be immediately reached. A. I. D. operations are most susceptible to this form of inertia.

Leadership and Coordination

In its December, 1962, report, the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel stated:

The Department's role should embrace not only the formulation of foreign policies, but also leadership in seeing that they are effectuated; the capacity of the

The police committee also gives consideration to matters which arise from the police's own work. The police is communicated in the U. S. Department of Justice, and is represented with letters. Further copies are distributed to other agencies which are or may become involved.

If the decision should be contrary to the expressed view of the U. S. Department, the Assistant Secretary will advise the Office of the Director or Desk Officer in writing in reply to the letter, which explains the reasoning involved in the decision. The Assistant Secretary strongly urges the course of action, and advises the Desk Officer with a statement of his view in the hope that the decision may be reversed. If this action does not produce a satisfactory result, the Assistant Secretary will request a "consultation".

A police which produces serious effects is reviewed, the Desk Officer will reply to the letter which he proposes to the Office of the Director. The same police committee will be recommended to examine the situation and choose one which offers the most promise of success. Policy changes can be effected rapidly, but progress may continue in the old direction from sheer inertia or because an satisfactory solution can be immediately reached. A. I. D. operations are most susceptible to the form of tactics.

Leadership and Organization

In its December, 1945, report, the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Personnel stated:

The Department's role should embrace not only the formulation of foreign policy, but also the execution of that policy, being that they are affected; the capacity of the

Department to provide this leadership and coordination in the conduct of foreign affairs needs to be strengthened . . .

Responsibility of the Desk Officer

The desk officer's responsibility for exercising leadership and coordination has never been defined or fixed. It is unrealistic to expect him to assume such a responsibility under present staffing arrangements. An officer is assigned a country desk to gain experience which will prepare him for positions of leadership later in his career. As stated previously, he is a younger Foreign Service officer who shows promise of becoming a senior officer in the future. This points up the conflict between those who see the desk officer as a trainee destined for a position of leadership and those who expect him to exercise leadership and coordination now.

On the whole, desk officers try conscientiously to discharge a responsibility for which they have insufficient qualifying experience. Some have taken the initiative to meet regularly with their counterparts in other agencies to exchange information, identify problems, and develop courses of action. These meetings are usually informal.

More frequently, ambassadors are being heard in expressions of dissatisfaction with the lack of coordination in Washington among departments, agencies, and other organizations carrying out operations in countries to which they are assigned. Some have proposed that a counterpart of the "country team" be established in the Department. It is certainly clear that a higher ranking officer must provide the kind of interagency leadership and coordination required.

Resolving Conflicting Policies

Resolutions of conflicting policies result, too often, in a compromise policy which does not completely satisfy the Department of State

Department to provide this leadership and coordination in the conduct of foreign affairs must be maintained . . .

Responsibility of the State

The State's responsibility for maintaining leadership and coordination has never been defined as broad. It is unrealistic to expect him to assume such a responsibility under present existing circumstances. He is assigned a narrow task to lead a committee which will prepare for the position of leadership in his country. He stands previously, he is a foreign policy adviser who was given credit for becoming a senior officer in the future. This points to the conflict between those who see the State's role as a future leader for a position of leadership and those who expect him to exercise leadership and coordination now.

On the whole, these officers try conscientiously to discharge a responsibility for which they have insufficient qualifying experience. They have taken the initiative to meet regularly with their counterparts in other agencies to exchange information, identify problems, and develop concrete plans of action. Their activities are usually informal.

More frequently, however, they are being asked to undertake of dissatisfaction with the lack of coordination in Washington among departments, agencies, and other organizations carrying out operations in countries to which they are assigned. Some have proposed that a committee of the "country team" be established in the Department. It is certainly clear that a higher ranking officer must provide the kind of interagency leadership and coordination required.

Resolving Conflicting Policies

Resolution of conflicting policies remains, too often, in a compromise policy which does not completely satisfy the Department of State.

or the other agency involved in the dispute. Policy disputes are most often resolved on the Assistant Secretary level in an ad hoc conference. However, the desk officer will exhaust the means for resolution on his level prior to action by higher authority. If unsuccessful in this venture, the desk officer prepares a paper delineating the position of the Department of State for his Assistant Secretary. Some examples of policies which lead to conflict are: Department of Defense desiring to sell obsolete U. S. arms to governments which do not enjoy the confidence of the Department of State; the "buy American" program of Commerce which may run afoul of a State Department program of keeping a client country's economy viable.

How a Country Desk Officer Spends His Time

A conscientious country desk officer is not an "eight to four" bureaucrat. The things which he must do cannot begin to be accomplished in eight hours. He therefore has to come early and stay late.

No desk officer can ever count on a routine day. The following schedule may not therefore be entirely typical, but it is revealing.

0815 - 0915	Reads incoming correspondence and telegrams from the field. Takes action as necessary. Reads newspaper.
0915 - 1000	Daily staff conference with other desk officers, chaired by his Office Director. (The Office Director has just come from the Assistant Secretary's staff conference.)
1000 - 1145	Conference with representatives from State, Agriculture, and the International Cooperation Administration to agree on the text of a grant to his country under Public Law 480 dealing with the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities.
1145 - 1245	Drafts telegram to American Embassy overseas, informing it of present stage of developments

or for other special interest in the district. Policy should be made
often reviewed as the district boundary lines in an old district.
However, the same policy will remain the same for the district as the
land which is subject to special interest. It is important to this
venture, the same effort should be made in making the position of
the department of state for the district boundary. Some examples of
policies which have been in conflict are: movement of land leaving the
sell estate in the state to government which do not enjoy the confidence
of the department of state; the "buy back" policy of the state which
has not about as a state department project of buying a certain country's
economy stable.

How a Country from Office from the

A connection country from office is not in "the state".
Pursuant. The subject which is not in "the state" is not recognized
in light of the fact that the state is not in "the state".
No such office can ever come in a certain way. The following
schedule may not be used in the state, but it is possible.

0012 - 0013	Reads from the correspondence and registers from the field. This office is necessary. reads necessary.
0013 - 0014	Daily staff conference with other staff officers, chaired by the office director. (The office director has had some time for the conference director's staff conference.)
1000 - 1045	Conference with representatives from state administration and the international cooperation administration to meet on the part of a grant to his country under public law 480 dealing with the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities.
1045 - 1245	Staff subject to American Embassy overseas, informing it of present state of development

on grant. Carries telegram by hand around Department for clearance.

- 1245 - 1345 Drafts tentative copy of formal Department Instructions which will go to American Embassy overseas to accompany text of proposed grant.
- 1345 - 1415 Lunch
- 1415 - 1500 Writes a personal, informal letter to the Chargé d'Affaires in the American Embassy overseas to explain the proposed grant.
- 1500 - 1600 Attends special conference to brief the Under Secretary of Commerce who is going to a trade fair in his country as the President's representative. The desk officer details political and economic conditions in the country and explains cultural differences.
- 1600 - 1630 Briefs a teacher who is going to his country on an exchange program. Discusses housing problems, the country's educational system, research facilities, as well as political, economic, and social conditions.
- 1630 - 1730 Reads memoranda and telegrams which have come to his desk during the day for clearance. Writes comments or recommendations.
- 1730 - 1800 Reads reports from field and other sources of information which have come to his desk during the day.
- 1800 - 1900 Reads incoming correspondence and telegrams from the field. Takes action as necessary.¹⁴

¹⁴From Elder, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

In addition to those events recorded above, the day has been interspersed with phone calls, both incoming and outgoing -- a Congressman, a businessman with interests in the client country, one to his client country's embassy in Washington and one from it, one to OP-61 in the Pentagon, and one from I. S. A. in the Pentagon. He also sought the Office Director's advice on a policy matter and checked several matters

2008 年 12 月 12 日

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-11-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW

2003 - 2021

Wanted to call conference to help the
United States of America who is now in
a bad way in the country in the present
circumstances. The main object of the
conference was to discuss the situation in the
country and to find out the differences.

6061 - 7052

There is a serious risk to the country
and an increasing number of people
are leaving the country. The country
is in a state of emergency, as well as political,
economic, and social conditions.

1971 - 1972

Letter comments re: recommendations
come in this form during the 90 day
period following the release of the report.

cond. = 20%.

During the 1940's, the
Department was not able to do this.

2004 - 2005

APR 1968

Office Director's advice as a police officer and advised several officers
 contacted, and was then T. J. J. in the country. He also worked for
 country's embassy in Washington and was then in 1941 in the
 a businessman with interests in the same country, was in his client
 occurred with these cases, both involving the same — a corporation.
 In addition to these events between 1939, the day has been inter-

with desk officers in neighboring offices. There were no personal visitors from his client country's embassy during this day.

The chart on the following page is a graphic display of how a desk officer spends his time. It is based on estimates provided by desk officers interviewed in the course of a study conducted by the Office of Management.

Approved for release by NSA on 08-29-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

The chart on the following page is a graphic display of how a day

and, in following testimony, no sound is heard. "and, in following testimony, no sound is heard."

© 2000 Blackwell Science Ltd *Journal of Internal Medicine* 247: 395–402

of 15,000,000 to

HOW A COUNTRY DESK OFFICER SPENDS HIS TIME
(Estimates stated in median percentages)

100%

Reading

25%

Incoming field reports and communications 15%; Department and other Government agency materials 5%; press and publications 5%.

Communication
with Posts

15%

Drafting and clearing outgoing communications.

Planning

15%

Participating in drafting and discussions of planning and other policy papers.

Answering
Congressional and
Public Inquiries

13%

Congressional 5%; public 5%; press 3%.

Briefings

10%

Preparing briefing papers for use in Department and White House. Briefing individuals and groups interested in country assigned.

Foreign Embassy
Contacts

10%

Providing information and assisting on variety of subjects. Arranging appointments for Ambassador and visiting dignitaries.

Meetings

10%

Average: 3 regular and 3 Ad Hoc meetings each week.

Misc. 2%

Administrative and other activities.

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

CHAPTER VII

POLICY MECHANICS

This chapter will outline the mechanical steps in policy making in order to relate the desk officer's role in a fictitious, but probable, situation.

Background for a Fictitious Policy

Note

The following country and the events involved in making U. S. policy toward that country are fictitious. The relationship of the policy delineated herein to actual U. S. policy is purely coincidental, because it is a composite of U. S. policies pursued at various times toward many diverse countries. The country described herein exists only in the imagination of the author, and its resemblance to any actual state is also coincidental. All sample telegrams in this chapter are representative of those which might actually be sent under similar circumstances.

Country Background

Algerobia, or the Algerobies, is a chain of volcanic and coral islands located in the Southwest Pacific Ocean, midway between Hawaii and New Zealand. The population (2,525,990 in 1950) is centered primarily on the three largest islands of Baccalá, Molto, and Tiki. These three islands of the Algerobian Archipelago are the only ones of 302 islands with an area of more than 2 square miles. Baccalá, the most northerly, possesses 1,692 square miles; Molto, 2,779 square miles; and Tiki, 1,225

UNITED STATES

This report will outline the background of the situation in order to raise the level of the discussion to a level which is realistic, not academic.

Background for a realistic policy

Note

The following country and the trends involved in setting U. S. policy toward that country are indicated. The relationship of the policy indicated herein to actual U. S. policy is purely hypothetical. It is a composite of U. S. policies toward at various times toward many diverse countries. The country described herein exists only in the imagination of the author, and its resemblance to any actual state is also hypothetical. All sample situations in this chapter are representative of those which might actually be met under similar circumstances.

Country Background

Algeria, on the Atlantic, is a chain of volcanic and coral islands located in the Southwest Pacific Ocean, about between Hawaii and New Zealand. The population (1,252,000 in 1970) is composed of people on the three largest islands of Macaia, Kalia, and Kila. These three islands of the Algeopian Archipelago are the only ones of the islands with an area of more than 1 square mile. Macaia, the most easterly, possesses 1,605 square miles; Kalia, 5,770 square miles; and Kila, 1,111

square miles. Baccalá is the most populous (1,068,078), while Molto (915,853) and Tiki (442,034) are less densely populated. There are 100,025 persons living in the lesser islands, mostly of mixed aboriginal and negro stock. The average population density is 377.2 per square mile.

The primary industry of Algerobia is the cultivation of cacao. Though in recent years sugar and sisal have increased in importance, cacao still accounts for 81 per cent of the national income. These industries provide subsistence on the three major islands. In the outer islands, the population subsists mainly on fishing and intermittent copra gathering.

Ethnic groups include: Negroes (1,078,078), Mestizos (901,853), Polynesians (285,043), and Chinese (261,016). The negroes were imported in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from Africa by the Spanish conquerors of the Algerobies. The Polynesians are all that remain of the once numerous aboriginal population which inhabited the archipelago on the eve of its conquest. The Chinese population migrated there in the late nineteenth century to work on the cacao plantations when slavery was outlawed.

Santo Tomás de Baccalá is the largest city (658,172) and the principal port of the Algerobies. This city is also the seat of government. It possesses an excellent roadstead in its harbor, able to accommodate the largest of commercial vessels. Major sugar refineries, distilleries, and sisal processing plants are located here.

Nueva Aguila on the Island of Molto is the second city (275,383), where most of the cacao processing plants are located. Nueva Valencia, the third city (193,284), is located on Tiki, where there are other cacao processing plants and a few factories for processing sisal. Like

square miles. Because in the most populous (1,000,000), while others (915,000) and still (445,000) are less densely populated. There are 100,000 persons living in the former islands, mostly of mixed blood and Negro stock. The average population density is 37.5 per square mile.

The primary industry of all islands is the cultivation of coconuts. Though in recent years sugar and rice have increased in importance, coconuts still accounts for 81 per cent of the national income. These industries provide subsistence for the large major element of the population, the population estimates ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000.

Public works include: Port of (1,000,000), Port of (400,000), Port of (250,000), and Port of (100,000). The islands are important in the movement and exportation of coconuts from Africa to the mainland. The coconuts are all that remain of the once numerous aboriginal population which inhabited the islands on the eve of the conquest. The Chinese population estimates there in the late nineteenth century is over 100,000 Chinese plantations where slavery was abolished.

Sancti Spiritus de Sancti is the largest city (100,000) and the principal port of the islands. This city is also the seat of Government. It possesses an excellent harbor in its harbor, able to accommodate the largest of commercial vessels. Major sugar refineries, distilleries, and other processing plants are located here. There is also on the island of Sancti is the second city (100,000), which most of the sugar processing plants are located. There is also the third city (100,000), it is located on the island, where there are other sugar processing plants and a few factories for processing sugar. Like

Santo Tomás de Baccalá, both of these cities possess excellent harbors, but neither has developed its port facilities as extensively.

Volcanoes, new and old, are the most conspicuous feature of the landscape. Seismic disturbances are also common.

Typhoons of a destructive force are an annual occurrence, striking the islands in the south and usually curving toward the northwest. Concomitant or subsequent torrential rains, and not the high velocity winds, cause most of the damage to property.

Temperature variations are minor. Rainfall is plentiful in the summer and autumn but intermittent in the winter and spring.

The Algerobies were discovered by Don Baltasar de Algeroby, in 1564, while on a voyage of exploration from Nueva España at the behest of the Spanish Crown. He returned in the following year with a fleet of seven ships and 1,020 colonists and established the city of Santo Tomás de Baccalá on the shores of the Bahía de Baccalá. The ensuing conquest of the area was easily accomplished because of the hospitable nature of the Polynesian aboriginals. Thence the Spanish conquerors settled down to operate large plantations and enslave the aboriginals, who were nearly exterminated in the process. As the aboriginals died off or fled to hide in the tropical forests, negro slaves were imported in large quantities to labor in the growing plantation economy.

In 1610, the islands suffered a Dutch invasion which, though defeated, destroyed nearly all of the economy built up by that time. The next invaders were British, who appeared off the coasts in 1762 with a well-equipped fleet and easily subdued the ill-prepared garrison. The British did not remain to enjoy the fruits of their conquest but restored it to Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

But we have that situation in our country.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific information required.

The records of the National Archives and Records Administration, relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, are being transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration, and are being made available to the public.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

and 1,000 soldiers and established the city of Santa Fe de

[illegible]

...the ...
...the ...
...the ...

the tropical forest, sugar cane was imported in large quantities

The 1990, the Bureau suggested a 10% increase in the
 labor in the private planning economy.

...the economy built up at that time. The next

that results in enjoy the fruits of the common good, but it is not

- 104 -

In 1813, having noted the commencement of uprisings in other parts of the Spanish Empire, Julio Tortuga led an abortive three-year effort to gain independence. It was cruelly crushed by General Alfredo Perez, leading an army of regulars and mestizos at the Battle of Umballawalla in 1816. No further significant uprisings for independence occurred until 1849. In that year Gustavo Mata opened a revolt of mestizos and negroes which was successful after a guerilla-type struggle of five years duration.

General Mata's provisional government convened a constitutional convention at Santo Tomás de Baccalá in 1856. Here a liberal constitution was framed establishing a bicameral legislature of limited powers under a powerful executive who was to be elected for a single seven-year term. General Mata was elected as the first president in December, 1856, by a franchise extended to all property-owning males above the age of twenty years. He was assassinated in 1865 after having abrogated the constitutional provisions pertaining to the presidency to permit himself to be elected to that office for life. His successor and assassin, Colonel Narciso Paredes, also died in office, being poisoned in the wake of oppressive anti-Chinese measures in 1871.

Since then, only three of the twenty-four presidents have succeeded peacefully to that office and peacefully departed from it. Until 1933 the usual assassination or palace revolution "elected" and "inaugurated" a new president. From 1933 to 1954, the Algerobies enjoyed a growing prosperity derived from good cacao crops and a rising cacao price in the world markets. Their prosperity continued despite growing world tensions and was uninterrupted in the coming conflict. The Algerobies were undisturbed by early Japanese hegemony in the Pacific and remained

In 1911, the first meeting of the Government of the Republic of China was held in the Great Hall of the People. The meeting was attended by the President, the Vice President, and the members of the Executive Yuan. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People, which was then the largest hall in the world. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People, which was then the largest hall in the world. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People, which was then the largest hall in the world.

General Sun's provisional government continued a constitutional commission as Sun Yat-sen's de facto leader in 1911. There is a strong possibility that the commission was established as a democratic institution of the Republic of China. The commission was established as a democratic institution of the Republic of China. The commission was established as a democratic institution of the Republic of China. The commission was established as a democratic institution of the Republic of China. The commission was established as a democratic institution of the Republic of China.

Since then, only three of the twenty-four presidents have succeeded in their efforts to lead the nation. The first president, Sun Yat-sen, was elected in 1911. The second president, Yuan Shikai, was elected in 1915. The third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1916. The fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1917. The fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1918. The sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1919. The seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1920. The eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1921. The ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1922. The tenth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1923. The eleventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1924. The twelfth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1925. The thirteenth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1926. The fourteenth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1927. The fifteenth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1928. The sixteenth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1929. The seventeenth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1930. The eighteenth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1931. The nineteenth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1932. The twentieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1933. The twenty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1934. The twenty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1935. The twenty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1936. The twenty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1937. The twenty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1938. The twenty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1939. The twenty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1940. The twenty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1941. The twenty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1942. The thirtieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1943. The thirty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1944. The thirty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1945. The thirty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1946. The thirty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1947. The thirty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1948. The thirty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1949. The thirty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1950. The thirty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1951. The thirty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1952. The fortieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1953. The forty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1954. The forty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1955. The forty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1956. The forty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1957. The forty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1958. The forty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1959. The forty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1960. The forty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1961. The forty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1962. The fiftieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1963. The fifty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1964. The fifty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1965. The fifty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1966. The fifty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1967. The fifty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1968. The fifty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1969. The fifty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1970. The fifty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1971. The fifty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1972. The sixtieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1973. The sixty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1974. The sixty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1975. The sixty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1976. The sixty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1977. The sixty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1978. The sixty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1979. The sixty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1980. The sixty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1981. The sixty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1982. The seventieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1983. The seventy-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1984. The seventy-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1985. The seventy-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1986. The seventy-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1987. The seventy-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1988. The seventy-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1989. The seventy-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1990. The seventy-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1991. The seventy-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1992. The eightieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1993. The eighty-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1994. The eighty-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1995. The eighty-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1996. The eighty-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1997. The eighty-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 1998. The eighty-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 1999. The eighty-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2000. The eighty-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2001. The eighty-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2002. The ninetieth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2003. The ninety-first president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2004. The ninety-second president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2005. The ninety-third president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2006. The ninety-fourth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2007. The ninety-fifth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2008. The ninety-sixth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2009. The ninety-seventh president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2010. The ninety-eighth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2011. The ninety-ninth president, Li Yuanhong, was elected in 2012. The hundredth president, Cao Rong, was elected in 2013.

completely neutral until they granted the Allied Powers permission to construct airfields and supply bases on Baccalá. The economy remained prosperous following the end of hostilities as the world demand for cacao increased, despite growing competition in the world market from African nations.

In the winter of 1954, following the election of Dr. Eldemiro Gonivo as president, an especially destructive typhoon lashed the islands, leaving a devastation from which it recovered but slowly. With Algerobian cacao production at a fraction of its former level, other producing countries seized the opportunity to expand their markets and captured former Algerobian customers. With patient rebuilding, the Algerobian producers regained a few of their customers; but they were unable to regain some 16 per cent of their former markets, and the economy suffered accordingly.

With U. S. funds and technical assistance, a vast program of cash crop diversification was initiated. Unfortunately, this program ground slowly to a halt in the face of opposition from the mestizo landowners who form the majority of the support for Dr. Gonivo's government. With their support assured, Dr. Gonivo abrogated the constitution and was elected president for life in 1961. The promising social revolution "died aborning" and cash crop diversification withered away.

Beginning in 1961, Dr. Gonivo organized his followers into several para-military organizations and armed them with modern Czech weapons. These organizations have been used to stamp out opposition to his rule -- potential or actual. Their cruel methods, reminiscent of Hitler's Gestapo, have shocked the civilized world, provoking widespread liberal and humanitarian condemnation. He subverted the armed forces by trying

[illegible]

their leaders and executing them on trumped-up charges of treason.

These he replaced with officers personally loyal to himself.

The small, vociferous communist party was formally outlawed by a rubber stamp legislature in late 1961. Their few members were hunted down by inflamed mobs and burned alive. Their skulls decorate the entrance gates of the Ministry of Justice.

Guerilla warfare reduced the national income by 8 per cent before it was completely crushed. Sugar cane fields, cacao plantations, and sisal plants were burned or sabotaged. However, the results of the guerilla efforts were not sufficiently demonstrable to maintain support. Apathy grew apace, and real opposition ended through Dr. Gonivo's paid informer program. A heavily rewarded informer enabled the Guardia Nacional to ambush and machine gun the last opposition on Algerobian territory.

Opposition to the U. S. aid program led to mob violence against the property of the U. S. Embassy. Dr. Gonivo's henchmen subjected American diplomatic personnel and their property to such indignities that a rupture of relations with the United States has been all but imminent. The U. S. Ambassador returned to Washington for consultations. Many Embassy personnel were expelled, and the U. S. Government retaliated in kind against Algerobian Embassy personnel in Washington. Remaining at the U. S. Embassy were: the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim, the First Secretary/Political Officer, the Second Secretary/Economic Officer, the Second Secretary/Administrative Officer, the Assistant Attaché (C. I. A.), the Army Attaché, and the Naval Attaché.

On the morning of February 3, 1963, Mt. Pompier, a long-dormant volcano on the Island of Baccalá, burst into violent activity. Clouds

[illegible]

of volcanic debris were hurled miles into the atmosphere, and molten lava rushed down its slopes, sweeping everything before it.

Simultaneously, strong tremors shook the island, causing buildings to topple, streets to crack into yawning chasms, and boulders to roll from the mountains. In the wake of this seismic disturbance, a tsunami struck the coast, wreaking further havoc.

Policy Development

Reporting

From the first explosive rumble of Mt. Pompier, the Chargé was out of bed to observe. During the tremors that followed, he and his family went to the yard of his residence to escape any debris which might be shaken loose from his house. This newly and substantially built edifice remained undamaged, though it swayed noticeably in the seismic disturbance which was interrupting the normal lassitude.

With the cessation of tremors, the Chargé dressed and drove rapidly to the cable office to send out his first report, while his wife commenced telephoning other Embassy personnel to ascertain their well-being. As he drove through the streets he noted that the municipal police and the Guardia Nacional were already assembling to maintain order, while the Cuerpo de Bomberos raced with their apparatus to answer alarms. Ambulance sirens also howled for clearance enroute on missions of mercy.

At the cable office, he drafted a brief and concise report which informed the Department of what he knew at that time. Some information addresses were included in the chance that their host countries were disturbed by the same events. Other information addresses were included to give them background information in the possibility that they might

of volcanic origin were killed after the earthquake, and were
then thrown down the river, according to the report.
Simultaneously, strong tremors shook the island, causing damage
to the people, and in some cases causing death, and houses to fall
from the mountains. In the wake of this violent disturbance, a strong
storm the next day, causing further damage.

Police Department

Reporting
From the first reported trouble at the station, the police were
of help to themselves. During the trouble that followed, he and his family
went to the yard of his residence to escape any trouble which might be
caused for him from his house. This house and apartment building which
remained standing, though it was not completely in the same condition
which was interesting the normal situation.
With the cessation of the storm, the Chief returned and they finally
to the police office to hear the first report, which was
concerned with the other houses destroyed in the same way.
He then through the station he noted that the situation
police and the Guardia Nacional were already beginning to receive reports,
while the Grupo de Bomberos faced with their equipment in another place.
Although there was much fire damage, except on the side of the city.
At the police office, he drafted a report and caused report which
informed the Department of what he knew at that time. Some information
elsewhere was obtained in the course of their own activities with
disputed by the news service. Other information was also
in the first background information in the investigation that they were

later be called upon to assist in some manner. The message, as received in Washington, appears following.¹

¹Excluding certain message headings which are of interest only to communications technicians, the messages which follow will be substantially as received in the Department of State's Operations Center, incoming or outgoing.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

February 3, 1963

ACTION:	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IMMEDIATE	197
INFO:	AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON	PRIORITY	26
	AMEMBASSY CANBERRA	PRIORITY	16
	AMCONSUL NOUMEA	PRIORITY	3
	POLAD CINCPAC	PRIORITY	28
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	PRIORITY	UNN

ALGEROBIES BEING SHAKEN BY VIOLENT EARTHQUAKE 4:30 AM FEBRUARY 3. EMBASSY PERSONNEL BELIEVED SAFE. NO INFORMATION LOCAL AMERICANS. DETAILS TO FOLLOW.

SMITH

Initial Reactions in the Department: Germination of Policy

Though the above message was sent out at 4:58 A.M. local zone time, it was not received in the Department until 11:30 A.M. because of zone time differences and time consumed in transmissions and receipts. The six-hour time difference between the post and the Department must be borne in mind when reading the messages in this chapter. For this same reason, it was not received in Wellington, Canberra, or Noumea until the following day, these cities being across the International Date Line.

By 11:35 A.M. this message was in the Operations Center, and copies were being distributed to the White House, the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, the Office Director for Southwest Pacific Affairs, and

It is called upon to assist the Government in the following manner:

1. To provide the Government with the following information:

2. To provide the Government with the following information:

ANNEX A

Annex A, 1991

Activity	Frequency	Priority
1. To provide the Government with the following information:	1. To provide the Government with the following information:	1. To provide the Government with the following information:
2. To provide the Government with the following information:	2. To provide the Government with the following information:	2. To provide the Government with the following information:
3. To provide the Government with the following information:	3. To provide the Government with the following information:	3. To provide the Government with the following information:
4. To provide the Government with the following information:	4. To provide the Government with the following information:	4. To provide the Government with the following information:
5. To provide the Government with the following information:	5. To provide the Government with the following information:	5. To provide the Government with the following information:

ANNEX B, 1991

ANNEX

Initial Review of the Government's Policy

1. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

2. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

3. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

4. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

5. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

6. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

7. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

8. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

9. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

10. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

11. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

12. The Government's policy is to provide the following information:

the desk officer -- the Officer in Charge of Algerobian Affairs. Further distribution was made throughout A. I. D. hierarchy in a similar manner.

The immediate reaction of the desk officer was a thought that the United States should wait and see the extent of damage and be prepared to render aid for humanitarian reasons if necessary. A large factor in determining whether or not aid should be given would depend on whether or not aid was requested and what recommendations were made by the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim. The desk officer outlined his thoughts briefly in conversation with his Office Director, adding that if aid should be given, it should be administered directly to the Algerobian people and divorced from the Gonivo Administration as much as circumstances permitted.

The Office Director concurred in these thoughts and indicated that preliminary guidance in this vein had just been received by telephone from the Assistant Secretary. Because the Department of Defense had been an information addressee² on the message, there was no need to telephone

²Usually written and spoken as addee in U. S. military communications.

authorities there.

In the Department of Defense, the message had been received in the Communications Center and had received distribution in that agency. Likewise, distribution had been made in C. I. A., U. S. I. A., and other interested government agencies.

Policy had been germinated, but nothing more could be done or planned pending information from the post.

Amplifying the Report

After transmitting his initial message to the Department, the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim had gone directly to the U. S. Embassy, which he

usually written and signed as stated in U. S. official communications.

...to the Department of Defense, the message had been received in the
Communication Center and was received immediately by the press agency. Like-
wise, information was being made to C. I. A., D. I. A., and other
interested government agencies.

After disseminating his initial message to the Department, the Chief

found intact and undamaged. His staff officers had already begun the laborious process of investigating the safety of American citizens known to them. A radio was tuned to the local broadcast frequency to glean information, but thus far only a repeated appeal from the District Military Commander urging calmness and promising assistance had been heard.

By 9:30 A.M., through news broadcasts, local employee observation, and informal telephone conversations with other diplomatic missions in the capital, the Jefe del Cuerpo de Bomberos, the Jefe de la Policía, and the Jefe del Estado Mayor General de la Guardia Nacional, a partial picture of the damage could be pieced together. Though building damage was widespread throughout the city of Santo Tomás, its northeast section had been hit hardest. A majority of the known American citizens residing in the area had been contacted and found safe and uninjured. However, the welfare of all known American citizens could not be determined because of intermittent telephone operation. The death count was rising and not yet complete, but was apparently extensive. The few hospitals were treating the injured on a mass-production basis. The utility companies were hard at work trying to restore services. Based on this information, an amplifying telegram was encrypted and sent to the Department of State. It was encrypted to prevent the Gonivo Administration from gaining any knowledge of proposed U. S. aid in view of the strained relations existing between the two governments. The message, as decrypted in the Department Operations Center, follows below.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

February 3, 1963

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IMMEDIATE

198

crypted in the important operations Center, Baltimore, Md.,
 relations existing between the two governments. The records, as de-
 from being any knowledge of proposed U. S. aid in case of the cessation
 Department of State. It was accepted in payment the Japanese administration
 information, no specific reference was made to the
 companies were said to work toward to restore services, based on the
 were treating the situation as a non-political matter. The matter
 and not yet complete, but was apparently extensive. The two parties
 because of inevitable religious opposition. The matter must not bring
 the welfare of all known American citizens could not be disregarded.
 in the area had been contacted and found safe and unharmed. However,
 had been well informed. A majority of the known American citizens residing
 was widespread throughout the city of Santo Domingo. The religious situation
 status of the damage could be placed as follows. Through religious groups
 the Japanese Government as an American Embassy, a certain
 called, the Japanese Embassy in Havana, the facts as in Manila, and
 and information which no investigation with other religious officials in the
 by 9:30 A.M., through some intermediaries, local religious organizations,
 transferred along channels and through religious officials in Manila.
 information, the case has only a tentative answer from the Japanese Embassy
 to them. It could be found by the local government's response in Manila.
 Japanese question of investigating the subject of religious relations seems
 to have been well answered.

А Б В Г Д Е Ж З И Й К Л М Н О П Р С Т У Ф Ц Ч Ш Щ Ъ Ы Ь Э Ю Я

E. coli O157:H7

104-10368-10000

182 508 189

INFO:	AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON	PRIORITY	27
	AMEMBASSY CANBERRA	PRIORITY	17
	AMCONSUL NOUMEA	PRIORITY	4
	POLAD CINCPAC	PRIORITY	29
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	PRIORITY	UNN

EMBTTEL 197

1. BACCALA STRUCK BY VIOLENT EARTHQUAKE ESTIMATED FORCE 7 AT 4:37 AM WITH ASSOCIATED VOLCANIC ACTIVITY.
2. PRELIMINARY AND FRAGMENTARY REPORTS INDICATE SCORES DEAD HUNDREDS INJURED.
3. BUILDING DAMAGE SANTO TOMAS WIDESPREAD. WATER MAINS RUPTURED NORTH-EAST SECTION CITY. COMMUNICATIONS INTERMITTENT. ELECTRIC POWER OUT NORTHEAST SECTION CITY.
4. EMBASSY UNDAMAGED. NO DEATHS REPORTED AMERICAN CITIZENS BUT EMBASSY MAKING EFFORTS ASCERTAIN THEIR WELFARE AND WHEREABOUTS THIS CONSULAR DISTRICT.
5. DO NOT INTEND RAISE QUESTION POSSIBLE U. S. AID BUT RECOMMEND CONSIDERATION AND PLANNING IN EVENT SUCH REQUESTED BY GOA.
6. IF GOA REQUESTS ASSISTANCE RECOMMEND IT BE LIMITED TO FOODSTUFFS AND MEDICINES DIRECTLY ADMINISTERED IN ORDER AVOID IT BEING CONSTRUED AS SUPPORT FOR GONIVO REGIME.

SMITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

This telegram was received in Washington at 4:20 P.M., and by 4:35 P.M. had been decrypted and distributed in the same manner as its predecessor. Paragraphs 5 and 6 contain the Chargé's assessment of what might be done and how. His views are, it will be noted, in consonance with the opinions prevailing in the Department and are indicative of a close and harmonious working relationship between the Department and the post.

Origination of a Private Request

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the first message, news reports of the quake had been broadcast by the press services throughout

the United States. These reports caused the Baptist Missionary Society considerable concern for one of their number in the Algerobies. A phone call to the Department of State did little to ease their worry, because the Department's only information was based on the first telegram. Though the Algerobian desk officer assured them that they would be advised in the event that their missionary "sister" were injured or dead, this assurance was insufficient to calm their fears. The society's secretary therefore phoned a friendly senator, who advised that he would personally make every effort on behalf of his constituent's welfare.

Shortly thereafter, the senator phoned the Algerobian desk officer and requested that a specific query be directed to the U. S. Embassy to determine the status of his constituent missionary. Because the desk officer had gleaned most of the details from his phone conversation with the missionary society, it was only a matter of minutes before he had a message drafted and released by the Office Director. The message, as sent, appears below.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

February 3, 1963

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS

IMMEDIATE

93

EMBTEL 197

SENATOR HOOPLE CONCERNED SAFETY CONSTITUENT FANNY DOGOODER, BAPTIST MISSIONARY, QUINTA LOS BORRACHOS, AVENIDA PRINCIPAL, URBANIZACION LOS TEQUES, NUEVA AGUILA. ADVISE SOONEST.

RUSK

With the receipt of the second message from the post, the desk officer could somewhat allay the fears of the senator and the Baptist Missionary Society, but final disposition of the request would have to await further information from the Chargé. Note that outgoing telegrams

[illegible]

and decorated with a Republic Party by division on the U. S. Embassy in
officially identified, the division knows the situation and will not
be released by the Office of the Secretary, the message, as

1991, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 26

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With the receipt of the second message from the post, the bank officer could somewhat assist the efforts of the committee and the National Monetary Society, but final disposition of the request would have to await further information from the Chicago bank that conducted the business.

from the Department are always signed with the name of the Secretary of State.

Preliminary Planning

On receipt of the second message from the Chargé, the Office Director instructed the desk officer to contact the Department of Defense to learn what support that agency could supply in case the Algerobian Government did request aid. The desk officer phoned I. S. A. in the Department of Defense and talked with a colonel, U. S. A., who had jurisdiction in Algerobian matters for that agency.

The colonel advised the desk officer that he, too, had received both messages from the Chargé and had done some preliminary planning. In his view, present armed forces operating schedules would permit the dispatch of two large cargo aircraft if only small quantities of aid were desired. If a larger quantity of supplies were requested, a U. S. Navy AKA was completing a shipyard availability at Bremerton and could be made available for operations commencing February 6. However, both the desk officer and the colonel concluded that any further planning would be contingent upon more specific information from the Embassy.

The gist of this conversation was reported to the Office Director, who agreed in the conclusion. He then directed the desk officer to draft a telegram to Baccalá, advising the Chargé of the Department's concurrence in the recommendations set forth in the Embassy's telegram #198. The Office Director indicated, additionally, that the Assistant Secretary would "sign off"³ on this message. An unencrypted copy of

³Normally, messages such as this, which fix policy, are initialed ("signed off") by the Assistant Secretary or his alter ego.

Yours truly,
 [Signature]

[illegible][illegible]

the colonel advised the bank officials that he, too, had received
two messages from the Chicago and had been very positively alarmed.
In his view, present armed forces operating schedules would permit the
dispatch of two large cargo aircraft of more than sufficient to the
west coast. It is in the country of Mexico were requested, a U. S.
Army Air Corps conducting a military aviation at present and could
be made available for operations commencing February 1. However, with
the bank officials and the military concluded that any further planning
would be contingent upon more specific information from the industry.

[illegible]

usually, exchange with air, which is easily, as indicated
(shown only) in the relation between the air and

this message, which was cleared with A. I. D. and the Department of Defense prior to being sent, appears below.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

February 3, 1963

ACTION:	AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS	PRIORITY	94
INFO:	AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON		202
	AMEMBASSY CANBERRA		301
	AMCONSUL NOUMEA		39
	POLAD CINCPAC		817
	DOD		UNN

EMBTEL 198

CONCUR YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS PARAS 5 AND 6. FURTHER PLANNING HERE CONTINGENT UPON YOUR PROPOSALS.

RUSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The desk officer spent the remainder of the afternoon and the early evening in answering the phone calls made by anxious relatives of American citizens in the Algerobies. He also phoned the Algerobian Embassy to determine the extent of their knowledge of the earthquake but found that his information was better than theirs. When he departed for home, he advised the Department's Operations Center where he could be reached should an important message be received.

Watchful Waiting

In Santo Tomás, the Chargé had phoned the Foreign Minister to offer the sympathy of the U. S. people for the people of the Algerobies in their hour of need. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks and invited him to lunch that same day. Smith accepted, hoping to learn of any Algerobian requests for aid. The information which he gathered at

then arranged, which was cleared with A. J. S. and the Department of

Defense prior to being sent, appears below.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 1953

TO :	AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON	FROM :	STATE DEPT
INFO :	AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON		
	AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON		
	AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON		
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URGENT 121
COMMUNIST TROOP RECONSTITUTIONS BEING 2 AND 3. FURTHER RECONSTITUTIONS
CONTINUING FROM FOUR MONTHS.

END

CONFIDENTIAL

The desk officer spent the remainder of the afternoon and the early evening in connecting the phone calls made by various relatives of American citizens in the afternoon. He also learned the situation Embassy no determines the extent of their knowledge of the situation but found that the information was better than before. When he reported for work, he advised the Department's Operations Control Group he could be reached should an important message be received.

Official Meeting

In South Town, the group had known the Foreign Minister to offer the sympathy of the U. S. people for the people of the Republic in their hour of need. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks and invited him to lunch that same day. With accepted, hoping to learn of any disposition regarding the aid. The information which he gathered at

that luncheon is summarized below in the message which was sent to the Department later that same afternoon.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

February 3, 1963

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMEDIATE 199

INFO: POLAD CINCPAC PRIORITY 30
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMMEDIATE UNN

EMBTTEL 198

1. POMIN LOPEZ CONDE AT LUNCH TODAY STATED GOA PRESENTLY HAS NO PLANS REQUEST USG AID.
2. LOPEZ STATED GOA ABLE ADMINISTER ALL RELIEF REQUIRED BUT INDICATED FULL EXTENT DAMAGE STILL UNKNOWN TO GOA.
3. LOCAL RED CROSS PRESIDENT CUERVO ALSO PRESENT ADDED NOTHING TO ABOVE.
4. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES ON BACCALA NOT YET RESTORED. EMBASSY EFFORTS COMPLETE CHECK WELFARE AMERICAN CITIZENS CONTINUING. CROSSDECK (ALUSNA) ATTEMPTED FLY TO NUEVA AGUILA AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 3 TO INQUIRE WELFARE/WHEREABOUTS AMERICAN CITIZENS BUT PREVENTED BY BAD WEATHER.
5. ENROUTE AIRPORT CROSSDECK SAW EXTENSIVE DAMAGE URBANIZACION LAS LOMAS AND VILLAGE LOS GATOS. LOS GATOS/LOS PESCADORES ROAD IMPASSABLE ACCORDING HIS REPORTS. EMBASSY HAS CERTAIN INFORMATION LAS COLINAS AND EL CARIBE SECTIONS SANTO TOMAS INTACT OR VERY LIGHTLY DAMAGED.

SMITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

While the Charge lunched with the Foreign Minister, the Embassy had been receiving a steady stream of damage reports from a wide variety of sources, including two Embassy officers whom he had instructed to make a first-hand survey of local conditions.

The Naval Attache had been instructed to fly to Nueva Aguila and investigate the welfare of American citizens employed at the Diamond Chocolate Company, a U. S. company with a large plant in that city. The Assistant Attache (C. A. S.)⁴ had been directed to investigate conditions

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2 of 2

ITEM	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	QUANTITY	UNIT
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2

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CONFIDENTIAL

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⁴An officer of the C. I. A.

in Santo Tomás. A summary of their reports⁵ was included in the

⁵The Assistant Attaché sent a report with the same information to his own agency.

message which the Chargé drafted after his lunch with the Foreign Minister.

Closing a Case

As the Assistant Attaché concluded his report to the Chargé, Department Message #93 concerning Fanny Dogooder was delivered. Fortunately, telephone communications with Molto and Tiki had been restored, so that a telephone call to the residence of Miss Dogooder sufficed. The Second Secretary/Administrative Officer, who made the phone call, was informed that Miss Dogooder had departed on the day previous for her annual vacation in Perth, Australia. The message apprising the Department of this information appears below.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FEBRUARY 3, 1963

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIORITY 200

INFO: AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 18

DEPTEL 93

FANNY DOGOODER DEPARTED NUEVA AGUILA 2 FEB FOR ANNUAL VACATION PERTH, AUSTRALIA.

SMITH

With the restoration of telephone service to Molto and Tiki, the Chargé phoned the Diamond Chocolate Company, where he was able to reach

1. The Office of the Director

In your letter, a number of facts reported for inclusion in the

The Director's report is a report with the same information in
the same agency.

Whereas when the Director's report was made with the Director

Director.

Director's Office

As the Director's report contained his report on the Director

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only a sleepy watchman, but the Chargé was able to obtain the home telephone number of the plant manager. A call to the manager's home supplied the information that seismic disturbances on Molto had been slight. The plant had functioned normally that day with all employees present.

Later that night, Department Telegram #94 was delivered to the Chargé. This, he felt, required no immediate action, because his latest message to the Department, #199, had indicated that U. S. aid would not be required.

The Embassy staff continued making phone calls into the early morning hours, trying to assure the welfare of American citizens, until, at last, they departed for their homes and a well-earned rest.

In Washington, shortly before eight o'clock on the morning of February 4, the Algerobian desk officer arrived in his Department office. Starting with his usual stack of correspondence, he noted copies of telegrams #199 and #200 from the field. Their contents had been phoned to him during the night by the Department Operations Center. With telegram #200 in hand, the desk officer called the Baptist Missionary Society and eased their concern for Miss Dogooder. The phone call following this to Senator Hoople advised him of the information given to the Baptist Missionary Society and ended his concern in the matter. One case was closed.

The desk officer then attended the Assistant Secretary's morning staff conference with his Office Director. During the conference, the contents of telegram #199 were discussed; and it was agreed to hold assistance plans in abeyance pending a specific request from the field. The desk officer informed his A. I. D. counterpart of this decision.

A New Facet

Shortly after the end of the staff conference, the desk officer received a phone call from the Executive Vice President of the Diamond Chocolate Company in New York. He inquired about the status of company personnel and property in Nueva Aguila, because he had been unable to talk to the Nueva Aguila plant by telephone. It was mentioned that a company ship with factory spare parts and supplies would be departing from New York in three days and that any food or medicines required by company personnel could be added to its cargo.

Because he had no knowledge of damage on Molto or Tiki, the desk officer could only reply that he would send a cable to the Embassy at Santo Tomás and request them to investigate the status of the Diamond Chocolate Company personnel and property. He further assured the executive vice president that his company would be advised in this matter as soon as a reply was made. The desk officer therefore drafted the following telegram, which was released by the Office Director and transmitted.

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 95

EMBTel 197

EXEC VICE PRES DIAMOND CHOCOLATE N. Y. CONCERNED SAFETY NUEVA AGUILA PERSONNEL AND PLANT. STATES SS DIAMOND BAR DEPARTING N. Y. FEB 7 FOR NUEVA AGUILA WITH FACTORY SPARES AND SUPPLIES. SPACE AVAILABLE 4 LONG TONS EMERGENCY FOOD AND MEDICINES FOR COMPANY PERSONNEL IF REQUIRED. ADVISE ASAP.

RUSK

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

How the Mighty Are Fallen

Embassy personnel arrived even earlier than usual in Santo Tomás and resumed the business of determining the status of American personnel whom they had been, as yet, unable to contact. This process was well under way when a phone call from the Foreign Minister informed the Charge that the Algerobian President desired to see him at 9:00 A.M. in the Presidential Palace. A summary of the meeting which ensued was forwarded to the Department. Below is a decrypted copy.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

February 4, 1963

ACTION:	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IMMEDIATE	201
INFO:	POLAD CINCPAC	IMMEDIATE	31
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	IMMEDIATE	UNN

EMBTLS 198 AND 199. DEPTTEL 94.

1. GONIVO CALLED ME TO PALACE THIS MORNING AND GAVE ME PRELIMINARY DAMAGE REPORT IN PRESENCE FOMIN AND PRES RED CROSS.

2. HIS INFORMATION INDICATES 127 DEAD AND 348 INJURED, NONE AMERICAN. APPROXIMATELY 10,000 HOMELESS. ALL CASUALTIES BACCALA. CASUALTIES CONTINUING MOUNT. KNOWN DAMAGE ESTIMATED 16 MILLION PESOS. NO LOOTING OR CIVIL DISORDER REPORTED. NO DAMAGE REPORTED MOLTO OR TIKI. EMBASSY HAS COMPLETED INVESTIGATION STATUS U. S. CITIZENS IN ALL PARTS ALGEROBIES. NO DEATHS, INJURIES, OR WANT TO ANY AMERICAN CITIZENS HERE KNOWN EMBASSY.

3. GONIVO URGENTLY REQUESTS 3 U. S. HELICOPTERS HELP ASSBSS EXTENT DAMAGE. ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE FOR U. S. RELIEF ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY MEDICINES. STATED REQUEST WOULD BE MADE IN WRITING THIS AFTERNOON. I SAID I WOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO DEPARTMENT.

4. ARCHBISHOP GOMEZ VEGAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE CATHOLIC RELIEF SOCIETY THROUGH PAPAL NUNCIO ALFREDO D'ESTE.

5. IN VIEW FOREGOING AND TRADITIONAL U. S. FRIENDSHIP ALGEROBIAN PEOPLE I RECOMMEND FOLLOWING ACTION:

A. PROVIDE ASAP 3 HELICOPTERS FOR DAMAGE SURVEY IN COOPERATION WITH ALGEROBIAN ARMED FORCES.

B. AIRLIFT RED CROSS DISASTER EVALUATION TEAM IMMEDIATELY.

C. AID/W CONSULT U. S. HEADQUARTERS CATHOLIC RELIEF SOCIETY TO COORDINATE POSSIBLE SHIPMENTS EMERGENCY FOOD SUPPLIES AND MEDICINES.

D. RECOMMEND SHIP TYPHUS VACCINE SUFFICIENT HALF MILLION PEOPLE, SUPPLY HALIZONE TABLETS, PENICILLIN, ASSORTED DISINFECTANTS, AND BANDAGES.

6. FURTHER DETAILS THIS CONVERSATION FOLLOW SEPTIL.

7. CROSSDECK INTENDS OVERFLY BACCALA WITH SEVERAL GOA OFFICIALS AS PASSENGERS TO MAKE PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE TODAY WEATHER PERMITTING.

SMITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

In addition to the above message, the following self-explanatory telegram was sent separately.

S E C R E T

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION:	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	LIMDIS	IMMEDIATE	202
INFO:	POLAD CINCPAC		IMMEDIATE	32
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE		IMMEDIATE	UNN
	AMEMBASSY MOSCOW		IMMEDIATE	3
	AMEMBASSY TAIPEI		IMMEDIATE	UNN

EMBTEL 201

1. DURING COURSE MEETING GONIVO REPORTED REPTTEL POMIN TOLD ME HE HAS RECEIVED TELEGRAMS FROM MAO TSE TUNG AND KHRUSHCHEV OFFERING FOOD, MEDICINES, AND DAMAGE SURVEY TEAMS.

2. GONIVO STATED HE HAS POLITELY REFUSED BOTH OFFERS.

3. IN VIEW GONIVO'S PAST ANTI-COMMUNIST RECORD, I SURMISE HE IS UNWILLING OPEN WAY COMMUNIST PENETRATION ALGEROBIES.

4. LITTLE SYMPATHY HERE PEOPLE CHINESE EXTRACTION FOR CHICOM GOVT.

5. AS DEPT AWARE, SUCH REMAINING MEMBERS COMMUNIST PARTY ALGEROBIES AS MAY EXIST COMPLETELY UNDERGROUND SINCE 1961 LYNCHINGS BUT MIGHT RISK SURFACING IF KHRUSHCHEV AID ACCEPTED.

6. LIKELY NEUTRALIST INDIAN AND AFRICAN PRESS WOULD CRITICIZE REJECTION SOVIET AND CHICOM AID.

2. WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
CONTAINED: THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS.

3. THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS ARE
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CONCLUSIONS

7. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
CONTAINED: THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS.

APPENDIX

8. THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS ARE
CONTAINED: THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS.

SECTION	NUMBER OF PAGES	NUMBER OF PAGES	NUMBER OF PAGES
1. GENERAL INFORMATION	10	10	10
2. INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS	10	10	10
3. INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS	10	10	10
4. INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS	10	10	10
5. INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS	10	10	10

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10. THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS ARE
CONTAINED: THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT'S ACTS.

7. IN ORDER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE U. S. INTEREST IN WELFARE PEOPLE ALGEROBIES IN THEIR HOUR OF NEED, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE THINKING IN TERMS OF A MAXIMUM IMPACT PROGRAM CONSISTENT WITH EXTENT DAMAGE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW COMMUNIST OFFERS AS WEIGHED AGAINST OVERALL U. S. POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ALGEROBIES.

SMITH

S E C R E T

While the Chargé conferred with Dr. Gonivo at the Palacio Blanco, the Embassy staff was able to account for the remaining known American citizens in the Algerobies. This information was included in telegram #201 to the Department.

Improved weather permitted the Naval Attaché, the Assistant Attaché, and several Algerobian officials to conduct an aerial survey of damaged areas. The Algerobian Government's one ancient airplane also flew on a similar mission.

The written request from the Algerobian Government to the United States for helicopter assistance in damage assessment was delivered to the Embassy early in the afternoon of February 4. A copy of that request, as pouched to Washington, appears on the following page.

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1967

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12955

The following information was included in various clients in the Alphabet. This information was included in various clients in the Alphabet.

[illegible][illegible]

the Embassy early in the afternoon of February 4. A copy of that message, as posted in Washington, appears on the following page.

A formal Request for the Assistance of the U. S. Government from the
Algerobian Government

(Text translated from the Spanish original)

REPUBLICA DE LAS ISLAS ALGEROBIAS
Ministerio de Negocios Extranjeros
Plaza de la Independencia
Santo Tomas de Baccalá

4 de Febrero de 1963

N.º 79na
Sir:

I refer to your kind expression of sympathy for the stricken people of the Algerobian Islands on behalf of the people of our great sister Republic of North America.

Sensible of the oft-expressed generosity and understanding of the American people for their less fortunate fellow creatures, and mindful of the traditional friendship which for these many years so happily has animated the intercourse between the United States of North America and the Republic of the Algerobian Islands, the Government of the Algerobian Islands has the honor to appeal to the noble and altruistic policies which guide the Government of the United States in order to make formal request that three United States helicopters be despatched as soon as possible to the Algerobian Islands in order that an aerial survey may be conducted of the Island of Baccala to ascertain the extent of the damage inflicted by the disastrous earthquake which so cruelly struck the Algerobian Islands on February 3, 1963.

The Government of the Algerobian Republic sincerely trusts that its appeal will be received and acted upon by the Government of the United States in the same spirit of comprehension and friendship which the peoples of the world have come to anticipate from the leader of the Christian world.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Francisco Teófilo López Conde

John H. Smith, Esquire
Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim
of the United States of America

A formal report for the President of the U. S. Government from the

Minister of the Interior

(Text translated from the original document)

Ministry of the Interior
Minister of the Interior
Paris, France, 18th July 1901

4th Avenue de la République

U. S. Government
Sir,

I refer to your kind expression of sympathy for the African
people of the African Islands on behalf of the people of our country
Ministry of the Interior of Paris, France.

Ministry of the Interior of Paris, France, 18th July 1901.
American people for their less fortunate African brethren, and mindful
of the traditional friendship which for these many years has happily
existed between the United States of America and the African Islands,
and the people of the African Islands, the Government of the
African Islands has the honor to appeal to the people and authorities
of the United States of America to assist the Government of the African
Islands in their efforts to bring about a more complete
and permanent settlement of the African Islands in order that the
people of the African Islands may be able to live in peace and
harmony with the people of the United States of America and the
people of the African Islands.

The Government of the African Islands sincerely trusts that
the appeal will be received and acted upon by the Government of the
United States in the same spirit of comprehension and friendship which
the people of the world have come to anticipate from the Government of the
United States.

Respectfully,
Yours very truly,
Minister of the Interior

Minister of the Interior

John A. Smith, Secretary
Charles A. Smith, Secretary
of the United States of America

Progress of the New Facet

Embassy message #201 crossed the Department's telegram #95 in transmission. The contents of the newly-arrived message were phoned to the manager of the Diamond Chocolate Company at Nueva Aguila by the Second Secretary/Economic Officer. The gist of the conversation which ensued between them can best be determined from the following telegram.

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMEDIATE 203

DEPTEL 95

MANAGER DIAMOND CHOCOLATE NUEVA AGUILA STATES OPERATIONS NORMAL PLANT AND PERSONNEL. NO REQUIREMENT FOOD OR MEDICINES THIS TIME.

SMITH

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

Planning a Survey

Embassy telegrams #201 and #202 were received in the late afternoon in Washington. Message #201 was distributed in the Department to the Secretary, Under Secretary, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary, Office Director, desk officer, the concerned A. I. D. hierarchy, and other interested federal agencies. Telegram #202, because of its "LIMDIS" caption, received a more restricted distribution on a strict "need-to-know" basis in the Department's chain of command. The White House, naturally, received copies of both telegrams. After a brief conference with their Assistant Secretary, the Office Director and the desk officer held a phone conference with I. S. A.

It was determined in the course of this conference that it would be impracticable to fly helicopters to Santo Tomás from Hawaii because

Embassy telegrams 4301 and 4302 were received in the late afternoon in Washington. The contents of the newly-received message were shown to the manager of the Diamond Chocolate Company at Miami Beach by the second secretary/consular officer. The gist of the conversation which ensued between them can best be determined from the following telegram:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EMBASSY 4, 1963

SUBJECT: MANAGEMENT OF SITE

EMBASSY 4301 AND 4302 WERE RECEIVED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON. THE CONTENTS OF THE NEWLY-RECEIVED MESSAGE WERE SHOWN TO THE MANAGER OF THE DIAMOND CHOCOLATE COMPANY AT MIAMI BEACH BY THE SECOND SECRETARY/CONSULAR OFFICER. THE GIST OF THE CONVERSATION WHICH ENSUED BETWEEN THEM CAN BEST BE DETERMINED FROM THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM:

SUBJECT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

EMBASSY 4, 1963

Embassy telegrams 4301 and 4302 were received in the late afternoon in Washington. The contents of the newly-received message were shown to the manager of the Diamond Chocolate Company at Miami Beach by the second secretary/consular officer. The gist of the conversation which ensued between them can best be determined from the following telegram:

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It was determined in the course of this conference that it would be impracticable to fly helicopters to Santo Domingo from Miami because

of their limited range. Further, it was not feasible to send helicopters from Long Beach or Pearl Harbor by ship because this would consume too much time. However, Task Group 93.2, composed of 1 A. S. W. carrier⁶

⁶An aircraft carrier configured for anti-submarine warfare. Written in naval communications as CVS.

and 5 destroyers, was conducting training operations 150 miles north of New Zealand in an ANZUS exercise which was nearly completed. The carrier, with a normal complement of 14 helicopters and 28 fixed-wing aircraft, could reach Santo Tomás in about 3 days. Even if 3 helicopters were available in closer proximity, there were no maintenance facilities available for them in Santo Tomás. Further, a carrier and her aircraft in the harbor of Santo Tomás would supply a demonstrable American presence. For these reasons, it was decided that dispatching the carrier offered the best solution to the problem, provided that this solution would be acceptable to the Algerobian Government.

The desk officer then conferred with his A. I. D. counterpart, briefing him on what had thus far transpired. Together they phoned the national headquarters of the Catholic Relief Society, where it was learned that an adequate supply of the medicines requested by telegram #201 was already being prepared for immediate air shipment.

After ascertaining the medical supply shipping data, the desk officer telephoned the U. S. Red Cross headquarters. Here he learned that the International Red Cross headquarters at Geneva had been requested by the Algerobian Government to send a disaster evaluation team and was acceding to that request.

will find. However, the paper by J. G. Thompson et al. (1986) from Long Beach is fairly typical of this category. The authors are

⁶On all but one occasion for anti-submarine warfare, British

and 2. However, was connecting existing navigation 100 miles north of New Zealand in the same manner which was finally completed. The catalyst, with a general component of 1.5 million tons and 15.5 million tons, could reach 100 miles in about 2 days. Even if 2 million tons were available in other projects, there were no maintenance facilities available for them to reach 100 miles. However, a catalyst and two additional in the region of 100 miles would mean a considerable decision process. For these reasons, it was decided that shipping the catalyst offshore the best solution in the present provided that this solution would be available to the Atlantic Ocean.

The case against them consisted with the U. S. Government, believing him on what was then far stronger. In fact they showed the national indignation of the United States, where it was known that an attempt would be made to assassinate the President (1901) and always being prepared for emergency air transport.

to that extent.

Algerian Government to send a letter advising him and was sending instructions and copies of reports at Geneva had been suggested by the telephone the U. S. had some newspapers. When he returned from his visit concerning the medical report involving him, she has advised

With all of these considerations in mind, the desk officer briefed his Office Director. Then, jointly, they drafted the message below, which was cleared by their Assistant Secretary and transmitted.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS IMMEDIATE 96

INFO: POLAD CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 820

EMBTELS 201 and 202

1. CONCUR YOUR ANALYSIS REPTTEL 202.

2. USS EUTAW (CVS-72) CONDUCTING TRAINING 150 MILES NORTH NEW ZEALAND ONLY FEASIBLE SOURCE HELICOPTERS AND HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE.

3. YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED INFORM GOA THAT USG DESIRES ACCEDE ITS REQUEST FOR 3 HELICOPTERS CONDUCT SURVEY DAMAGED AREAS. NAVY PREPARED DESPATCH EUTAW WITH HELICOPTER SQUADRON EMBARKED TO SANTO TOMAS ARRIVING FEBRUARY 7.

4. EUTAW CAN MAINTAIN 4 HELICOPTERS CONTINUOUSLY AIRBORNE DAYLIGHT HOURS.

5. REQUEST YOU INFORM GOA AND, IF AGREEABLE, ARRANGE CLEARANCES FOR EUTAW AND ESCORTING DESTROYERS HULL AND PREBLE ENTER SANTO TOMAS.

RUSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The information concerning the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Society efforts was forwarded in the separate messages below, drafted by the desk officer and released by the Office Director.

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 97

INFO: POLAD CINCPAC 822

WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS CATHOLIC RELIEF SOCIETY ADVISES 79 BOXES MEDICAL

With all of these considerations in mind, the above officer directed his office to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation were as follows:

CONCLUSIONS

February 4, 1963

SECTION: INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
DATE: 2/4/63

1. The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Memphis Police Department has revealed that the following information is correct:
2. The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Memphis Police Department has revealed that the following information is correct:
3. The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Memphis Police Department has revealed that the following information is correct:
4. The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Memphis Police Department has revealed that the following information is correct:
5. The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Memphis Police Department has revealed that the following information is correct:

CONCLUSIONS

The information concerning the above case and the results of the investigation are as follows:

CONCLUSIONS

February 4, 1963

SECTION: INVESTIGATION
SUBJECT: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
DATE: 2/4/63

WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM DATED 2/4/63 SUBJECT: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

SUPPLIES BELIEVED ADEQUATE ALL NEEDS DISASTER ARRIVING SANTO TOMAS
FEBRUARY 6 PAA CARGO FLIGHT.

RUSK

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS PRIORITY 98

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS GENEVA ADVISES DISASTER EVALUATION TEAM WILL
ARRIVE SANTO TOMAS FEBRUARY 5 QUANTAS FLIGHT 400.

RUSK

Ending the New Facet

Later that afternoon, the desk officer received Embassy telegram
#203. After noting its contents, he phoned the Executive Vice President
of the Diamond Chocolate Company in New York and relayed the text to him.

Further Amplification

When the Naval Attaché and the Assistant Attaché returned from their
flight, they made their report to the Chargé, who summarized it in the
following message to the Department.

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRIORITY 204

INFO: POLAD CINCPAC PRIORITY 33
 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRIORITY UNN

DEPARTMENT POUCH AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA/AMCONSUL NOUMEA

1. FOLLOWING DAMAGE NOTED BY CROSSDECK FLIGHT THIS AM

A. ALL ROADS NORTH AND EAST OF SANTO TOMAS BLOCKED BY LANDSLIDES.

B. VILLAGES SANTA CRUZ AND LA TRINIDAD COMPLETELY DESTROYED IN LAVA
FLOW.

RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM THE BUREAU OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ON JANUARY 1, 1903.

DATE

RECEIVED OFFICIAL

RECEIVED

JANUARY 1, 1903

ACTION: NEW YORK STATE TOLLS

INTEREST: NEW YORK STATE TOLLS

NAME

RECEIVED THE NEW YORK

After this afternoon, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised.

RECEIVED THE NEW YORK

After this afternoon, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised.

RECEIVED OFFICIAL

JANUARY 1, 1903

ACTION: NEW YORK STATE TOLLS

INTEREST: NEW YORK STATE TOLLS

NAME: NEW YORK STATE TOLLS

After this afternoon, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised. After raising its tolls, the New York State Tolls were raised.

- C. ONLY FEW SIGNS LIFE NOTED VILLAGES SAN JUAN AND LOS PESCADORES.
 - D. MANY FISHING BOATS WRECKED ON BEACHES.
 - E. PENINSULA GORDA CUT BY SEA.
 - F. EL VALLE AREA OBSCURED VOLCANIC DUST.
 - G. SANTA HERMANDAD AREA OBSCURED BY CLOUDS.
- 2. NO DAMAGE NOTED MOLTO OR TIKI.
 - 3. RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTERS NEEDED VERIFY SURVEY.

SMITH

L I M I T E D O F F I C I A L U S E

Clearances Granted

When he received Department telegram #96, the Chargé phoned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an appointment with Foreign Minister López. Being advised that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would see him at any time, Smith went at once to the Ministry and explained the advantages of a visit by the U.S.S. Eutaw and her two accompanying destroyers. He emphasized that such a visit would permit continuous operation of four helicopters, instead of three operating intermittently, permitting a more rapid survey of damage. It was also suggested that the destroyers might survey the ports of Baccalá.

Foreign Minister López noted, regrettably, that he would not recommend that shore leave or liberty be granted to the three thousand ships' personnel in view of the disastrous circumstances prevailing in Santo Tomás. However, with this understanding, the assistance of the U. S. Navy would be welcomed. The Foreign Minister promised that he would convey the results of the conversation to Dr. Gonivo and that clearances for the ships could be considered granted as of that moment, although this would be confirmed by note to follow shortly.

With these assurances, the Chargé left the ministry and returned to the Embassy, where he sent the following message.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FEBRUARY 4, 1963

ACTION:	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IMMEDIATE	205
INFO:	POLAD CINCPAC	IMMEDIATE	34
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	IMMEDIATE	UNN

DEPTEL 96

1. FOMIN GRANTED VERBAL CLEARANCE EUTAW, HULL, PREBLE ENTER SANTO TOMAS. WILL CABLE TEXT IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT. ADVISE ETA EUTAW AND DESTROYERS.
2. FOMIN SUGGESTS NO LIBERTY OR SHORE LEAVE BE GRANTED PERSONNEL EUTAW AND DESTROYERS. I CONCUR.
3. IF FEASIBLE, RECOMMEND HULL AND PREBLE BE UTILIZED SURVEY WATERS PORTS OF SANTO TOMAS AND LOS PESCADORES.

SMITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The text of the note in which Foreign Minister López Conde expressed effusive thanks and granted clearance to the ships was sent to the Department later. Its text was couched in flowery terms similar to the note in which he had requested helicopter assistance.

The Chargé also telephoned the Papal Nuncio, Archbishop Gómez Vegas, and the Algerobian Red Cross office once more, expressing sympathy and advising that Red Cross and Catholic Relief Society assistance would soon arrive in Santo Tomás.

Department of Defense Action

It was nearly midnight when message #205 arrived in the Department of State Operations Center. Telegram #204 had been received late that evening prior to the desk officer's departure for his home, but it was

With these assumptions, the Group will be required to

be the primary source of information.

CONCLUSIONS

February 1, 1945

ACTION	REMARKS ON THIS	DATE
1. ACTION	REMARKS	DATE
2. ACTION	REMARKS	DATE

1. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 1. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 1. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE:

2. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 2. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 2. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE:

3. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 3. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE: 3. ACTION: REMARKS ON THIS: DATE:

1/1/45

CONCLUSIONS

The fact of the case, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information, is the fact of the case, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information.

The Group is required to be the primary source of information, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information. The Group is required to be the primary source of information, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information.

REMARKS ON THIS

It was noted that the Group is required to be the primary source of information, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information. The Group is required to be the primary source of information, in which the Group is required to be the primary source of information.

decided that it required no immediate action. Telegram #205, however, required immediate attention, and, complying with their instructions, the Operations Center telephoned the desk officer at his home and paraphrased its contents.

In turn, the desk officer phoned his I. S. A. contact, who had already been awakened with a report of the same message by the Department of Defense Communications Center. The colonel advised the desk officer that a message directing the three ships to proceed to Santo Tomás would be sent immediately. It was also agreed that the two destroyers could conduct the port survey but that it would cease with the completion of the helicopter survey to permit all ships to depart from Santo Tomás in company. As a result of this conversation, the following message was originated in the Department of Defense, directing the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to send the naval units to the Algerobies. A similar message from the Department informed the Attaché, directly, of the approximate arrival time of the naval units and their instructions.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

00000 050545Z GR 96

FROM: CNO
TO: CINCPACFLT
INFO: ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS
CTG 98.2
EUTAW
HULL
PREBLE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALGEROBIAN SURVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

1. DIR DIVERT EUTAW, HULL, AND PREBLE PRESENT OPS PROCEED SANTO TOMAS DE BACCALA BEST SUSTAINED SPEED. CLNC ARRANGED. RETAIN OPCON.

2. EUTAW CHOPPERS ASSIST ALGEROBIAN GOVT SURVEY EARTHQUAKE AND VOLCANIC DAMAGE FOR PERIOD ABOUT ONE WEEK.
3. HULL AND PREBLE CONDUCT SURVEY WATERS SANTO TOMAS AND LOS PISCADORES. COMPLETE OR CEASE THIS SURVEY TO DEPART IN COMPANY WITH EUTAW.
4. NO SHORE LV OR LIB AUTH.
5. EXPENDITURES CHARGEABLE MN 1357256482 NAVY.
6. ADVISE ALUSNA ASAP ETA SANTO TOMAS.
7. DIRLAUTH ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The above message, when received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prompted the message following.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

00000 050703Z GR 83

FROM: CINCPACFLT
 TO: CTG 98.2
 EUTAW
 INFO: CNO
 ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS
 DEPT OF STATE
 HULL
 PREBLE
 REF: A. CNO 050545Z

ALGEROBIAN SURVEY

CONFIDENTIAL

1. FOR CTG. 98.2. SHIFT FLAG BARNEY AND PROCEED IAW ANNEX BRAVO MY OPORD 9-63. CHANGE 9 WILL FOL.
2. FOR EUTAW. PROCEED WITH HULL AND PREBLE MAX SUSTAINED SPEED POINT PEDRO WHERE REFUEL FROM SHIAWASSEE. THEN PROCEED SANTO TOMAS IAW REF A.
3. MAKE DAILY SITREPS IAW ANNEX ROMEO MY OPORD 7-63 WITH CNO ACTION ADDEE DEPT OF STATE INFO ADDEE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The message above insured that the carrier and her accompanying destroyers would have sufficient fuel for the pending operation. It

3. WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF RECEIVING THIS MESSAGE, THE FOLLOWING
 4. WILL BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED TO THE
 5. COMPLETE THE MESSAGE WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME FRAME.

6. BY 1200 HOURS ON 10/10/54.
7. INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
8. DATE 10/10/54 BY 1200 HOURS.
9. DISSEMINATE TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES.

COMMENTS

The above message, when received by the appropriate agencies, should
 be processed in accordance with the following instructions.

COMMENTS

000000 000000 000000 000000 000000 000000 000000 000000 000000 000000

FROM: DIRECTOR
 TO: CIB 08.1
 INFO: CIB
 SUBJECT: ALIEN INFLUENCE
 DATE OF INFO: 10/10/54
 REF: 10/10/54
 REF: 10/10/54

ADMINISTRATIVE

- COMMENTS
1. FOR CIB, 08.1, WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIVING THIS MESSAGE BY 1200 HOURS ON 10/10/54.
 2. FOR CIB, 08.1, WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIVING THIS MESSAGE BY 1200 HOURS ON 10/10/54.
 3. MAKE DAILY CHECKS FOR ANY INFORMATION THAT MAY BE RECEIVED FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

COMMENTS

The message above indicates that the carrier has not been
 destroyed would have sufficient time for the pending operation. It

also directed that daily situation reports be sent to the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

Weather permitting, Eutaw and her escorts could reach Santo Tomás in sixty-eight hours steaming time from her position north of New Zealand. The ANZUS training exercise previously mentioned had been completed, and the task group was already proceeding at normal cruising speed for Pearl Harbor. Because Eutaw's meteorologist forecast calm seas and unlimited visibility, her commanding officer sent the message which follows to Santo Tomás.

00000 050801Z GR 35

FROM: EUTAW
TO: ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS
INFO: CNO
 CINCPACFLT
 DEPT OF STATE
 HULL
 PREBLE

REF: A. CNO 050545Z⁷
 B. CINCPACFLT 050703Z⁷

UNCLAS. BTA SANTO TOMAS LIGHT EUTAW, HULL, AND PREBLE 080400Z. REQ PILOTS AND ANCHORAGES. PRATIQUE CERTIFIED.

⁷External Date-Time Groups

For those not versed in the technicalities of Greenwich Mean Time, the above message indicates that the three ships would arrive at 5:00 P.M. local Algerobian time on February 7. The request for anchorages and pilots is obvious, especially where a commanding officer is not familiar with the harbor that he plans to enter.

The three vessel messages were received at the Embassy late on the night of February 4 while the Chargé and his staff were working their

also directed that this information be sent to the Department
of Defense and the Department of State.
The above information was received from the Department of Defense
in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
Department of State in a letter dated February 1, 1964.
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in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
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in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
Department of State in a letter dated February 1, 1964.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
RE: [REDACTED]
DATE: [REDACTED]
TIME: [REDACTED]
BY: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

NEW YORK, NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 1, 1964.
[REDACTED]

Administrative Information

The above information was received from the Department of Defense
in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
Department of State in a letter dated February 1, 1964.
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in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
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in a letter dated February 1, 1964, and was received from the
Department of State in a letter dated February 1, 1964.

usual late hours. After the Chargé read them, he decided that replies could be deferred until the following morning.

On the day following, the Chargé called Foreign Minister López Conde and informed him when the three ships would arrive. He suggested that the usual honors and ceremonies be dispensed with in view of the current national difficulties. The Foreign Minister agreed. Meanwhile, the Naval Attache completed telephone arrangements for harbor pilots and anchorages with the Captain of the Port. Then, together, the Chargé and the Naval Attache drafted the message below, which was sent to the Eutaw.

PPPPP Ø62Ø15Z GR 56

FROM: ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS
TO: EUTAW
INFO: CNO
CINCPACFLT
DEPT OF STATE
HULL
PREBLE

REF: A. YOUR Ø5Ø8Ø12
CINCPACFLT PASS TO EUTAW

1. PILOTS AT SANTO TOMAS LIGHT.
2. ANCHORAGES AS FOL:

A. EUTAW	Ø95	MUELLE	RATON LIGHT	175Ø YDS.
B. HULL	145	MUELLE	RATON LIGHT	15ØØ YDS.
C. PREBLE	165	MUELLE	RATON LIGHT	1625 YDS.
3. NO SALUTES OR HONORS.
4. HARBOR CKT K9B.

Note here that the Embassy did not communicate directly with the distant ships but resorted to requesting a shore establishment to pass the messages. Because operational control was retained by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, his command would be maintaining constant radio communications with his units.

usual last name, after the first name, in German form.

could be referred to the following manner.

On the following, the above listed German names were
checked and found to be the same as those listed in the
list of the above names and circumstances of the
checked against the list. The German names were
the same as those listed in the list of the
and compared with the list of the above names, the
and the above listed the above names, which are on the

Below:

FROM: 1000 1000

TO: 1000 1000

FROM: 1000 1000

TO: 1000 1000

FROM: 1000 1000

TO: 1000 1000

1. FROM: 1000 1000

2. FROM: 1000 1000

3. FROM: 1000 1000

4. FROM: 1000 1000

5. FROM: 1000 1000

6. FROM: 1000 1000

NOTE: The above listed the above names, which are on the

list of the above names and circumstances of the

checked against the list. The German names were

the same as those listed in the list of the

and the above listed the above names, which are on the

With their anchorages assigned and pilots provided, the ships could, and did, enter harbor and anchor without fanfare. In a similar business-like manner, the naval units conducted their surveys, making daily situation reports to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Department, in coordination with the U. S. Embassy, Santo Tomás. A sample situation report, the final one, is shown below.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PPPPP 130400Z GR 101

FROM: EUTAW
TO: CNO
CINCPACFLT
INFO: DEPT OF STATE
ALUSNA SANTO TOMAS (BY HAND)
HULL
PREBLE
REF: A. CINCPACFLT 050703Z
B. ANNEX ROMEO CINCPACFLT OPORD 7-63

FINAL SITREP

CONFIDENTIAL

1. 22 SORTIES COMPLETED THIS DATE. TOTAL NR. SORTIES THIS OP 137.
2. DAMAGED AREA NOTED THIS DATE FOL:
 - A. SAN ISIDRO. 25 PERS REMAIN OF 170. ONLY 7 HABITABLE DWELLINGS REMAIN.
 - B. SAN IGNACIO. 150 PERS REMAIN OF 165. ALL DWELLINGS INTACT.
 - C. LOS JESUITAS. NO DAMAGE.
 - D. SAN PABLO. NO DAMAGE.
3. TOTAL DAMAGE THIS SURVEY:
 - A. 927 DEAD
 - B. 2,625 INJURED
 - C. 17,452 HOMELESS
4. HULL AND PREBLE SURVEY COMPLETED. NO BOTTOM DISPLACEMENT NOTED HARBORS.
5. UNODIR UNITS DEPART 131900Z FOR PEARL HARBOR.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

in their exchanges and visits provided, the latter would
and only, when there was another without contact. In a similar business
the manner, the same would be conducted. Their lawyers, during 1917,
situation reports to the United States Department and the Department,
in consultation with the U. S. Attorney, Santa Clara. A single situation
report, the final one, is shown below.

1 4 1 7 8 3 0 1 5 8 0 5

[illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
RE: NEW YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU, 1/11/68
[REDACTED]

११८१२ ॥ १०४ ॥

2007年10月10日

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1977; 237: 1001-1002.

[illegible]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

10000 726	3
10000 726	3
10000 726	3

4. WILL ANY FURTHER SURVEYS BE CONDUCTED, AND IF YES, WHEN WILL THEY BE CONDUCTED?

2. (FOIA b)(7)(C) - DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION COULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1

A Request for Aid

As the list of casualties mounted, an attitude of dismay and apprehension permeated the Algerobian Government. Dr. Gonivo proclaimed a state of national emergency and suspended certain portions of his new constitution. Some units of the armed forces and the Cuerpo de Bomberos were organized into labor batallions to open the roads. Other units of the armed forces and the police maintained patrols in the stricken areas to prevent looting and civil disorder. The hospitals were crowded to capacity as the doctors labored "around the clock" to tend the injured. Burial squads interred the bodies recovered from the rubble to maintain a semblance of sanitation. Both the Red Cross and the Catholic Relief Society worked to alleviate the suffering.

In this atmosphere, the distraught dictator summoned the Chargé and informed him that the Algerobian Republic urgently needed emergency food. Existing stocks could not support the present demand much longer. Dr. Gonivo therefore requested that the United States give emergency food to the people of the Algerobian Republic and presented the Chargé a written request. Smith replied that the request would be forwarded to the U. S. Government. These events were reported to the Department in the following message.

S E C R E T

FEBRUARY 6, 1963

ACTION:	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	IMMEDIATE	206
INFO:	POLAD CINCPAC	PRIORITY	
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	PRIORITY	

DMBTel 202

1. GONIVO SUMMONED ME PALACIO THIS MORNING AND ADVISED ME LOCAL SUPPLIES EMERGENCY FOOD BEING DEPLETED RAPIDLY.

2. HE PRESENTED REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY FOOD COMMENTING THAT UNLESS FOOD WERE MADE AVAILABLE SOON, POPULACE WOULD BE REDUCED TO STARVATION. AFTER EXPRESSING APPROPRIATE SYMPATHY FOR ALGEROBIAN PEOPLE, I REPLIED I WOULD CONVEY HIS REQUEST TO USG.

3. LOCAL CATHOLIC RELIEF SOCIETY REQUESTING FOOD SHIPMENT FROM CRS UNITED STATES.

4. FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AS WELL AS POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS DISCUSSED REPTEL I RECOMMEND;

A. AIR SHIPMENT 50 TONS TITLE II EMERGENCY FOODSTUFFS WITH FOLLOW ON OCEAN SHIPMENT 3500 TONS.

B. LOCAL DISTRIBUTION THESE EMERGENCY FOODSTUFFS BE MADE THROUGH CRS ORGANIZATION IN ALGEROBIES AS SIMPLEST AND MOST EFFICACIOUS METHOD FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION ALGEROBIAN PEOPLE AND ALSO BUTTRESS POSITION ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND MINIMIZE POLITICAL DIVIDENDS WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD ACCRUE GONIVO GOVERNMENT.

5. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED WILL CONVEY FIRST PERSON NOTE EXPRESSING SYMPATHY PEOPLE US FOR ALGEROBIANS TO FOMIN FEBRUARY 8. TEXT TO BE TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL.

SMITH

S E C R E T

The note which requested food from the U. S. Government was substantially the same as that which requested helicopter assistance. For this reason, it will not be repeated here.

In the telegram above, the Chargé's recommendation to distribute the food through the Algerobian Catholic Relief Society was made for several reasons. First, the people of the Algerobies are Roman Catholics; even those of Chinese extraction are now. Second, they have already done extensive relief work in the area and are familiar with local customs. Third, the introduction of another relief agency would only serve to complicate the distribution of relief -- the Algerobians would be suspicious of unfamiliar organizations, and the Catholic Relief Society might be unwilling to cooperate with rivals in relief administration.

3. The President suggests for consideration that the local food
banks should be organized as follows: (a) to be organized as
voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

4. Local food banks should be organized as follows:
(a) to be organized as voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

5. The President suggests for consideration that the local food
banks should be organized as follows: (a) to be organized as
voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

6. The President suggests for consideration that the local food
banks should be organized as follows: (a) to be organized as
voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

7. The President suggests for consideration that the local food
banks should be organized as follows: (a) to be organized as
voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

8. The President suggests for consideration that the local food
banks should be organized as follows: (a) to be organized as
voluntary associations of citizens for the purpose of
collecting and distributing food to the needy.

9.

CONCLUSION

The note which requested food from the U. S. Government was
submitted to the same as that which requested volunteer assistance.
For this reason, it will not be repeated here.

In the future show, the Charge's recommendation to the President

the food through the American Catholic Relief Society was made for
several reasons. First, the people of the Philippines are Roman Catholics,
even those of Chinese extraction are now, second, they have already done
extensive relief work in the past and are familiar with local conditions.
Third, the intervention of another relief agency would only serve to
complicate the distribution of relief -- the Philippines would be not
pictures of volunteer organizations, and the Catholic Relief Society
might be unwilling to cooperate with rivals in relief administration.

Fourth, it could be expected that political dividends would be reaped by the current U. S. administration by its seeming support of the Catholic Relief Society, when, in fact, no official U. S. support for that organization is intended or can be construed. The use of the Catholic Relief Society as a distributing agency is a matter of practical expediency.

When it was distributed in the Department in the late afternoon, telegram #206 from the Embassy caused a flurry of activity. The Office Director went to his Assistant Secretary, who assented to the recommendations made in the message and directed his Deputy Assistant Secretary to obtain approval in principle for the use of A. I. D. funds from the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, A. I. D., and to advise the Office Director of the results. In this manner a political decision fixing policy had been made.

Because the same telegram had been distributed to the cognizant A. I. D. hierarchy, the Assistant Administrator had already obtained an allotment of \$100,000 from contingency funds to support the project by the time that the Deputy Secretary phoned him. These funds, the Assistant Administrator considered, would be more than ample to cover the shipping cost of Title II food to the Algerobies. The Assistant Administrator also indicated that the Director, Voluntary Foreign Aid Service, A. I. D., would coordinate the project for his agency, because that office maintained liaison with all voluntary relief organizations, including the Catholic Relief Society.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary then called his Office Director, whom he briefed on the progress of the project, and directed him to insure that the desk officer was made aware of what had thus far transpired.

North, it could be expected that political activities would be stopped by the United States Government. In fact, no official U. S. support for Catholic Relief Society, even in 1945, was given. The use of the Catholic Relief Society as a distributing agency in a matter of political expediency.

When it was distributed in the department in the late afternoon, telegrams from the Embassy caused a flurry of activity. The Office Director went to his assistant secretary, who reported to the Department. In the message and directed his Deputy Assistant Secretary to obtain approval in principle for the use of U. S. funds from the Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, U. S. A. and to advise the Office Director of the results. In this manner a political decision fixing policy had been made.

Because the same telegram had been distributed to the Assistant A. I. O. hierarchy, the Assistant Administrator had already obtained an allotment of \$100,000 from Congress. Funds for support the project by the time that the Deputy Secretary phoned him. When funds, the Assistant Administrator considered, would be more than enough to cover the shipping cost of little if any to the Philippines. The Assistant Administrator also indicated that the Director, Voluntary Foreign Aid Service, U. S. A., would coordinate the project for his agency, because that office maintained liaison with all voluntary relief organizations, including the Catholic Relief Society.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary then called his Office Director, when he briefed on the progress of the project, and directed him to insure that the desk officer was made aware of what had thus far transpired.

He added that he or the Assistant Secretary would "sign off" on the message which advised the Embassy of arrangements for the food shipment.

In the meanwhile, the desk officer had phoned his I. S. A. contact and determined that the two cargo aircraft initially discussed could still be made available. He appraised his Office Director of their availability and was, in turn, informed of the progress made by senior officials in the matter.

The Director, Voluntary Foreign Aid Services, A. I. D., then telephoned the desk officer to consult him on implementation. The Director noted that the Catholic Relief Society headquarters had advised him that they would be willing to arrange ocean shipping and distribution of 3,500 tons of emergency food if funds could be made available to defray the shipping costs. The desk officer suggested that the Director draft a letter to the Catholic Relief Society authorizing an expenditure of funds for food shipment costs. This letter should indicate that its contents were not to be disclosed in the Algerobies. The desk officer also requested that he be notified of shipping arrangements.

When arrangements were completed, the desk officer drafted the message below, which was initialed by the Office Director and released by the Assistant Secretary after clearance from A. I. D. and I. S. A.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FEBRUARY 6, 1963

ACTION:	AMEMBASSY SANTO TOMAS	IMMEDIATE	99
INFO:	POLAD CINCPAC	PRIORITY	
	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	PRIORITY	

EMBTEL 206

1. NOTE PARA 5 REPTTEL AUTHORIZED.

It added that on the evening of January 19, 1953, the
 message which arrived from the Embassy in Washington for the first time
 was that the ship had been sighted on January 18, 1953.
 In the meantime, the ship had been sighted on January 18, 1953.
 and reported that the two ships were still in the vicinity of the
 still to be made available. We reported this Office Director of the
 availability was not, in fact, the case, but the progress made by the
 officials in the matter.
 The Director, Jointly with the Director, J. I. U. U. U. U.
 telephoned the ship officer to consult him on the matter. The
 Director noted that the ship had been sighted on January 18, 1953.
 his that they would be willing to accept the ship's report and discontinue
 of 3,500 tons of emergency food if food could be made available to carry
 the shipping costs. The ship officer suggested that the Director write
 a letter to the Catholic Relief Society authorizing an expenditure of
 funds for food shipment costs. This letter should indicate that the
 contents were not to be disclosed in the newspaper. The ship officer
 also requested that he be notified of shipping arrangements.
 When arrangements were completed, the ship officer drafted the
 message below, which was received by the Office Director and released
 by the Assistant Secretary after clearance from A. I. U. U. U. U. U. U. U.

CONFIDENTIAL

February 5, 1953

ACTION: AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES	INFORMATION	BY
INFO: MOBILE CINCINNATI	INFORMATION	
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR	INFORMATION	

1. NOTE DATA 2 BUREAU AUTHORITY.

2. 50 TONS EMERG FOOD WILL ARRIVE SANTO TOMAS FEBRUARY 11 IN TWO USAF C-135 AIRCRAFT FOR DISTRIBUTION SANTO TOMAS. ARRANGE AND ADVISE CLEARANCES.

3. 3,500 TONS FOOD DEPARTS SAN FRANCISCO FEBRUARY 13 SS MATSONIA ARRIVING SANTO TOMAS FEBRUARY 22.

4. ALL SHIPMENTS MARKED FOR JUAN MOLINO C/O CRS SANTO TOMAS.

RUSK

C O N F I D E N T I A L

When he received the above message from the Department on the morning of February 7, the Chargé phoned Archbishop Gómez Vegas and outlined the Department's arrangements for the emergency food supplies. The Archbishop expressed his gratitude for the prompt and generous response of the United States, adding that he would appreciate the Chargé's assistance in obtaining government trucks to distribute the food. He said that his personal approach to Dr. Gonivo had been made difficult by his refusal to offer a Te Deum in his cathedral after the failure of the latest assassination attempt on the life of Dr. Gonivo.

The Chargé then arranged to be received at the Palacio Blanco by Dr. Gonivo and his Foreign Minister. They, too, expressed their thanks for the generosity of the United States Government and assured the Chargé that clearances for the U. S. A. F. aircraft would be arranged immediately. Dr. Gonivo then suggested that the helicopters, due to arrive that day, might be employed in distributing emergency food after the survey of damage was completed. To this the Chargé replied that the request would have to be transmitted to the Department, where it would receive consideration. However, plans for distribution should be formulated utilizing locally available means of transportation in the event that the defense requirements of the United States necessitated that the carrier and her

embarked aircraft be required elsewhere. In addition, the Chargé expressed the hope that the Algerobian Government would make trucks available to the Catholic Relief Society to assist in the distribution of the foodstuffs. After some moments of hesitation, Dr. Gonivo assented and directed the Foreign Minister to tell the chief of the armed forces to arrange the details with the Archbishop.

In the manner which has been demonstrated in this chapter, the Chargé reported the gist of this conference at the Palacio Blanco to the Department, recommending against food distribution by helicopter because of the availability of idle and more suitable Algerobian Government vehicles. Naturally, the Department concurred in the Chargé's recommendation, and its decision declining the suggestion was subsequently given to Dr. Gonivo.

The note expressing the sympathy of the people of the United States for the people of the Algerobies is copied below.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaza de los Próceres
Santo Tomas de Baccalá

No. 21

February 8, 1963

Excellency:

I have the honor to join my expression of deep sympathy with those of my Government for the people of the Island of Baccalá who have been so tragically afflicted by the earthquake which struck the Algerobian Islands on February 3.

I wish to assure Your Excellency that the people of the United States stand ready to render appropriate humanitarian assistance to the people of Baccalá in order to alleviate the suffering and need caused by this natural disaster.

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Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

John T. Smith
Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim

His Excellency
Francisco Teófilo López Conde
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Santo Tomas de Baccalá

Notice that every expression of sympathy is for the people and not the government -- a polite way of hinting that the United States does not approve of the Gonivo regime.

Summary

Even though relations between the Algerobian Republic and the United States initially were strained, the United States Government's response to requests for help, out of humanitarian considerations, presaged improving relations. The United States gained from the catastrophe.

United States help did not enhance the stature of the Gonivo regime, despite his later wild claims. People could see plainly the U. S. markings on the aircraft which located the injured and the carrier from which those aircraft operated. There were plain indications of U. S. aid on the food packages which were distributed to the people by priests and lay workers of the Catholic Relief Society and not by officials of the oppressive Gonivo Administration. Even use of Algerobian Government trucks for distribution did little to add to Gonivo's image.

The manner in which the aid was rendered permitted minimum U. S. involvement with the Gonivo Government and buttressed the position of the Archbishop, Gonivo's most outspoken critic.

John F. Kennedy
United Nations on Africa

His Excellency
Secretary General U Thant
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United Nations Building

It is a fact that every expression of sympathy for the people and
for the Government -- a public way of stating that the United States
does not approve of the Gambia regime.

Summary

From 1960 relations between the African Republics and the
United States have been friendly and reciprocal, the United States Government's
response to requests for help, and its humanitarian assistance,
practical support and aid. The United States has given the
Gambia.

United States help has been essential for the survival of the Gambia regime,
Gambia is a state with citizens. People would not remain in U. S.
enclaves on the island which housed the island and the capital
which those states operated. There were other relations of U. S.
aid on the food packages which were distributed to the people by private
and lay members of the Catholic Relief Society and not by officials of
the oppressive Gambia administration. With the aid of American Government
funds for distribution the state has not collapsed.

The manner in which the aid was rendered provided a strong U. S.
involvement with the Gambia Government and indicated the position of
the Archbishop, Gambia's most respected cleric.

It might be said that selfish national interest motivated the entire policy of the United States in this example -- especially after considering the Russian and Chinese Communist interest displayed in the Algerobian earthquake. However, it must be admitted that selfish national interest was reinforced by altruism. Few nations permit consideration of altruistic reasons in the formulation of foreign policy. That the United States does, is, perhaps, part of its greatness.

The success of the policy described cannot be easily measured unless the hundreds of letters of thanks which Algerobians sent to the Embassy or the words of thanks expressed to the Chargé on the street can be used as criteria. The local press no longer prints anti-United States sentiments, and the Chargé is now welcomed in government circles.

The presence of the U. S. Navy ships in Santo Tomás signalled other nations of U. S. interest in the Algerobies and of a willingness to commit forces to maintain our interest.

The final test of the policy's success remains to be determined by the course of events which follow in the wake of that policy. Who can predict the future?

It might be said that British colonial countries maintain the
policy of the United States in this respect — especially when
confronting the Russian and Chinese Communist interest in the
Mediterranean region. However, it must be admitted that British
national interests are reflected in a different way. British policy
towards the Mediterranean region is the continuation of British policy.
That the British stance does, in principle, rest on the same basis.
The success of the policy described cannot be easily measured
because the interests of British and other nations seem to be
balanced on the basis of British interests in the Middle East.
Can be used as evidence. The British seem to follow a policy of
states' interests, and the change is now apparent in government circles.
The presence of the U.S. Navy which is being built up
near the coast of the U.S. suggests in the American and of a willingness
to commit forces to maintain an interest.
The final test of the policy's success seems to be an indication
by the course of events which follow in the wake of each policy. One
can, indeed, find the policy of the U.S. Navy which is being built up
near the coast of the U.S. suggests in the American and of a willingness
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near the coast of the U.S. suggests in the American and of a willingness
to commit forces to maintain an interest.

CHAPTER VIII

ENHANCING THE ROLE OF THE COUNTRY DESK OFFICER

Time and again in hearings before the Jackson Subcommittee the problem of layering between the Secretary and the desk officer has been discussed. A common example of message action, which might seem extreme to the uninitiated, was previously delineated in this paper. Previous comment also suggested a necessity for placing responsibility and authority in the hands of individuals who will be expected to use it and holding them strictly accountable for its use. The multiplicity of committees and diffusion of responsibility suggests a tendency toward downgrading the position of the individual. Henry A. Kissinger suggests that the insecurity of our policy makers leads them to seek the advice of ad hoc committees.¹

¹Henry S. Kissinger, "The Policymaker and the Intellectual," The Reporter, XXXIX (March 5, 1959).

There is, then, a need for a determined effort in the Department to consolidate overlapping functions, reduce layering, eliminate useless committees, and assign clear areas of responsibility.

Secretary Rusk, referring to the regional bureaus, spoke of the possibility of an experiment to eliminate the office level, upgrade the desk officer, and strengthen the hand of the Assistant Secretary. Abolishment of the regional office level would excise a major layer in the Department's hierarchy. Desk officers would then report directly to their regional Assistant Secretary. On the basis of general guidance,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

of ad hoc committees.

Reported, TIME March 2, 1957.
Henry S. Alexander, "The Subliminal and the Intellectual," THE

to their regional Assistant Secretary. On the basis of special assignments in the department's district, team efforts would then report directly to the Assistant Secretary. On the basis of the regional office level studies a major factor in the work effort, and strengthen the hand of the Assistant Secretary. possibility of an experiment to eliminate the office level, improve Secretary would, referring to the regional bureau, scope of the committee, and assign clear areas of responsibility.

the desk officer could be given greater responsibility for handling country affairs.²

²United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.

Secretary Rusk had given consideration to the problem of layering well in advance of his remarks concerning its debilitating effects to the Jackson Subcommittee. At his instance, a study was completed by the Office of Management on March 6, 1963, which purports to recommend measures "to make possible a return to the original country officer concept -- but in an environment which responds to today's needs."³

³Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus (Washington: Department of State, 1963), p. 1.

This study, like most others concerned with the organization of the Department of State, is an attempt to solve personnel problems with revisions in the bureaucratic machinery. Part of its thesis is to change the job titles of several ranks in the chain of command in order to emphasize the roles proposed. In actuality, the changes proposed are superficial, but they would contribute to the elimination of a portion of the problems mentioned on the previous page.

Summary of Recommendations

A summary of the recommendations of the Office of Management follows:

1. Concentrate the leadership and action responsibilities of the desk officer in a new position of Principal Policy Officer.
2. Locate the Principal Policy Officer immediately under the Assistant Secretary.

the last office could be given greater responsibility than has been

country officials.

United States Government, Bureau of Governmental Operations,
Administration of National Security, Division of Administration, and Division
of National Security Systems and Operations, with comments, and attached,
December 11, 1963 (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1963), page 17.

Secretary has been requested to the extent of his power to
well to advance of his recent work with the National Security Council
the Jackson Commission. At the same time, a study was conducted by
the Office of Management on March 5, 1963, which reported to the
President "to date has been a review of the original country officer
concept -- but in an environment which requires a today's review."

Office of Management, Department of State, Program for Action
in the Regional Interest (Washington, Department of State, 1963), p. 1.

This study, like most others conducted with the organization of the
Department of State, is an attempt to solve personnel problems with
revolution in the bureaucratic machinery. Part of its basis is to
change the job titles of several ranks in the chain of command in order
to emphasize the roles proposed. In addition, the changes proposed
are suggested, but they would contribute to the solution of a
portion of the problems mentioned on the previous page.

Summary of Recommendations

A summary of the recommendations of the Office of Management follows:

1. Consolidate the leadership and action responsibilities
of the last office in a new position of Principal Policy
Officer.

2. Locate the Principal Policy Officer immediately
under the Assistant Secretary.

3. Assign to the Principal Policy Officer responsibility for one country or a group of countries, depending on the nature and complexity of country problems.

4. Give the freedom to organize and utilize staff, to meet his needs as he sees them, to each Principal Policy Officer.

5. Initiate a one-year program for phasing into the Principal Policy Officer concept as rapidly as officers with demonstrated executive and leadership ability are available for such assignment.

6. Designate in each bureau one alter ego Deputy Assistant Secretary.

7. Restrict functional advisors, and all other officers outside of the direct chain of command, to advisory and liaison roles and reduce the number of those at the bureau level as the Principal Policy Officer concept is phased into the bureau organization.⁴

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

Concentrate the Leadership and Action Responsibility of the Desk Officer in the New Position of Principal Policy Officer.

The Office of Management Staff Study notes that the country desk officer is too junior in grade and too limited in authority to assume a major role in the conduct of foreign policy. It further suggests that until he moves to a place in the bureau structure consonant with responsibility for the total range of problems, the country desk officer will not play a leadership and action role.⁵ In the course of the many

⁵Ibid., p. 4.

departmental reorganizations over the years, the desk officer has moved farther and farther from the policy level. In crisis or near crisis, the Office Director or other higher authority assumes control, indicating

3. Review of the National Policy Office's responsibilities for one branch or a group of branches, depending on the nature and complexity of current problems.

4. Give the President the opportunity to review the National Policy Office's work in the past, to make recommendations for the future.

5. Establish a working group for the President's National Policy Office, composed of members of the President's staff, the National Policy Office, and other relevant agencies.

6. Assign a staff member to the President's National Policy Office.

7. Establish functional divisions, and all other offices outside of the direct chain of command, to advise and assist the President in the exercise of his powers as President.

1961, p. 2.

Coordinate the President's and Vice President's responsibilities for the year
Office in the National Policy Office.

The Office of Management shall study and report to the President the effect of the President's and Vice President's responsibilities for the year in the exercise of their powers as President and Vice President. It is further suggested that until we move to a place in the future structure, the President's and Vice President's responsibilities for the total range of problems, the country and the world, will not play a leadership and action role.² In the course of the year

1961, p. 4.

departmental responsibilities over the year, the Vice President and the President and Vice President from the policy level. In cases of major crisis, the Office Director or other high-level executive committee, including

how little the desk officer is expected to contribute to the formulation of difficult decisions.

Paradoxically, the same study indicates that desk officers probably know more about their countries than anybody in Washington and are, as a group, hard-working, dedicated, and representative of the most promising officers in the Foreign Service. This being correct, who, then, is more qualified to make policy decisions concerning the country?

As Secretary Rusk said, "It seems to me that the man in Washington who spends all of his time brooding about a country like Brazil ought to be a man comparable in competence to the man who is ambassador to Brazil."⁶ This statement indicates that all of the policy sections of

⁶United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State, Study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 6.

the Department will be composed of chiefs and no Indians. It may be assumed that Secretary Rusk has country desk officers in the Grades FSO-1 or FSO-2 in mind.

This position is also paradoxical; because it suggests that the junior officers, who today deal with matters which before World War II would have been handled by the Secretary of State, are not performing their duties in a satisfactory manner; or those matters which were administered by the Secretary of State prior to World War II are of minor importance today. Further, when the Office Director or other higher authority assumes control of all desk matters in a crisis or near crisis, it would indicate that there is a lack of confidence in the ability of the desk officer.

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and have their country in jeopardy in addition to the

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

then, is more difficult to make policy decisions concerning the country.

At the time of the 1990 census, the population of the city was 1,100,000.

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to be a complete in control of the situation at the time of the attack.

To: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. J. Lee Rankin from Mr. J. Lee Rankin dated 10/11/50

Government Printing Office, 1961). P. 6.
The Secretary of State, 22-24 exhibits in the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Organization, 93rd Congress, 2d Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1974).

10-10-68

Statement: This country has usually been peaceful in the past.

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This position is also paradoxical, because it suggests that the

Junior Officers, who today sell with a great deal of success

Information on the state of visitation will be helpful and will be discussed.

THIS DOCUMENT IS A U.S. GOVERNMENT WORKING PAPER AND IS NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY

To the II was given to some state to ministered out by determined

almost impossible today. Further, when the Office Director or other

to a large extent, the results of the study are consistent with the findings of other studies.

next crisis. It would indicate that there is a lack of confidence in

the ability of the book (1992).

In actuality, crisis engages attention -- that of the Office Director as well as that of more senior Department officers. With the attention thus engaged, it is natural for the senior official to assume more control over every facet of policy. In such cases, the desk officer does not necessarily become a "fifth wheel." Rather, he works closely with his Office Director and Assistant Secretary around the clock in constant telephone and telegraphic communication with the overseas post. In this activity, he gains requisite experience for future positions of greater responsibility, and his superiors can judge his performance under pressure.

If the desk officer were of an FSO-1 or FSO-2 grade with commensurate experience in dealing with affairs of his client country, he could indeed be expected to initiate policy in crisis and in calm with minimum supervision, and his participation in policy discussions with the Assistant Secretary would undoubtedly command greater respect.

The prestige of his enhanced rank would insure more attentiveness to his policy directions in the interagency meetings that he would chair. Here he would be expected to provide other agencies with a conceptual framework around which specialized policy programs could be developed and to review the effectiveness of the total U. S. efforts in achieving foreign policy objectives.

In these terms, the Principal Policy Officer (suggested new name for the desk officer) would supply the elusive elements of leadership and responsibility presently so diffused below the Assistant Secretary level.

Undoubtedly, the nature of the Principal Policy Officer's responsibilities require competence and experience coupled with empirical capacity for administration, coordination, and action -- a Washington

is necessary, cases require attention -- that of the Office
Director as well as that of more senior Department officials. With the
attention now focused, it is essential for the senior officials to
assume more control over the policy. In such cases, the
case officer does not necessarily become a "policy maker," rather, he
works closely with his senior officials and assistant secretary, keeping
the clock in constant telephone and telegraphic communication with the
overseas post. In this activity, he takes responsibility for
future questions of greater responsibility, and his superior can judge
his performance under pressure.

If the desk officer were to be given a more active role with senior
superior experience in dealing with affairs of the client country, he
could indeed be expected to initiate policy in certain and in some with
minimal supervision, and his participation in policy decisions with
the assistant secretary would undoubtedly command greater respect.

The pressure of his increased role would induce more attentiveness
in his policy decisions in the interagency meetings that he would chair.
Here he would be expected to provide other agencies with a conceptual
framework around which specialized policy programs could be developed
and to review the effectiveness of the total U. S. efforts in achieving
foreign policy objectives.

In these terms, the Principal Policy Officer (suggested new name for
the new officer) would supply the elusive element of leadership and
responsibility presently so difficult to find the assistant secretary level.

Undoubtedly, the nature of the Principal Policy Officer's
responsibilities require competence and experience coupled with excellent
capacity for administration, coordination, and action -- a Washington

counterpart of the ambassador. Selection for Principal Policy Officer requires that personnel efficiency reports be adequate and honest, in order to bring the best men to the top and excise the dead wood.

It is implicit that the present desk officer would become an assistant to the Principal Policy Officer, still doing the pick and shovel work, and gaining in experience for the day when he would become a Principal Policy Officer.

Locate the Principal Policy Officer Immediately Under the Assistant Secretary.

By reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary, the Principal Policy Officer can best provide strong leadership and facilitate action. The level at which he reports will breed an intimacy and familiarity with the mind of the Assistant Secretary, permitting informed exercise of delegated authority. In time, psychic bond will replace the necessity for much of the present consultation required.

Both the Staff Study and Assistant Secretary Harriman suggest that the desk officer should be in such accord with his Assistant Secretary that he would be able to function as a deputy to the Assistant Secretary for his client country, acting in all matters of consequence and keeping the Assistant Secretary informed of his progress and any noteworthy events. To create this atmosphere, a close and easy access to the Assistant Secretary is required.

Two unnecessary supervisory layers between the desk officer and the Assistant Secretary would be expunged. Every effort expended to effect this proposal is well worth while. The chart following illustrates examples of current supervisory layers and the effect of this proposal.

EXAMPLES OF SUPERVISORY LAYERS IN REGIONAL BUREAUS

Present			Proposed
Assistant Secretary ↑	Assistant Secretary ↑	Assistant Secretary ↑	Assistant Secretary (alter ego Dep. Asst. Secy.) ↑
Deputy Assistant Secretary ↑	Deputy Assistant Secretary ↑	DAS ↑	Principal Policy Officer ↑
Office Director ↑	Office Director ↑	Office Director ↑	Initial Action Officer ↑
Dep. Off. Dir. ↑	Dep. Off. Dir. ↑	Dep. Off. Dir. ↑	
Off. in Charge ↑	Desk Officer ↑	Desk Officer ↑	
Desk Officer ↑			

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

Assign to the Principal Policy Officer Responsibility for One Country or a Group of Countries Depending on the Nature and Complexity of Country Problems.

"Span of control limitations coupled with the importance of avoiding layering between the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Policy Officer will require many -- perhaps most -- Principal Policy Officers to cover more than one country. Countries whose problems are critical and demanding, such as Cuba, are a full load for one Principal Policy Officer. Countries whose political situations are relatively stable and in which U. S. involvement is less complex can usefully be grouped. In some cases, existing office groupings may well continue under a Principal Policy Officer, or may even be enlarged."⁷

⁷Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus (Washington: Department of State, 1963), p. 7.

The above paragraph summarized the new guise of the Office Director, despite any platitudinous remarks to the contrary. The concept expressed above negates the concept of the country team in Washington by not carrying out the principle of one Principal Policy Officer per country to its logical conclusion. Admittedly, some countries have stable political situations wherein U. S. involvement is less complex, but the implication that the Principal Policy Officer for one such country would not be fully occupied seems utterly incredible. Those hours not absorbed in the pressure of business could be utilized in thought -- thought about what to do and how best to do it. Being under less pressure, the Principal Policy Officer for a stable country would be more perceptive to hints of change in that country. Advance planning could be more readily accomplished, and the area of surprise might be reduced.

action to the Principal Policy Officer responsibility for the country

or a group of countries depending on the nature and complexity of

country problems.

"Plan of control limitations coupled with the importance of avoiding
friction between the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Policy Officer
will require many -- perhaps more -- Principal Policy Officers to cover
more than one country. Countries whose problems are critical and
demanding, such as Cuba, are a full load for one Principal Policy
Officer. Countries whose political situations are relatively stable
and in which U. S. involvement is less complex can usually be grouped.
In some cases, existing office groupings may well continue under a
Principal Policy Officer, or may even be enlarged."

Office of Management, Department of State, Organizing for action
in the National Foreign Administration, Department of State, 1967, p. 7.

The above paragraph summarized the new guise of the Office Director,
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above negates the concept of the country team in Washington by not
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what to do and how best to do it. Being under less pressure, the
Principal Policy Officer for a stable country would be more perceptible
to hints of change in that country. Advance planning could be more
readily accomplished, and the area of surprise might be reduced.

Further, the mere fact that U. S. relations with a particular country are presently quiescent is no guarantee that they will remain so. Few foresaw, if in actuality they really did, the state to which relations with Panama would degenerate in such a short span of time.

It may be suspected that one of the factors motivating change is an excess of Foreign Service officers in senior grades. Secretary Rusk has admitted that one of the problems of the career Foreign Service is dealt with in the military services by the up-or-out system.⁸ While

⁸United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, December 11, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part VI.

a selection-out process does exist, the problem of those who have reached their ceilings of ability prematurely remains.

It seems to me that expanding field services could best utilize such personnel. Permitting them to become entrenched in Washington would only aggravate the "hump" problem. Utilizing such personnel in the field would clear the way for up-and-coming officers of recognized talents and ability to become more quickly involved in the process of policy making. The utilization of these personnel in the field necessarily depends on budget limitations. If a sufficiency of funds is not appropriated to expand field services, then the Congress should be requested to legislate authorization to prune the Foreign Service as necessary. Such legislation would, to an extent, be contrary to the principles of tenure; but tenure, if carried to extremes, encourages mediocrity. The Foreign Service should be the last harbor of mediocrity. Its standards should be maintained at a high level of excellence.

...in actuality they realize it, the odds to which
country are presently inclined to the Government that they will remain
...the same fact that D. A. ...

It may be suggested that some of the factors mentioned above are common to foreign service officers in other nations. The reality, however, is that the situation of the personnel of the foreign service in India is unique in the military service in the government system.² While

December 11, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 21. A. 1.

their college of military government studies.

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such personnel. - Personnel must be known and trusted in Washington and must have the confidence of the President. The President must be able to rely on them in the most critical moments of the administration. The President must be able to rely on them in the most critical moments of the administration. The President must be able to rely on them in the most critical moments of the administration.

70-100 86 10-30-79 Set of two color slides showing a view of the building from the street.

with the "The Institution of the Lord's Supper" in the 1540s.

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION DURING THE YEAR 1900

responsible for the loss of the ship.

reinstated to full-time employment to provide the local service as

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and the fact that the Commission has not yet received any information from the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the proposed changes to the law.

Antioch. The foreign service should be the first to consider the

[illegible]

Charts on the following pages show the structure of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs as it existed until March, 1964, and the alternative structure proposed in 1963.

There are the following facts from the structure of the Bureau
of Information Affairs as it existed until 1964, and the
Executive Order issued between 1963.

The Bureau of Information Affairs was established in 1963, and
it was the first time that the Bureau of Information Affairs
was established as a separate bureau. The Bureau of Information
Affairs was established as a separate bureau, and it was the
first time that the Bureau of Information Affairs was established
as a separate bureau.

The Bureau of Information Affairs was established in 1963, and
it was the first time that the Bureau of Information Affairs
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as a separate bureau.


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
Present Structure

BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS



From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

An Example of an Alternative Structure
for
BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS



From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

Give to Each Principal Policy Officer the Freedom to Organize and Use Staff to Meet His Needs as He Sees Them.

The present office structure, which is comprised of an aggregate of desks, has been faulted for a lack of flexibility. Area maps and not needs have determined the organization and staffing of the offices.

Just as each President has his own style of doing business,⁹ so

⁹United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, an Interim Report submitted by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 4.

each Principal Policy Officer will have his own style of business. The Principal Policy Officer therefore has a need to adapt his office and procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style. This proposal suggests giving him wide latitude in organizing and staffing his office, applying those managerial principles which he feels are saliently appropriate to his special circumstances. Supposedly, routine tasks will be assigned to more junior personnel, while demanding tasks will be reserved for his personal action -- to each according to his ability (seniority?).

While agreeing that the Principal Policy Officer should be free to establish a flexible, simple unit that is responsive to his needs, an admonition concerning "empire building" seems appropriate. Budgetary limitations permitting, a tendency in the growth of offices may be expected, possibly creating a new layering problem. Personnel should be assigned only if they meet specific requirements of the job to be done. General Lauris Norstad has stated that in organizing an important planning office he used five colonels without staff divisions and thereby accomplished in a week work that would have taken six times that much time with a larger staff.¹⁰

Use Staff to Meet His Needs as He Sees Them.

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⁹United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Organization, Organization for National Security, an interim report submitted to the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 88th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 4.

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¹⁰United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, March 11, 22, and 25, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), part I.

The chart which follows depicts the organization of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs as it was until March, 1964, and two alternative structures. As proposed, the alternative structures do not fulfill the principle of the country team in Washington that has been previously discussed.

United States, Committee on Governmental Investigations,
Administration of National Security, hearings before the subcommittee
on National Security and Government, 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1957),
pages 11, 12, and 13, 1957 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957).

The chart which follows depicts the organization of the Office of
Central American and Caribbean Affairs as it was until March, 1964, and
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The chart which follows depicts the organization of the Office of
Central American and Caribbean Affairs as it was until March, 1964, and
two alternative proposals. As proposed, the alternative structure is
not in full view of the principle of the country team in Washington that has
been previously discussed.

CENTRAL AMERICAN AND PANAMANIAN AFFAIRS

Present Structure 1/

Director Deputy Director
Guatemala (FSO-3)
El Salvador (FSO-5)
Honduras (FSO-5)
Nicaragua (FSO-4)
Costa Rica (FSO-5)
Panama (FSO-3)

Examples of Alternative Structures

A		B	
Principal Policy Officer 2/	for	Principal Policy Officer 2/	for
Central American and Panamanian Affairs		Central American and Panamanian Affairs	
Guatemala	Country specialist (FSO-1 or 2) Foreign affairs officer (FSO-3 or 4) Junior officer	Guatemala	Country specialist (FSO-1 or 2) Foreign affairs officer (FSO-3 or 4) Junior officer
El Salvador		El Salvador	
Honduras		Honduras	
Nicaragua		Nicaragua	
Costa Rica	Country specialist (FSO-1 or 2) Junior officer	Costa Rica	Country specialist (FSO-1 or 2) Foreign affairs officer (FSO-3 or 4)
Panama		Panama	
Supporting Staff	Economic officer (FSO-3 or 4)	Supporting Staff	Economic officer (FSO-3 or 4) Junior officer

NOTE:

1/ Each country desk has one officer who performs all tasks related to his country.

NOTE:

2/ No deputy is proposed for the Principal Policy Officer. It is assumed that one of the country specialists would act for the Principal Policy Officer as necessary.

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

Initiate a One-Year Program for Phasing into the Principal Policy Officer Concept as Rapidly as Officers with Demonstrated Executive and Leadership Ability Are Available for Such Assignments.

This recommendation indicates that a master plan for the top structure of each bureau should be formulated by the regional Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, acting in concert. This plan should specify the number of Principal Policy Officers required, their names, and scheduled rotation dates. Exceptions should be made to normal tour of duty practices until all Principal Policy Officer positions are filled with those chosen.

Designate to Each Bureau One Alter Ego Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Other than an alter ego deputy, any deputy position in the chain of command constitutes a layer and should, for that reason, be subject to careful scrutiny. Any deputy between the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Policy Officer tends to diffuse responsibility and creates uncertainty in leadership. However, when the Assistant Secretary is out of his office or otherwise occupied, an alter ego deputy with full authority and responsibility would be useful. Such a deputy would not necessarily constitute an additional layer.

The present proliferation of Deputy Assistant Secretaries is a result of assigning this title to non-line, functional advisors -- a misnomer applied for purposes of prestige. There are, of course, a few line deputies, such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs, who supervise organizations concerned with other than country affairs, and whose existence does not denigrate the principle of country responsibility. However, the precedents which their existence creates can be kept within rational bounds only by the most disciplined

TRANSFERS & DEPUTY SECRETARIES FOR POLITICAL POLICY
OFFICE SECRETARY AS DEPUTY TO OFFICIALS WITH DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY ARE AVAILABLE FOR SUCH ASSIGNMENTS.

This recommendation indicates that a master plan for the assignment of such duties should be formulated by the regional assistant secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, acting in concert. This plan should specify the number of Political Policy Officers required, their names, and scheduled rotation dates. Assignments should be made on a general basis of only practicing until all Political Policy Officer positions are filled with those chosen.

REQUIREMENTS IN EACH REGION FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Other than an acting deputy, any deputy position in the chain of command constitutes a layer and should, for that reason, be subject to careful scrutiny. Any deputy between the Assistant Secretary and the Principal Policy Officer tends to dilute responsibility and creates uncertainty in leadership. However, when the Assistant Secretary is out of his office or otherwise occupied, an acting deputy with full authority and responsibility would be useful. Such a deputy would not necessarily constitute an additional layer.

The present provision of Deputy Assistant Secretaries is a result of assuming this title to non-line, functional positions -- a minimum applied for purposes of prestige. There may, of course, be few line deputies, such as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs, who represent organizations concerned with other than country affairs, and whose relations have not transcended the principle of country responsibility. However, the precedents which would exist in such cases can be kept within rational bounds only by the most disciplined

organizations. In the case of non-line Deputy Assistant Secretaries, the title suggests an involvement in the chain of command which is unwarranted and debases the use of the title until its prestige value is lost.

When present incumbencies are terminated, or better, as the Principal Policy Officer concept is initiated, non-line Deputy Assistant Secretaries should be given new titles, commensurate with their advisory functions, which are properly reflective of the prestige that is their due.

Restrict Functional Advisors, and All Other Officers Outside of the Direct Chain of Command, to Advisory and Liaison Roles and Reduce the Number of Those at the Bureau Level as the Principal Policy Officer Concept Is Phased into the Bureau Organization.

A misunderstanding of the role of the functional advisor is responsible for confusion in the bureau lines of authority and substantially contributes to delays in action. The purpose of the functional advisor is a staff function. Line officers should decide when to seek advice and how to use it. The need for specialist advisors varies among bureaus and among geographic areas within bureaus. In accordance with the idea of permitting the Principal Policy Officer the freedom to structure his own staff, he should determine the necessity for the type and number of functional advisors in his organization. After this is done, the essentiality of each bureau-level advisor should be scrutinized for possible elimination.

organization. In the case of a small unit, the organization
of the staff should be determined in the light of the nature of the
organization and the nature of the work which it performs.
In fact,

When a small organization is organized, the staff
should be organized in such a way as to be able to perform
the work which it performs. The staff should be organized
in such a way as to be able to perform the work which it
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Staff Organization
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
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Commentary

The preceding pages of this chapter have presented a detailed description of the methods by which the role of the country desk officer was to be enhanced. The principle of responsibility for action coupled with commensurate authority is recognized, but only a few mincing steps were suggested in placing that responsibility where it logically belongs. If the Principal Policy Officer were required to administer the relations of the United States with more than one country, no matter how quiescent the status of such relations might be, the "country team in Washington" counterpart of the embassy's country team is compromised in principle. Half measures are insufficient. If an overhaul of the Department's administrative procedures is to be undertaken, then that overhaul should be complete and in consonance with the concept that provides its basis.

The preceding pages of this report have presented a detailed description of the role of the country team officer and to be understood. The principle of responsibility for action coupled with commensurate authority is recognized, but only a few simple steps were suggested in placing that responsibility where it logically belongs. If the principal police officer were required to administer the relations of the United States with more than one country, no matter how disjunct the status of such relations might be, the "country team" is considered a concept of the embassy's country team is organized in principle. All countries are insufficient. If an overhaul of the Department's administrative procedures is to be undertaken, then that overhaul should be complete and in accordance with the concept that provides its basis.


Bureau of African Affairs



OM/MS-1/23/63

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).


Bureau of European Affairs



OM/MIS-1/23/63


From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs



From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).


Bureau of Inter-American Affairs



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Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).


Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs



OM/MS - 1/23/63

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus,
Office of Management, Department of State
(Washington: March 6, 1963).

Organization of



▶ A SENIORS AGENCY WITH THE DIRECTOR REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY AND SERVING AS FINANCIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT ON ALLS CONFINED AND DISAPPEARMENT

From Organizing for Action in the Regional Bureaus.
Office of Management, Department of State
Washington: March 19, 1940

CHAPTER IX

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED

A New Assistant Secretary

In December, 1963, after President Johnson had been in office for a decent interval, he announced the ensuing replacement of the Honorable Edwin M. Martin by the Honorable Thomas C. Mann in the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. At the same time, President Johnson designated Assistant Secretary Mann as Special Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs and Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress.

As Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, Assistant Secretary Mann was given the broad powers of an Assistant Administrator of A. I. D. This was the first step in the direction of fully integrating the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Bureau for Latin America, A. I. D.

As Special Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs, there lies a danger that a special relationship between Assistant Secretary Mann and the President might impinge on the relationship which should exist between the President and the Secretary of State. It is obligatory that the President should be careful not to ask a subordinate officer to handle independently tasks which fall within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. A situation of this nature could destroy the effectiveness of the Secretary of State.

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Reorganization

Just as the President reorganizes elements of the executive branch to accommodate his manner of conducting business, so Assistant Secretary Mann was afforded the opportunity of adapting the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to accommodate his idiosyncrasies. From January until March he discussed proposals for reorganization with the higher echelons of A. I. D., Office Directors, and country desk officers. He also studied those proposals suggested by the Office of Management. The organization which Assistant Secretary Mann decided upon was promulgated in March, 1964. While it goes farther toward the principle of one country desk officer per country than did the Office of Management Study, it does not proceed to the logical conclusion which that principle implies. Ten regional offices have replaced the seven previously extant. Panamanian Affairs were accorded a separate office because of the crisis in United States/Panamanian relations which occurred in January, 1964, while the reorganization plan was being developed.

Objectives

The reorganization had two objectives: (1) to place greater decision-making authority within the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Bureau for Latin America, A. I. D., and (2) to bring the staffs of the two Bureaus closer together in the interest of effective operations.¹

¹Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and Bureau for Latin America, A. I. D., Department of State, Organizational Information (Washington: Department of State, 1964), p. 1.

Just as the President requested elements of the executive branch to accommodate his manner of conducting business, so Assistant Secretary Ross was afforded the opportunity of suggesting the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to accommodate his instructions. From

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¹Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and Bureau for Latin America, A. I. U., Department of State, Organizational Instructions (Washington: Department of State, 1964), p. 1.

In order to accomplish these aims, the following steps have been taken:

The geographic desks of the two bureaus have been physically colocated.

Joint economic offices have been organized under the administration of a Deputy Assistant Secretary who is also designated as Deputy Assistant Administrator.

The Comprehensive Country Planning System has been installed in several Latin American Posts.

The New Office Director

The Office Directors have received new titles -- Directors of Country Affairs. They are to be the single focal point of authority and responsibility from which other government officials may request advice, information, and guidance in administering the sundry facets of any program in that country. A political, economic, and development staff is provided to support their efforts.

Office Reorganization

Recognizing that the Directors of Country Affairs, too, have their quirks in conducting business, they have been permitted to organize their offices, using personnel of the two Bureaus of Inter-American Affairs and Latin America, A. I. D., as they see fit to provide a flexibility in consonance with their personal working styles. Personnel of the two bureaus receive direction and supervision in their daily tasks from the Directors of Country Affairs, but continue to receive a modicum of guidance from their parent organizations.

Directors of Country Affairs are officers assigned indiscriminately from either of the two bureaus, ability to see the broad picture and excellence in performance being the criteria for such assignment. Their

in order to encourage them, the following steps have been

taken:

The geographic basis of the two bureaus have been physically separated.

Joint economic officers have been assigned under the administration of a primary assistant secretary who is also designated as primary assistant administrator.

The Geographic Division's planning system has been installed in several Latin American bureaus.

The New Office Division

The Office Division has received new status -- Director of Country Affairs. They are to be the single focal point of authority and responsibility from which all government officials may request advice, information, and guidance in administering the country's affairs of any program in that country. A political, economic, and general staff is provided to support this office.

Office Reorganization

Recognizing that the interests of Country Affairs, and, more particularly in contacting business, they have been permitted to organize their offices, using personnel of the two bureaus of Latin American Affairs and Latin America, A. I. B., as they see fit to provide a flexibility in connection with their personnel working styles. Personnel of the two bureaus receive direct and personal attention in their daily work from the Director of Country Affairs, but continue to receive assistance of guidance from their parent organizations.

Officers of Country Affairs are officers assigned indefinitely from either of the two bureaus, ability to see the local picture and excellence in performance being the criteria for such assignment. Their

staffs have been selected from the two bureaus on the same basis and are used interchangeably in handling peak work loads.

Layering

The reorganization, as promulgated, supposedly reduced layering of staff and states that Directors of Country Affairs report directly to the Assistant Secretary; Deputy Assistant Secretaries providing policy guidance in their respective areas of responsibility only, they will not need to pass on most papers.

In practice, it is apparent that layering has not been significantly reduced. Directors still have Deputy Directors, and the Assistant Secretary still has Deputy Assistant Secretaries. However, there is one Deputy Assistant Secretary who is an alter ego Deputy Assistant Secretary in every respect. Nevertheless, the proliferation of Deputy Assistant Secretaries has not reduced the problem of compound reviews on this level. The dual nature of State/A. I. D. affairs has only eliminated the problem of compound reviews and chasing concurrence in purely political, economic, or development policies. Other policy matters remain essentially as before.

Whither the Country Desk Officer

Brazilian, Panamanian, and Mexican affairs were considered sufficiently important and pressing to require their organization into separate offices. Elsewhere, country affairs are essentially managed by the same country desk officers described in the preceding pages. These country desk officers are still some seven or eight levels away from the Secretary of State. Excepting policy matters for three countries then, the problem of layering has not been significantly

staff have been selected from the best sources in the field and
are well indoctrinated in handling these cases.

Summary

The Commission, as previously mentioned, is composed of
of staff and secretaries who are all of the highest caliber
to the Commission's Secretary, who is a highly qualified person
policy guidance in their respective areas of responsibility only, they
will not need to pass on most papers.

In conclusion, it is pointed out that the Commission has not been significantly
reduced. The Commission will have Deputy Secretaries and the Assistant
Secretaries will be Deputy Assistant Secretaries. However, there is
one Deputy Assistant Secretary who is in direct contact with the Secretary
Secretary in every respect. Therefore, the Commission of Deputy
Assistant Secretaries has not reduced the problem of compound review
on this level. The dual nature of the U. S. Office has only
eliminated the problem of compound review and clearing committee in
policy, political, economic, or development policies. Other policy
matters remain essentially as before.

What the Commission Does

Planning, coordination, and review of the Commission's work
efficiency, improvement and planning to review their organization
and administrative offices. Moreover, the Commission is essentially
managed by the same country team officials mentioned in the preceding
pages. These country team officials are still seen from an eight
years ago and the Secretary of State. The Commission's policy matters for
these countries then, the problem of having has not been significantly

reduced. Policy problems for ninety-three other country desk officers remain the same.

The organizational charts printed on the following pages illustrate the combined Bureaus of Inter-American Affairs and Latin America, A. I. D. as they exist at this time and the organization of their several regional bureaus.

regional, policy guidelines, the study, three other country-level offices

remain the same.

The organizational chart placed in the following pages illustrates

the combined Bureau of Latin American Affairs and Latin America, A. I. U.

as they exist at this time and the organization of their several

regional bureaus.

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
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affairs, the Bureau of Latin American Affairs, the Bureau of Latin American

BUREAU OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
BUREAU OF LATIN AMERICA

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graph TD
    Sec[SECRETARY] --- Admin[ADMINISTRATOR]
    Sec --- AsstSec[ASSISTANT SECRETARY and U.S. COORDINATOR]
    AsstSec --- DepAsstSecEcon[DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ECONOMIC POLICY]
    AsstSec --- DepAsstSec[DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY]
    AsstSec --- DepAsstSecCoord[DEPUTY U.S. COORDINATOR]
    AsstSec --- DepAsstSecSocial[DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT]
    
    AsstSec --- SpecialAttache[SPECIAL ATTACHE]
    AsstSec --- SpecialAsst[Special Assistant for Policy Coordination]
    AsstSec --- CongStaff[CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS STAFF]
    
    AsstSec --- OfficeCoord[OFFICE OF U.S. COORDINATOR (CCA)]
    AsstSec --- PublicAffairs[Public Affairs Staff]
    AsstSec --- PublicInfo[Public Information Staff]
    AsstSec --- DevLegal[Development Legal Staff (DL)]
  
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


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
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OFFICE OF

BOLIVIAN - CHILEAN AFFAIRS



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William Dentzer

/S/

M. L. Spector

/S/

Rodger C. Abraham

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Secretary
Maryann Croghan
Deputy Director
Henri A. Weismann
Secretary
Mary F. Williams

Assistant Director
(Development)
Willy J. Feuerlein

ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS

Chief
Thomas D. Kingsley

POLITICAL
AFFAIRS

Chief
Harry Quinn

Secretary
Sobina Crane
Secretary
(vacancy)

DEVELOPMENT
AFFAIRS

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Northeast Development Officer
Sebastian J. Gionfriddo
Agriculture & Human Resources
Development Officer
Frances B. Johnson
Development Officers
Gerald Gower
Anne Mansfield
Joan Curello
Staff Assistant
Edward Campbell
Secretaries
Concettino Zizzo
Connie Bezella
Lorena Queen

APPROVED: /S/

Ralph Burton

/S/

M. L. Spector

/S/

Rodger C. Abraham

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OFFICE OF

CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS

Director
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Secretary
Jessie Reichard
Deputy Director
Richard E. Lippincott
Secretary
Emily Borchert

DOMINICAN
AFFAIRS

Chief
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Assistant Chief
Margaret Krantz
Secretary
Dianne Canter

HAITIAN
AFFAIRS

Chief
Elizabeth von Thurn
Assistant Chief
Patricia Price
Secretary
Barbara J. Wingard

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AFFAIRS

Chief
John R. Kanline
Assistant Chief
Leopold Laufer
Secretary
Amy Patterson

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AFFAIRS

Chief
Melvin E. Sinn
Assistant Chief
F. Brett Miller
Secretary
(Amy Patterson)

POLICY
PLANNING

Chief
Virgil P. Randolph
Secretary
Dorothy Dingman

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Kennedy Crockett

/S/

M. L. Spector

/S/

Rodger C. Abraham

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OFFICE OF

CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS

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Oliver L. Sause
Secretary
Beverly Persse
Deputy Director
John W. Fisher
Secretary
Adeline Guilbault
Assistant Director
(Development)
Henry Randall
Secretary
Frances LaSalle

COSTA RICAN
AFFAIRS

Chief - H. Franklin Irwin
Assistant Chief
Edward J. Nadeau
Secretary
Agnes Fitzgibbons

EL SALVADOR
AFFAIRS

Chief - Anthony J. Albrecht
Asst. Chief
Arthur Furnia
Secretary
Susan Klimecko

GUATEMALAN
AFFAIRS

Chief - (vacancy)
Assistant Chief
Grover Kincaid
Development Officer
James Lopes
Secretary
Doris Meeks

HONDURAN
AFFAIRS

Chief - Edward J. Rowell
Asst. Chief
Pauline Maddox
Secretary
Theresa Garland

NICARAGUAN
AFFAIRS

Chief - John M. McIntyre
Asst. Chief
(vacant)
Secretary
Sandra Irving

ROCAP
AFFAIRS

Chief - Lloyd Barber
Asst. Chief
Richard Herr
Development Officer
Fred Fisher
Secretary
Ruth Harrington

APPROVED:

/S/

Oliver Sause

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M. L. Spector

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
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/S/ M. L. Spector


/S/ Rodger C. Abraham

L/ Responsibility for AID programs in British Guinea and Surinam is exercised by this office. Mr. Arnesen is the point of contact.

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OFFICE OF

MEXICAN AFFAIRS

Director
Robert M. Sayre
Administrative Asst.
(vacant)
Secretary
Leota Roberts
Deputy Director
Harry Yoe
Secretary
Lois Caldwell

MEXICAN POLITICAL
AFFAIRS

Chief
Harry Bergold

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
& WATER COMMISSION
AFFAIRS

Chief
T. R. Martin

MEXICAN ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS

Chief
Richard Bloomfield

MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT
AFFAIRS

Chief
(vacant)

Secretary
Sarita McPeake

APPROVED: /S/

Robert M. Sayre

/S/

M. L. Spector


/S/

Rodger C. Abraham

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Department of State (Washington: March, 1964).

OFFICE OF

PANAMANIAN AFFAIRS



APPROVED: /s/

V. Lansing Collins

/s/

M. L. Spector

/s/

Rodger C. Abraham

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Department of State (Washington: March, 1964).

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

From the evidence presented in the preceding pages, it can be determined that the present country desk officer's role in major policy decisions is more myth than reality. His position is best described by using familiar naval terminology -- he is analgous to a ship's navigator. The desk officer recommends courses which his commanding officer (Director of Country Affairs) and his commodore (Assistant Secretary) may or may not follow, depending on their assessment of the proposed course and their inclinations.

If the country desk officer possesses a strong personality and his Director of Country Affairs has a weaker personality, the strength of his character may serve to impose his views in policy matters. Likewise, each paper drafted by the country desk officer can easily be slanted, emphasizing his views and belittling or omitting opposing viewpoints. Their acceptance wholly or "cum grano salis" by the Director of Country Affairs and other higher authority is dependent upon a personal relationship -- the measure of trust and confidence which senior officials place in the country desk officer.

In spite of the clear recognition of the problem by Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Harriman, and other senior Department of State officials, only a few steps have been taken toward the reduction of layering. Has the bureaucracy captured these supreme arbiters of

policy? Some ninety-three country desk officers still remain seven or eight levels down from the Secretary.

It seems logical to me, as has been suggested, that the elimination of layering is a desirable method of making better, more responsible policy. Either the Office Director (Director of Country Affairs, ARA/LA) in his present form (Brazil, Panama, and Mexico Offices exempted) should be eliminated, or the country desk officer in his present form should be excised. Personally, I believe that the interests of the nation could best be served in the creation of a separate office for each country in order to carry the country team in Washington concept to its logical conclusion. These Office Directors should be of the grade of CAREER MINISTER/PSO-1, with commensurate experience and proven capability in administering the affairs of their client countries -- real counterparts of the ambassador and his country team. If a country is sufficiently important to the United States as to require an ambassador and a supporting team, then a counterpart country team in Washington is a logical conclusion.

policy. Low administrative costs are essential to the success of the program.

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